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RE-THINKING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE:  
THE PROSECUTION OF POLITICAL LEADERS IN THE ARAB REGION 






The dramatic uprisings that ousted the long-standing leaders of several 
countries in the Arab region have set in motion an unprecedented period of social, 
political and legal transformation. The Arab Spring uprisings saw criminal 
prosecutions in the Arab region take centre stage in the pursuit of transitional justice. 
Through a comparative case study of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, this thesis 
presents a critique of mainstream transitional justice theory. This theory is built on 
the underlying assumption that transitions constitute a shift from non-liberal to 
liberal democratic regimes, where measures – often legal – are taken to address 
atrocities committed during the prior regime. By examining the factors that 
triggered, drove and shaped decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders 
in the four case studies, this thesis will enhance our understanding of how 
transitional justice is pursued in varied contexts. The findings of this research 
therefore build on the growing literature that claims that transitional justice is an 
under-theorised field and needs to be developed to take into account non-liberal and 
complex transitions. 
I argue that transitional justice in the Arab region presents the strongest 
challenge yet to the transitional justice paradigm, which presumes a shift from 
violent, non-liberal rule to peaceful, liberal-democratic rule. There are four parts to 
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this argument. First, the non-paradigmatic nature of the Arab region transitions, 
whereby a renewed form of repressive, non-liberal rule has largely taken shape, 
warrants a re-thinking of transitional justice and its pursuit in various contexts. 
Second, the Arab region cases demonstrate that both domestic and international 
actors pursue competing accountability agendas, thereby weakening claims of a 
global accountability norm. Third, the emphasis these cases place on accountability 
for corruption and socio-economic crimes as opposed to civil and political rights 
violations underline the need to develop transitional justice theory. The limited 
content and extent of the investigations and prosecutions in the four case studies are 
driven by the controlled nature of the transitions and point to a practice of 
scapegoating certain high-level officials and a certain set of crimes to show that there 
has been a break with the former regime. Finally, a re-thinking of transitional justice 
needs to take into account the absence of pre-existing democratic structures and what 
this means for criminal accountability prospects in non-paradigmatic transitional 
contexts.   
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CHAPTER 1 | INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
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The dramatic uprisings that ousted the long-standing leaders of several 
countries in the Arab region have set in motion an unprecedented period of social, 
political and legal transformation. Prosecutions of former leaders and other high-
ranking government officials have emerged as the single most pursued route of 
transitional justice - something which was almost non-existent prior to the uprisings 
in the Arab region.1 Hosni Mubarak and other officials of his regime were tried for 
corruption and human rights violations in Egypt, Zine El Abidine Ben Ali and other 
former regime members were tried for similar charges in Tunisia, and Libya issued 
its first verdicts in July 2015 for the trial of thirty-seven former regime officials 
including Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, son of former Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.2 
Yemeni activists have been struggling to reverse – or work around - the immunity 
law passed to protect former president Ali Abdallah Saleh and his aides from 
prosecution.3 
Globally, the number of prosecutions of political leaders has increased 
significantly in the last two decades. Between 1990 and 2008, sixty-seven heads of 
state from forty-three countries were charged or indicted with serious criminal 
offenses.4  Political and military leaders in Latin America, Europe, Africa, and Asia 
have been put on trial for massive human rights violations and for corruption. Latin 
America in particular has seen leaders in Argentina, Chile, and Peru face 
prosecutions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Exceptions include the trial of former Iraqi president Saddam Hussein. 
2 To avoid confusion, I will refer to both Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Muammar Gaddafi by their full 
names throughout this thesis. 
3 Law No. 1 of 2012 Concerning the Granting of Immunity from Legal and Judicial Prosecution, 
2 To avoid confusion, I will refer to both Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Muammar Gaddafi by their full 
names throughout this thesis. 
3 Law No. 1 of 2012 Concerning the Granting of Immunity from Legal and Judicial Prosecution, 
translated from Arabic to English by Amnesty International in Yemen’s Immunity Law – Breach of 
International Obligations (March 2012) <www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/2012-03-
30mde310072012enyemenimmunitylaw.pdf> accessed 10 July 2015. 
4 Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger (eds), Prosecuting Heads of State (CUP 2009) 12. 
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This phenomenon has been described as a “justice cascade” that largely 
originated in Latin America and reverberated worldwide, leading to an increase in 
universal jurisdiction laws.5 This wave of trials and legal transformations is also 
referred to as the ‘Pinochet Effect,’ following one of the most notorious attempted 
prosecutions of former political leader, General Augusto Pinochet, who led Chile 
from 1973-1990.6 The emergence of the prosecution of political leaders in the Arab 
region, however, remains a largely unexplored area of this rising trend of individual 
criminal accountability for political leaders.   
The Arab Spring saw criminal prosecutions in the Arab region take centre 
stage in the pursuit of transitional justice, albeit to varying degrees in every country.7  
Through a comparative case study of Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, this thesis 
presents a critique of mainstream transitional justice theory. This theory is built on 
the underlying assumption that transitions constitute a shift from non-liberal to 
liberal-democratic regimes, where measures – often legal – are taken to address 
atrocities committed during the prior regime.8 The findings of this research therefore 
build on the growing critical literature that claims that transitional justice is an 
under-theorised field and needs to be developed to take into account non-liberal and 
complex transitions.9 The ways in which criminal prosecutions of former political 
leaders have been used in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen provide insight that has 
an important bearing on the predominantly liberal understandings of transitional 
justice.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Ellen Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human 
Rights Trials in Latin America’ (2001) 2 Chicago Journal of International Law 1, 5. 
6 Naomi Roht-Arriaza, The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights 
(University of Pennsylvania Press 2005). 
7 The term ‘Arab Spring’ refers to the mass anti-government uprisings that took place in 2010 and 
2011 in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria. 
8 See, for instance, Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (OUP 2000) and Ruti G. Teitel, Globalizing 
Transitional Justice: Essays for the New Millennium (OUP 2014). 
9 I review the critical transitional justice scholarship in the Literature Review section of this chapter.	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Summary of Arguments 
 
I argue that transitional justice in the Arab region presents the strongest 
challenge yet to the transitional justice paradigm, which presumes a shift from 
violent, non-liberal rule to peaceful, liberal-democratic rule. There are four parts to 
this argument. First, the non-paradigmatic nature of the Arab region transitions, 
whereby a renewed form of repressive, non-liberal rule has largely taken shape, 
warrants a re-thinking of transitional justice and its pursuit in various contexts. 
Second, the Arab region cases demonstrate that both domestic and international 
actors pursue competing accountability agendas, thereby weakening claims of a 
global accountability norm. Third, the emphasis on accountability for corruption and 
socio-economic crimes as opposed to civil and political rights violations underline 
the need to develop transitional justice theory. The limited content and extent of the 
investigations and prosecutions in the four case studies are driven by the controlled 
nature of the transitions and point to a practice of scapegoating certain high-level 
officials and a certain set of crimes to avoid the prosecution of others and to show 
that there has been a break with the former regime. Finally, a re-thinking of 
transitional justice needs to take into account the absence of pre-existing democratic 
structures and what this means for criminal accountability prospects in non-
paradigmatic transitional contexts.  
The term ‘transitional justice’ is used in this thesis to describe the processes 
that actors take to address past atrocities. Actors include the state, civil society, 
victims, the military, individual lawyers, politicians, and the judiciary.10  Transitional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Chapters 3 and 4 contain a more detailed explanation of the various actors involved in driving and 
shaping transitional justice processes.	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justice processes include a range of mechanisms, such as domestic and international 
prosecutions, institutional reform, vetting, reparations and truth commissions. This 
thesis, however, focuses on decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders in 
order to ensure a focused comparison between the four country case studies. The 
focus on prosecutions is also driven by the centrality of prosecutions in the pursuit of 
transitional justice in the Arab region. Together with domestic prosecutions, this 
thesis also takes into account the role of international actors in shaping transitional 
justice decisions, especially within the context of the International Criminal Court’s 
(ICC) involvement in Libya and the role of international actors in negotiating an 
immunity law in Yemen.  
This thesis, then, does not aim to define what is meant by the term ‘justice.’ 
Instead, the term ‘transitional justice’ is used primarily in reference to the tools 
pursued by various actors in the four case studies with a view to establishing 
criminal accountability for past atrocities. It is important to note, however, that this 
thesis does not seek to determine whether certain transitional justice mechanisms 
such as prosecutions or truth commissions should or should not be implemented. 
Rather, this thesis provides a critical inquiry of the liberal assumptions of the 
transitional justice paradigm and calls for a re-thinking of transitional justice theory 
and practice.  
Research Questions 
 
This thesis addresses two interrelated questions. First, it examines the factors 
that led to decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders in Egypt, Libya, 
Tunisia and Yemen. The term ‘political leaders’ here includes heads of state, former 
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ministers, and other high-ranking government officials. 11  Second, the thesis 
considers why there has been an emphasis on corruption and socio-economic crimes 
over civil and political rights crimes in the investigations and trials that have already 
taken place. The thesis addresses the first question by examining the trigger and 
driving factors that led to the decision to prosecute and not to prosecute. It addresses 
the second question by exploring the shaping factors that affect the content and 
extent of decisions regarding prosecution. By content I mean the types of charges 
and accusations in the investigations and trials. By extent I mean the selection of 
individuals who were prosecuted and/or investigated. 
Significance of the Thesis 
 
The significance of this research is five-fold. First, this thesis provides a 
critique of transitional justice literature that is overwhelmingly based on the 
understanding that transitional justice occurs in liberalising contexts. Laurel E. 
Fletcher and Harvey Weinstein note that the most influential transitional justice 
scholarship tests, applies, evaluates or theorises the “accepted transitional justice 
paradigm” and largely falls short of questioning the “foundational assumptions of the 
field.”12 This thesis aims to address this shortcoming of the field. It does so through 
a critique largely based on findings from field interviews on the prosecution of 
political leaders in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen between 2012 and 2014 and on 
scholarly texts. Most criminal prosecutions in the Arab Spring countries have dealt 
almost exclusively with crimes of the transition as opposed to crimes during the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Methodology section in Chapter 2 for an explanation for why the term ‘political leaders’ 
encompasses these individuals.	  
12 Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. Weinstein, ‘Writing Transitional Justice: An Empirical 
Evaluation of Transitional Justice Scholarship in Academic Journals’ [2015] Journal of Human Rights 
Practice 1 <http://jhrp.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/05/17/jhuman.huv006.abstract> 
accessed 15 July 2015. 
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decades of repressive rule prior to the political transitions. Moreover, most of the 
complaints and charges to date have had to do with corruption and financial crimes, 
as opposed to human rights violations. The reasons behind this duality of charges are 
unclear in the literature on the prosecution of political leaders. Scholars such as Ellen 
Lutz and Caitlin Reiger have flagged this as an area that requires closer attention.13  
Most scholarly research focuses on the outcome of the decision to prosecute 
and not to prosecute, without examining the shape that these decisions take as a 
result of the processes they emerge from and the contexts within which they unfold. 
The emphasis on corruption and socio-economic crimes in the investigations and 
trials that have taken place in the Arab region therefore warrants a closer 
examination. These practices have profound implications for the study of transitional 
justice because they weaken long-standing scholarly assumptions of the liberalising 
directions of transitions and of transitional justice.  
Second, an inquiry into efforts to prosecute in the past – before the 2010/2011 
Arab Spring uprisings – is necessary in order to understand the development and 
execution of the prosecutorial strategy in the four countries after the uprisings. Such 
an inquiry provides insight into the formative stages of these decision-making 
processes. Instead of judging the prosecutions and the decisions related to them 
solely on their outcome, the trigger-driving-shaping prism serves to explain the data 
collected and ensures a focus on the very making of these decisions.14 For example, 
while many would label the Mubarak and Ben Ali trials in Egypt and Tunisia as 
show trials or politicised trials that fell short of ensuring justice, this conclusion does 
not take into account the complex factors and the relationship between these factors 
that formed the processes leading up to the prosecutions. An inquiry into the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Lutz and Reiger (n 4) 280-282.	  
14 The trigger-driving-shaping mechanism is derived from process tracing and is explained in the 
Methodology section in Chapter 2. 
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formative stages of decisions regarding prosecutions, then, reveals that a variety of 
factors and actors shaped the decisions. As a result, attributing unfair trials to one 
factor such as a politicised and weak judiciary falls short of a more comprehensive 
explanation. Such simplistic inferences fail to take into account other significant 
factors such as the nature of the transition, civil society, the role of international 
actors, legal challenges, and so on that shaped transitional justice across the four 
countries. It is these factors that the research conducted for this thesis aims to 
identify and explain. 
Third, the four case studies are examples of the need to examine whose 
interests transitional justice serves and what these interests are, as Thomas Obel 
Hansen suggests.15 Such an analysis is important for the deconstruction of the use 
and abuse of transitional justice in varied political contexts.  The role of the 
judiciary, the military, civil society, and of interim governments is taken into account 
when addressing the use of transitional justice mechanisms. By examining the 
factors that triggered, drove and shaped decisions regarding the prosecution of 
political leaders in the four case studies, this thesis will enhance our understanding 
of how transitional justice is pursued in such non-paradigmatic contexts. The 
findings of this research therefore build on the growing literature that claims that 
transitional justice is an under-theorised field and needs to be developed to take into 
account non-liberal and complex transitions.  
This thesis does not attempt to propose a new theory of transitional justice. 
Rather, it seeks to challenge the predominant transitional justice paradigm, generally 
understood as a set of mechanisms to address past atrocities through the use of 
judicial and non-judicial measures, by arguing that it falls short in explaining non-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory,’ (2011) 13 Oregon 
Review of International Law 1, 2-3. 
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paradigmatic transitions. The Arab region case studies herein present a strong 
challenge to the existing theory of transitional justice, which is rooted in liberal and 
hence non-universal values. 
 Fourth, the timing of this research and of the questions asked in every 
interview conducted across the four countries is crucial. This thesis analyses the 
details of the early stages of decisions regarding prosecution from actors who were 
directly and indirectly involved in the prosecutions.  As time passes, memory of such 
details will wane, as was the case in Latin America and other parts of the world. I 
refer to what Kathryn Sikkink coins as the “frailties of human memory”:16  
When I first started the research for this book, I wracked my brains for a 
memory of the first time one of the activists from Argentina or Uruguay 
mentioned the possibility of prosecuting state officials for human rights 
violations, and I could not pinpoint the moment. Surely Emilio Mignone or 
Juan Mendez, each immersed in the human rights legal culture of the time, 
was already talking about prosecutions in 1981? Emilio Mignone died in 
1998, and I can no longer rely on his impeccable memory. Juan Mendez 
can’t pinpoint the moment, either…For almost two years I was part of a 
network that later became a main advocate for individual criminal 
prosecution, and yet I cannot identify the instant when the idea first appeared 
and started to flourish. So, my research began as a kind of detective work to 
locate the sources of the ideas and practices that I would later call the “justice 
cascade.”17  
 
By conducting this research shortly after the investigations and trials began, I 
avoided having to pick at the vague memories of those I interviewed. Instead, I was 
able to draw a clearer and more accurate picture of what happened while the 
memories were still fresh. The novelty of the trials, then, serves as an advantage for 
valuable research into the emergence of individual criminal accountability in a 
region that is new to it.  
Finally, the context of the Arab countries and their transitions are 
fundamentally different from previous studies on countries in other regions. Factors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 Kathryn Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World 
Politics (WW Norton 2011) 11. 
17 ibid 10-11. 
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that have played an important role in countries in Latin America, such as 
international and regional human rights mechanisms and the use of universal 
jurisdiction laws may not be as relevant to the Arab region.18 Moreover, transitional 
justice literature traditionally regards a transition as one that constitutes a shift from 
an authoritarian regime to a liberal-democratic regime.19  The case studies analysed 
by this thesis challenge these presumptions of paradigmatic liberal transitions, as 
serious questions regarding the absence of a liberal change are ubiquitous in the 
analyses of the Arab Spring.  
Structure of the Thesis 
 
 This chapter has introduced the research objectives of this thesis and has 
explained their significance. The next section provides an overview of the relevant 
literature within which the thesis is situated. Chapter 2 will then explain the 
methodology and case selection. It will also introduce the case studies by presenting 
the status of prosecutions in each country. Chapter 3 will present the findings from 
the interviews conducted across the four case studies. It is organised by country and 
themes and sub-themes within each case study. The chapter concludes with a 
summary of the key triggers, drivers and shapers that impacted decisions regarding 
prosecution. It therefore lays the foundation for the subsequent chapter, which 
reflects on these findings. Chapter 4, then, provides a critique of mainstream 
transitional justice theory with a focus on prosecutions. Using scholarly literature 
and the findings generated from interviews in each of the four case studies as 
presented in Chapter 3, this chapter challenges the predominant understanding that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 Tunisia, however, benefited significantly from universal jurisdiction laws in pre-transition 
prosecution efforts, as explained in Chapter 3.	  
19 Ruti G. Teitel, Transitional Justice (OUP 2000).	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transitional justice uniformly occurs in liberalising contexts.20 The findings of this 
research therefore build on the growing literature that claims that transitional justice 
is an under-theorised field and needs to be developed to take into account non-liberal 
and complex transitions. The concluding chapter summarises the findings and 





The practice of transitional justice includes a number of judicial and non-
judicial measures, usually in the form of criminal prosecutions, vetting, truth 
commissions, reparations and other national reconciliation methods. Kirsten J. Fisher 
and Robert Stewart define transitional justice as “the study and practice of trying to 
establish principled justice after atrocity by employing a range of approaches, 
including both judicial and non-judicial measures, to help address a legacy of mass 
human rights abuses.”21 Trials are usually at the forefront of transitional justice 
mechanisms and serve as a strong symbol of a break with the former regime. Some 
argue that transitional justice is under-theorised, as it is increasingly unable to 
explain its divergent objectives in varied contexts.22 Others, such as Paige Arthur, 
argue that there is no single theory or definition of transitional justice.23 In their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 As I explain shortly in the literature review, the predominance of this understanding is starting to 
diminish with the emergence of the critical scholarship on transitional justice. However, the classical 
transitional justice paradigm, which assumes a shift from authoritarian to liberal democratic rule, still 
holds significant ground and remains the principal point of reference from which analyses of varied 
transitional contexts are formed. 
21 Kirsten J. Fisher and Robert Stewart (eds), Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring (Routledge 
2014) 1. 
22 See Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Teresa Koloma Beck, Christian Braun and Friederike Mieth (eds), 
Transitional Justice Theories (Routledge 2014).	  
23 Paige Arthur, ‘How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
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analysis of transitional justice scholarship between 2003 and 2008, Fletcher and 
Weinstein highlight that transitional justice is interdisciplinary and note that:  
Law, political science, and sociology are the disciplines that dominated the 
field as reflected in academic journals. The most influential transitional 
justice articles in the social sciences and law suggested that readers were 
drawn to scholarly treatments that theorized the field or were analytical in 
nature. Scholars were wrestling with basic questions with regard to what 
transitional justice is and how it works.24 
 
Few scholars, then, have questioned the foundational assumptions of transitional 
justice.25 
This section presents a literature review of transitional justice scholarship 
since the early 1990s, when the field came to fruition following the fall of military 
dictatorships in Latin America. Given the research objective of this thesis, the review 
of the literature focuses on the role of criminal prosecutions and does not delve into 
commentary on the various other mechanisms of transitional justice, such as truth 
commissions, reparations, and vetting. I first provide an overview of the tenets of 
mainstream transitional justice theory. This is followed by the corresponding 
critiques of this theory. Third, I review the discussions and debates on accountability 
for socio-economic and corruption crimes. Fourth, I analyse the accounts of the role 
of international and domestic factors as drivers of decisions regarding the 
prosecution of political leaders. Finally, I include a brief review of the emerging 
scholarship on transitional justice in the Arab region. Reflections on how my 
findings from the Arab region case studies challenge, confirm, and build upon the 
existing literature are presented in Chapter 4. 
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Mainstream Transitional Justice Theory: A liberalising process  
 
Transitional justice scholarship is a rapidly evolving field that has become 
increasingly interdisciplinary, drawing contributions from legal scholars, political 
scientists, historians, sociologists and practitioners. The term ‘transitional justice’ 
was coined in the early 1990s during discussions regarding post-conflict justice 
following the fall of the Soviet Union and the transitions to democracy in Latin 
America in the 1980s. 26  Neil J. Kritz’s three volumes on transitional justice, 
published in 1995, in many ways set the stage for further scholarship on the 
dilemmas of what became known as transitional justice in various parts of the 
world. 27  Ruti Teitel’s seminal work on transitional justice in 2000 laid the 
foundations of transitional justice theory and highlighted it as a process of 
liberalisation.28 Here, I outline the tenets of mainstream transitional justice theory as 
presented by Teitel and other prominent transitional justice scholars, followed by 
critiques of the transitional justice paradigm. 
Teitel’s account of transitional justice is built on the underlying assumption 
that transitions constitute a shift from authoritarian, non-liberal regimes to liberal-
democratic regimes.29 Measures – often legal – are taken to address atrocities 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26 William Schabas, ‘Transitional Justice and the Norms of International Law’ (Annual meeting of the 
Japanese Society of International Law, Kwansei Gakuin University, 8 October 2011) 
<www.jsil.jp/annual_documents/2011/fall/schabas_trans_just911.pdf> accessed 15 July 2015. Teitel 
explains when she first coined the term: “…during the late eighties, at the time of the Soviet collapse, 
I introduced the term ‘transitional justice’ on the heels of the Latin American transitions away from 
military rule.  In proposing this term, my aim was to account for the self-conscious contingent 
construction of a distinctive conception of justice associated with periods of radical political change 
after past oppressive rule.” Ruti G. Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Essays for the New 
Millennium (OUP 2014) xii. 
27 Neil J. Kritz (ed), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former Regimes 
(Vols. 1-3 USIP 1995). 
28 Teitel, Transitional Justice (n 19). 
29 ibid; Ruti Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Essays for the New Millennium (OUP 2014). 
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committed during the prior regime.30 Recognising the extraordinary role of law in 
transitions and the thin line between fair prosecutions and politicised justice, Teitel 
describes transitional justice as:  
[C]ontextualized and partial: It is both constituted by, and constituted of, 
the transition.  What is ‘just’ is contingent, and informed by prior 
injustice….While the rule of law ordinarily implies prospectivity, 
transitional law is both backward-and forward-looking, as it disclaims past 
illiberal values and reclaims liberal norms.31  
 
Teitel attributes criminal justice to this “liberalizing ritual” of states undergoing 
political transition and explains that criminal proceedings affirm “the core liberal 
message of the primacy of individual rights and responsibilities.”32 She emphatically 
denotes the significant role of criminal prosecutions as the “leading transitional 
response” that is able to publicly and authoritatively convey “the political differences 
that constitute the normative shift from an illiberal to a liberal regime.”33 While Teitel 
begins with a caveat mentioning that her book rejects “the notion that the move 
toward a more liberal democratic political system implies a universal or ideal norm,” 
she provides no explanation for how transitional justice operates in non-paradigmatic, 
illiberal transitions. Instead, she provides an analysis of the role of law in transitions, 
or in times of political change:  
The aim here is to shift the focus away from the traditional political criteria 
associated with liberalizing change to take account of other practices, 
particularly the nature and role of legal phenomena.  The constructivist 
approach proposed by this book suggests a move away from defining 
transitions purely in terms of democratic procedures, such as electoral 
processes, toward a broader inquiry into other practices signifying 
acceptance of liberal democracy and the rule-of-law.34  
 
Teitel’s point of departure, then, is rooted in transitions constituting a shift from 
authoritarian rule to liberal democratic rule.  
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31 Teitel, Transitional Justice (n 19) 96. 
32 ibid 30. 
33 ibid 104. 
34 ibid 5. 
	   26	  
The Necessity of Pre-Existing Democratic Institutions 
 
Teitel underlines the necessity of already existing democratically functioning 
institutions in order to avoid politicised justice and unfair trials during a transition.35 
Similarly, Lutz and Reiger argue that “accountability, by itself, is neither sufficient 
nor possible absent other functioning democratic institutions, including an 
independent judiciary…”36 Luc Huyse argues that the democratic institutions that 
existed prior to the four years of repressive rule in Belgium, France and the 
Netherlands were able to survive and were not completely eliminated following 
World War II. This meant that “four years of occupation and collaboration were 
insufficient time for the authoritarian regime’s legal culture and codes to take 
root.”37 This may, as Huyse suggests, explain the speed with which prosecutions 
were initiated.38 In contrast, communist regimes in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and 
Poland had lasted for 40 years after World War II. This meant that decision-making 
on crime and punishment was much slower and “[t]he legal culture created by 
communism was firmly established and [proved] hard to eradicate.”39 
Related to this argument is whether prosecutions strengthen or weaken 
fragile transitions to democracy. Many of the discussions in Kritz’s volume question 
whether democratic consolidation is best pursued through reconciliation and amnesty 
laws as opposed to prosecutions, given the potentially “destabilizing effects of 
politically charged trials.”40 This, however, assumes that the intention in both 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 ibid 30. 
36 Lutz and Reiger (n 4) 4. 
37 Luc Huyse, ‘Justice After Transitions: On the Choices Successor Elites Make in Dealing with the 
Past’ in Neil J. Kritz (ed), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with Former 
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38 ibid. 
39 ibid.	  
40 Diane Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a Prior 
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scenarios is democratic consolidation, which as will be discussed in Chapter 3 and in 
the context of the Arab region, is not necessarily the case.  
As a result of these dilemmas, prosecutions take time.  Elin Skaar’s nuanced 
account of the developments within the Argentinian judiciary and their relation to 
the variations in trials over time is helpful in understanding the role of institutional 
reform in facilitating fair criminal prosecutions.41 In the case of Argentina, Skaar 
argues that the initial absence of trials in the immediate aftermath of the transition 
was in part due to the ruling elite’s preferences, but also to politically biased courts. 
There was a failure on the part of executives to address human rights violations for 
fear of military retaliation or for lack of political will, which played an important 
part in the absence of trials. However, as Skaar explains, “the lack of justice at the 
time of transition [is also a result of] weak and often partisan courts that favored 
whoever was in power, including the military.”42 As the judiciary in Argentina 
became increasingly independent, the number of prosecutions of former leaders also 
increased. 
Transition Type and the Likelihood of Prosecutions 
 
One of the arguments scholars often make regarding the relationship between 
the type of transition and the likelihood of prosecutions concerns ‘ruptured’ versus 
‘pacted’ or ‘negotiated’ transitions.43 The argument goes that in ruptured transitions, 
where dramatic coups and mass demonstrations succeed in overthrowing the regime, 
prosecutions are more likely to take place than in transitions that are carefully 
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Sikkink, The Justice Cascade: How Human Rights Prosecutions are Changing World Politics (WW 
Norton 2011).	  
	   28	  
negotiated, such as the ruptura pactada in Spain and the pacted transitions of 
Uruguay and Brazil. This is because in negotiated transitions, bargaining is likely to 
take place between the outgoing elites (usually a military dictatorship) and the 
incoming elites, who often negotiate agreements on amnesties or other ways of 
barring prosecution. Ruptured transitions, on the other hand, leave less room for such 
negotiation and result in a more drastic change in the political scene.44  
Samuel Huntington breaks down these types of transitions further by placing 
them in three categories: transformations, replacements and transplacements. 
Transformations occur when the authoritarian regime in power wields great control 
in its transformation toward a democratic system, as in the case of Brazil.45 
Prosecutions are unlikely in this kind of transition. Transplacements occur when the 
outgoing government negotiates with the opposition the terms of the transition, 
making prosecutions only slightly more likely. Replacements, on the other hand, are 
ruptured transitions whereby the old regime is replaced through a coup or civil war, 
resulting in a much higher possibility for prosecutions to take place.  
Differences between negotiated and ruptured transitions and the resulting 
decisions regarding the prosecution of former leaders are striking in the cases of 
Spain, Portugal and Greece. Sikkink compares these three countries, as does Antonio 
Costa Pinto with Spain and Portugal. Spain, where General Francisco Franco’s 
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regime did not collapse with his death in 1975 but instead went through a negotiated 
transition to democracy, has experienced no trials to this day despite large-scale 
atrocities committed during Franco’s rule. Portugal and Greece, on the other hand, 
experienced ruptured transitions that saw some trials take place in the immediate 
aftermath of the overthrows.46 As Pinto points out, “Portugal and Spain are two 
paradigmatic cases of transition to democracy in the 1970s. The presence in the 
former and absence in the latter of transitional justice measures is doubtless linked to 
the nature of the process of rupture in Portugal and of ruptura pactada in the case of 
Spain…”47 
In the case of an overthrow of a leader, then, the likelihood of prosecutions is 
high. Huyse argues that in such cases, “[a]lmost no political limits exist. Full priority 
can be given to the thirst for justice and retribution.” 48  On the other hand, 
prosecutions are unlikely to take place where a compromise-based transition has 
unfolded. This, Huyse continues, is largely because former regime members and 
forces still hold enough power and control to be able “to dictate the terms of the 
transition,” which often includes an amnesty law. 49  “The need to avoid 
confrontation,” Huyse observes, “becomes the rationale for exchanging criminal 
prosecution and severe lustration for a policy of forgiveness.”50  
The absence of any substantial discussion in the literature on the role of 
geopolitics in shaping domestic decisions regarding prosecution is noteworthy. 
Given that Huyse and others’ observations are largely based on the experiences of 
Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe, this is perhaps not surprising. The 
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Arab region cases and the role of geopolitics in certain countries there, however, 
present questions that diversify the ‘nature of transition type’ discussions in the 
existing literature.51 
Skaar contributes to the debate on transition type in her observations on 
amnesty laws and the pursuit of non-judicial measures in various transitions. She 
argues that negotiated transitions often result in amnesty laws that prevent the 
prosecution of political leaders and instead result in truth commissions and other 
non-legal measures. Skaar adds that, “Only where there was an explicit military 
defeat – in Argentina – was it considered politically possible to even suggest holding 
the military to account…”52 Par Engstrom and Gabriel Pereira make a similar 
observation, while also underlining the role of the gradual return of the military to 
the barracks. They contend that the changing character of civil-military relations 
shaped transitional justice in Argentina.53 The gradual retreat of the military from 
political power “provided a propitious context for ambitious attempts to hold 
military and police personnel accountable for their crimes.  The contrast with other 
regional countries, such as Brazil for example, is striking in this regard.”54 Thus, the 
case of Argentina illustrates that even in situations where a ruptured transition took 
place, time is needed for the consolidation of the political transition itself and, as 
Skaar outlines, for the judiciary to establish its independence in order to adequately 
carry out prosecutions. 
Despite, or perhaps in response to, the dichotomous approach in the early 
transitional justice literature that contrasts ruptured and negotiated transitions, 
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commentary on prosecution decisions in transitions that do not neatly fall within 
those two categories almost simultaneously began to emerge. Jose Zalaquett, for 
example, points to lingering political constraints, even in cases where a democratic 
election has taken place. In his discussion on Argentina, he contends that “[T]he 
government may have had the legitimacy of a democratic election, but the military 
remained a cohesive force with control over the weapons.”55 Zalaquett attributes this 
to the initial failure of the Argentinian authorities to continue to carry out 
prosecutions of military chiefs. It points to an ethical dilemma undergirding 
decisions regarding prosecution. Zalaquett quotes Max Weber in his explanation of 
this dilemma: 
In ambiguous transitional situations, dealing with past human rights 
violations is indeed a wrenching ethical and political problem…The 
approach of democratic leaders in such difficult transitional situations 
should, then, be based on the ethical maxim that Max Weber lucidly 
characterized in his famous lecture, Politics as a Vocation: Political leaders 
should be guided by the ethic of responsibility, as opposed to the ethics of 
conviction…He stressed the fundamental difference between acting 
according to an ethical precept regardless of the outcome, and acting while 
considering the predictable consequences of one’s action. In Weber’s view, 
politicians must always be guided by an ethic of responsibility.56  
 
Ambiguous transitions, then, are not a new phenomenon that arose out of the Arab 
Spring experiences. The classic case of Argentina and several other Latin American 
countries point to the shortcomings of the ruptured versus negotiated transition 
argument. This is especially the case when analysing the course of decisions 
regarding prosecution over time. Sikkink correctly notes that as the examples of 
Guatemala, Chile and Uruguay show, “a ruptured transition was no longer a 
precondition for prosecutions.”57 In fact, it may have never been a precursor to 
prosecutions, as the case of Argentina in the early post-transition period shows. 
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Moreover, countries that underwent heavily pacted or negotiated transitions began to 
pursue prosecutions, especially since the 1990’s. This, Sikkink argues, illustrates that 
“the political world is not static.”58 The dichotomy of ruptured versus negotiated 
transitions and their impact on the prosecution of political leaders is therefore no 
longer sufficient to explain decisions regarding criminal accountability for crimes of 
the former regimes. This point, however, has not been sufficiently developed in the 
literature, as the reflections on the Arab region in Chapter 4 will discuss.  
Limited Criminal Sanction: A strategy to preserve a democratic transition 
 
 If the purpose of prosecutions is to ensure some form of accountability while 
facilitating a transition to democracy, then as some scholars argue, prosecutions need 
to be strategically limited. Teitel’s explanation of the limited criminal sanction is 
useful here. She states that both prosecutions that do not result in full punishment 
and prosecutions of a select number of individuals is what distinguishes transitional 
criminal justice from criminal justice in ordinary times. 59  Teitel explains that 
selective prosecutions are a pragmatic strategy to ensure “the return to a liberal 
state”:60 
The limited criminal sanction offers a pragmatic resolution of the core 
dilemma of transition; namely, that of attributing individual responsibility 
for systemic wrongs perpetrated under repressive rule. The basic transitional 
problem is whether there is any theory of individual responsibility that can 
span the move from a repressive, to a more liberal, regime.  Indeed, the 
emergence of the limited sanction suggests a more fluid way to think about 
what punishment does.  In fact, there has been a rethinking of the theory of 
punishment: wrongdoing can be clarified and condemned without 
necessarily attributing individual blame and penalty... In the extraordinary 
circumstances of radical political change, some of the purposes that 
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ordinarily are advanced by the full criminal process can be advanced instead 
by the sanction’s more limited form.61  
 
Diane Orentlicher echoes this view and argues for the prosecution of a select, high-
level set of individuals to avoid a backlash from the military, as happened in 
Argentina in the early post-transition period.62 She points, however, to the challenge 
in identifying “appropriate” criteria for this limited selection of defendants.63 The 
risk of arbitrariness, she adds, can be minimised by developing criteria that closely 
reflect distinctions based on degrees of culpability.64 I will revisit this discussion on 
the limited criminal sanction and its relevance to the Arab region case studies in 
Chapter 4. 
Critical Transitional Justice Literature 
 
The above section reviewed the literature on transitional justice from the 
early 1990s, with reference to the influential works of Kritz’s edited volumes, 
Teitel’s theorising of transitional justice in 2000, and others.65 Since then, the 
proliferation of transitions that do not follow the path from dictatorship to 
constitutional and civilian democracy have prompted some scholars to re-examine 
the principles and objectives of transitional justice. Cases such as Uganda, 
Colombia, Sudan and Morocco illustrate that transitional justice takes place in 
situations where there has been no fundamental transition, or where human rights 
abuses continue to be perpetrated.66 Mainstream transitional justice theory, which 
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operates on the assumption that transitional justice occurs in liberalising contexts, 
has thus come under increasing scrutiny in recent scholarship.  
For example, Obel Hansen, Hannah Franzki and Maria Carolina Olarte 
critique the limitations of this liberal conception of transitional justice by pointing to 
the simple fact that “transitional justice occurs in radically different contexts.”67 
Cases displaying varied, non-liberal transitions where transitional justice is actively 
pursued cannot, then, be explained by the mainstream theory of transitional justice. 
As Obel Hansen observes, transitional justice takes place in cases that are 
“fundamentally different from the type of cases around which the field was 
formed.”68 The cases around which the field was formed are largely drawn from 
Latin America, where the transitions from military dictatorships to civilian 
democracies contrast with the varied transitions that unfolded in the Arab region.69 
The emergence of literature that is critical of the explanatory power of mainstream 
transitional justice theory is, then, crucial for our understanding of transitional justice 
as both a field of research and of practice.  I will expand on how the Arab region 
case studies challenge the mainstream assumptions, several of which have been 
critiqued by Obel Hansen and others, in Chapters 3 and 4. Here, I review the 
critiques of mainstream transitional justice theory as presented by Obel Hansen, 
Franzki and Olarte. 
Using examples such as Chad, Rwanda, Haiti and Uganda, Obel Hansen 
illustrates that transitional justice takes place in transitions to non-liberal, non-
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democratic and repressive regimes. Moreover, transitional justice in such cases is 
used to consolidate repressive rule in the new regime. While he notes the diversity of 
non-liberal transitions and the consequent difficulty in theorising about them, he 
presents three questions that arise from the cases of transitional justice in non-liberal 
transitions.70  First, what types of crimes were committed and what is the time span 
of the crimes that transitional justice mechanisms are expected to address? Second, 
how does ongoing violent conflict impact the pursuit of transitional justice? Do 
security and stability take precedence over the consolidation of liberal democratic 
rule? Third, how does a country’s level of poverty affect its ability to pursue 
transitional justice? In other words, without effective judicial institutions in place, 
can transitional justice be pursued? 
Despite his critiques of mainstream transitional justice theory, Obel Hansen 
echoes the views of Teitel, Skaar and Lutz and Reiger regarding the necessity of 
functioning judicial institutions. Obel Hansen suggests that socio-economically 
poorer societies tend to suffer from the absence of well-functioning state institutions 
that are needed in order to pursue a transitional justice that furthers liberal 
democratic rule.71 He observes that the so-called liberal and wealthier societies that 
experienced transitional justice also possess well-functioning state institutions and 
are therefore in a better position to pursue a liberalising transitional justice than their 
poorer counterparts. However, Skaar’s analysis of the decades it took for 
prosecutions to become full-fledged in Argentina demonstrates that the wealth of a 
country is but one of several factors, not least of which is an independent judiciary, 
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that plays a part in ensuring adequate prosecutions that move transitional justice in a 
liberalising direction.72   
Given that transitional justice can limit liberalisation and democratisation, it 
is important, as Obel Hansen argues, to examine whose interests transitional justice 
serves:  
[M]ost observers think of transitional justice as something that is inherently 
"good," at least to the extent it preserves the rights of victims and 
perpetrators…there is a need for more rigorous scrutiny of the intentions 
behind establishing transitional justice mechanisms and, in particular, at the 
level of the general scholarship, a need for adjusting the perception that 
transitional justice generally aims at, and achieves, liberalization and 
democratization.73 
 
Rather than conforming to a blueprint that was developed in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, or by international non-governmental organisations (NGOs), prosecutions 
and other transitional justice mechanisms, then, are pursued for various reasons in 
various contexts. Obel Hansen cites, among others, the example of Chad, where a 
truth commission was set up as a political move to defame former President Hissène 
Habré (1982-1990).74 In Rwanda, the new regime pursued prosecutions while it 
continued to commit human rights atrocities, but not at the level of genocide. The 
case of Rwanda also illustrates that despite flawed prosecutions that often 
contravened human rights standards, restrictions on freedom of expression regarding 
‘genocide ideology,’ and the projection of a particular Rwandan history at the 
expense of other historical accounts, a process of transitional justice still took place. 
It did not conform to the orthodox liberalising process that unfolded in most 
transitions in others parts of the world, but a form of transitional justice nevertheless 
emerged. Obel Hansen, therefore, urges an inquiry into what “other ends” are 
pursued in such cases and argues that transitional justice should be evaluated 
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according to those ends.75 He contends that a context-specific understanding of such 
goals is important and that scholars should “consider more rigorously how tensions 
between various claims of transitional justice should be dealt with” so that an 
“updating” of transitional justice theory can take hold.76  
  On a theoretical level, critics of mainstream transitional justice theory point 
to its inherently political and liberal values, despite marketing by its proponents as a 
universal phenomenon that could and should apply across states.77 Franzki and 
Olarte, for instance, provide an engaging discussion on transitional justice as part of 
a “demo-liberal project.”78 They go further and attribute transitional justice to the 
broader neo-liberal socio-economic order. They charge transitional justice with 
falling short of addressing and even enabling structural inequalities:  
[T]ransitional justice seeks to establish liberal democratic orders, 
marginalizing other, wider notions of democracy which put stronger 
emphasis on democratic control of the economy and/or social equality. In 
solving the ‘problematic’ of liberalizing transitions, transitional justice 
scholarship is value-bound not only in that it militates for (an idealized) 
liberal democracy, but also in that it contributes to the delegitimation of the 
economic counterpart of actually existing liberal democracies, that is, market 
economics, mostly in a neo-liberal variant…Transitional justice’s uncritical 
embracing of the aim of liberal democracy speaks of the success of political 
liberalism to present itself as post-political, that is, as a political order that is 
acceptable to everyone…If we accept that political liberalism is not only  
political (as opposed to cultural, economic) but already political, 
‘transitional justice’ has to be considered part of this politics in so far as it 
seeks to legitimize liberal democratic institutions.79  
 
Transitional justice, then, is a highly political project that aims to strengthen liberal 
democracy and market economy. As a result, it perpetuates social inequality in 
certain contexts, exacerbating injustices that the ‘demo-liberal’ project proclaims to 
address. 
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 Paul Gready and Simon Robins similarly discuss the “foundational 
limitations” of transitional justice.80 They describe two principal limitations: the 
pursuit of liberal democracy as the endpoint of transitional justice and the overly 
state-centric approach to transitional justice processes. They argue for a 
transformative justice that places an emphasis on process rather than on 
predetermined outcomes.81 This, they contend, should be done by involving victims 
and survivors as agents of change and through less top-down approaches whereby 
the state drives the transitional justice process.82 They add that, “In addition to the 
transitional justice agenda being externally driven in many contexts, the state-centric 
focus it brings to examining violent pasts discourages the engagement of affected 
populations.”83 While Gready and Robins are critical of the overbearing role of 
external actors in local transitional justice processes, they note that certain types of 
external intervention can facilitate these processes. These external interventions, 
however, should take on a multi-dimensional approach that incorporates 
anthropology, social science, development, and human rights. Finally, they argue 
that reparations are the best mechanism for addressing socio-economic grievances as 
they offer “both corrective and distributive justice.”84 
Socio-Economic Accountability and Transitional Justice  
 
Accountability for corruption and economic crimes and their role in 
prosecutions vis-à-vis human rights violations have important implications for 
transitional justice research. One debate centres on whether or not transitional justice 
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mechanisms, including prosecutions, should expand to address corruption and socio-
economic crimes. Dustin N. Sharp, for example, argues that economic violence has 
been the “blind spot of transitional justice” as it is rarely scrutinised in comparison 
with human rights violations.85 Others question why trial charges are heavy on one 
set of crimes at the expense of the other. Lutz and Reiger emphasize that trends to 
prosecute perpetrators who engage in corruption have been “largely unremarked by 
the international justice movement” and should be explored.86 They cite the Asian 
examples of South Korea, India, Pakistan, Nepal, the Philippines and Indonesia, 
where senior officials were tried for corruption and financial crimes, but not for 
human rights crimes. They posit that reasons for why this is so include: the lower 
costs of trying former leaders for financial crimes than for human rights crimes (as a 
lower number of people are usually implicated in economic crimes), resource 
allocation, and political will. Significantly, they note that popular opinion may find a 
government official’s involvement in corruption and financial crimes more 
disturbing than that official’s perpetration of human rights crimes such as murder 
and torture.87 Still others critique the transitional justice project itself for enabling 
socio-economic inequalities, making it difficult to seek accountability for such 
crimes, as Franzki and Olarte explain.88 I will review these main questions on socio-
economic accountability in turn. 
In her account of the status of transitional justice in Egypt, Reem Abou-El-
Fadl argues that conventional transitional justice falls short of addressing two key 
areas that are relevant to Egypt. First, the culpability of foreign actors, such as the 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in supporting the former regime and its 
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atrocities, and secondly, the former regime’s violation of social and economic rights 
– neither of which, she argues, is adequately addressed in the transitional justice 
literature. She observes that stolen public funds and related crimes were a core focus 
of the 2011 uprising in Egypt and their articulation in the demands of the protesters 
played a key role in bringing former state officials to trial. She concludes that, as the 
Egyptian example shows, it is important that transitional justice practitioners take 
historical context into account to ensure a more comprehensive implementation of 
justice measures that better suits the needs of Egypt.89 The slogan of the Egyptian 
uprising, ‘Bread, Freedom, Social Justice,’ attests to the importance Egyptians 
attached to ensuring that both their socio-economic and human rights are respected.  
The invisibility of the economic dimension of transitional justice is further 
highlighted by Zinaida Miller, who argues that its inclusion would help ensure a 
more comprehensive accountability that would prevent renewed violence and 
inequality. She also cites the role of multinational corporations and other external 
actors in perpetuating socio-economic crimes at the domestic level:  
In one sense, this might simply echo the limitations of human rights 
discourse more generally, in which questions of socioeconomic rights are 
consistently underplayed while those of civil and political rights are 
emphasized, or where redistribution is generally backgrounded for the sake 
of punishing clearly defined crimes under a standard of individual 
accountability…By removing economic questions from transitional justice, 
the literature and institutions make invisible both the economic causes of 
conflict and the effects of the post conflict economic situation on the 
possibility for renewed violence related to past grievances or current 
experiences of maldistribution. In addition, they may erase from 
consideration the role in conflict of powerful outside states or multinational 
corporations, making transnational structural imbalances seem irrelevant 
with regard to internal violence or repression90 
 
Habib Nassar similarly raises the problem of crony capitalism in his account of 
transitional justice and the Arab Spring and references the role of international 
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financial institutions in supporting socio-economic rights violations.91 As Franzki 
and Olarte argue, socio-economic accountability has been absent from transitional 
justice because it has wrongly been relegated to “an allegedly non-political economic 
realm.”92 They add that this is not a coincidence, but a consequence of the legacy of 
the transition to democracy scholarship, which falls short of structural analysis:  
In embracing the notion of liberal democracy as the only possible meaning 
of democracy, [transitional justice literature] fails to reflect on the fact that 
transitologists, concerned above all with political stability, favoured this 
constitutional arrangement precisely because it would not put in danger the 
economic interests of pre-transition elites…we suggest that rather than 
merely making normative arguments for the inclusion of social and 
economic rights into existing transitional justice mechanisms and research, 
critical studies should provide analyses of why those dimensions have been 
excluded so far, and to what extent this exclusion is due to the very 
normative preference for ‘transitions’ (i.e. gradual and stable change).93  
 
Accountability for socio-economic crimes is not, then, simply one of the “blind spots 
of the field of transitional justice.”94 It is, according to Franzki and Olarte, part and 
parcel of the demo-liberal transitional justice project and a wider neo-liberal socio-
economic project that perpetuates inequalities.95 In a similar vein, Paul O’Connell 
deems the prospects for socio-economic accountability far from promising.  A 
political preference for neo-liberal globalisation, he argues, means that it is unlikely 
that socio-economic rights will be legally protected. He refers to domestic courts' 
“tacit and implicit acceptance of neo-liberal orthodoxy” which makes the judicial 
protection of socio-economic rights unlikely.96 
Darren Hawkins argues that a focus on economic and social rights generally 
yields less successful results than advocacy for civil and political rights.  He makes 
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this argument in the context of the role of international and domestic networks that 
partner together to bring cases forward. In his discussion on the Chilean network, he 
contends that its success is owed to the fact that human rights norms are better 
established internationally than other kinds of rights. Hawkins continues, “…it is 
difficult to imagine that a network focusing on economic and social rights would 
have had the same level of success as the Chilean network. In fact, some Chilean and 
international NGOs did focus on the individual costs to the poor of Pinochet’s 
neoliberal economic program, but without much success.”97  
Scholars and practitioners have thus been consumed with the tendency of 
transitional countries to include human rights crimes at the expense of socio-
economic rights crimes in their transitional justice mechanisms.98 As a result, two 
discernable attributes of the existing literature on this issue emerge. First, much of 
the literature on transitional justice is prescriptive and makes the case for how socio-
economic rights should be included in transitional justice mechanisms.99 A stronger 
account for the few yet significant cases in which corruption and socio-economic 
crimes were the focus of prosecutions, as in the Asian examples cited by Lutz and 
Reiger and others, should therefore take hold.100 Second, several explanations for 
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why socio-economic rights have not been included have been proposed.  For 
example, transitional justice is largely drawn from international human rights law, 
which has traditionally viewed economic and social rights as entitlements rather than 
rights. 101  Other explanations include the difficulty to ascribe responsibility to 
individuals for socio-economic crimes and that social justice is a longer-term 
political process that short-term transitional justice mechanisms cannot fully take 
into account.102 Moreover, scholarly discussions on the inclusion of economic and 
social rights in transitional justice mechanisms focus on their place in truth 
commissions and reconciliation deals, with limited discussion on their place in 
criminal prosecutions.  
 The link between socio-economic rights violations and civil and political 
rights violations is, as some scholars observed, often and wrongly overlooked. For 
example, Kora Andrieu explains that corruption is often motivated by the 
opportunity it serves for perpetrators to maintain impunity for human rights 
violations. By addressing corruption and grand scale socio-economic crimes, 
Andrieu continues, justice mechanisms will more effectively address atrocities and 
will contribute to successful democratic transitions. 103  Corruption and socio-
economic crimes are often cited as a background against which human rights 
violations occur. This reflects, in part, a significant shortcoming of international 
criminal justice in particular, which is preoccupied with individual criminal 
accountability as opposed to structural causes. As Lars Waldorf observes: 
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Not surprisingly then, there have been very few prosecutions under 
international criminal law for massive violations of ESC rights…Other truth 
commission reports (e.g. Guatemala, Peru and Sierra Leone) addressed the 
socio-economic factors behind the conflicts, including dispossession, 
inequality, exclusion, and even the colonial legacy. Yet, socio-economic 
factors were mostly relegated to the sections on historical background, where 
they could be more easily ignored.104 
 
Ruben Carranza also warns that, “impunity for economic crimes reinforces impunity 
for human rights violations.”105 He illustrates that corruption is often used not just to 
amass wealth, but also to avoid criminal accountability. Leaders such as Pinochet, 
Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines (1965-1986) and Suharto of Indonesia (1967-
1998) used their illicit gains and “financed destabilization and intimidation, stifled 
investigations, delayed trials, fought extradition and sponsored political proxies to 
counter attempts at holding them accountable for human rights violations.”106  
Even classic transitional justice cases such as Argentina reveal that where 
human rights violations were systematically reported and investigated, some of their 
economic root causes were left unaccounted for. Susan Marks provides the example 
of Amnesty International’s human rights report on Argentina in 1976, in which it 
details systematic torture and disappearances without mentioning the military’s 
“restructuring [of] the country’s economy along radically neo-liberal lines.”107 She 
adds, “The report contains long lists of decrees that violated civil liberties, but makes 
no reference to the laws that led wages to be lowered and prices increased, no 
reference to the abrupt abrogation of social protection and redistributive schemes, or 
to the deepening poverty of ordinary Argentinians that was the result of these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
104 Waldorf (n 102) 173, 176.  ESC here stands for economic, social and cultural rights. 
105 Ruben Carranza, ‘Plunder and Pain: Should Transitional Justice Engage with Corruption and 
Economic Crimes?’ (2008) 2 IJTJ 310, 314. 
106 ibid 314. 
107 Susan Marks, ‘Human Rights and Root Causes’ (2011) 74 (1) MLR 57, 58. 
	   45	  
measures.”108  Marks concludes that the tendency to document human rights abuses 
without explaining them “meant that human rights became a set of blinders.”109  
Carranza cites the example of Mobuto Sese Seko, former President of the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (1965-1997), whose USD12 billion of embezzled 
funds went largely unaddressed by transitional justice:  
In the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the legacy of Mobuto Sese 
Seko remains unaddressed, including the estimated $12 billion in funds he 
embezzled. By leaving unexamined the relationship between Mobuto’s 
economic crimes and the enduring violence in the DRC, transitional justice 
has been boxed into a small corner, dwelling on the violent consequences of 
an unresolved past while mostly ignoring its structural causes.110 
 
There is an overwhelming consensus in the literature, then, that socio-economic 
rights violations can and must be addressed by transitional justice mechanisms, 
including but not only through prosecutions.  
Andrieu stresses the importance of accountability for corruption and socio-
economic crimes in the Arab region because of its ability to delegitimise the 
previous regime. She also refers to Chile, where Pinochet was investigated and 
arrested for financial crimes, the revelations of which as Andrieu argues, were 
significantly more damaging for Pinochet’s image and legacy.111  Others caution 
against emphasising one set of rights over the other, as this leads to impunity for 
massive human rights violations. Former Philippine President Joseph Estrada (1998-
2001), for example, was charged with corruption in 2007 and subsequently pardoned 
by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010), despite the Estrada regime’s 
role in the perpetration of massive human rights violations.112 Similarly, former 
president Suharto in Indonesia was charged with embezzling USD570 million, but 
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not with massive human rights abuses during his three decade long rule.113 Other 
examples displaying a similar trend of prosecutions for corruption crimes, but not for 
human rights crimes include South Korea, India, Pakistan and Nepal.114 Yet, the 
reasons why some countries choose to prosecute for one set of crimes rather than the 
other have remained unclear. The Arab country case studies, which will be discussed 
in the next chapter, will help provide some explanations for such limited 
prosecutions. 
The Drivers of the Prosecution of Political Leaders: The role of international 
and domestic actors 
 
The difference in the decisions states make on whether or not to pursue the 
prosecution of their leaders has and continues to be the subject of much debate in 
transitional justice literature. David Pion-Berlin usefully identifies six factors that 
may explain the divergence in decisions regarding trials: 1.) The legacy of human 
rights abuse: did the nature, scope and intensity of repression vary sufficiently 
between the countries to make the difference? 2.) The balance of power that emerged 
through the transition between the armed forces and the civilian authorities; 3.) Elite 
preferences; 4.) Organised interest group pressures: “Irrespective of leadership 
preferences, was the human rights movement better organized, more vocal, and more 
persuasive in Argentina than elsewhere?” 5.) Strategic calculation: “What were the 
potential costs and benefits to avenging the victims?” 6.) Contagion effect: “What 
influence did human rights decisions in Argentina have on later decisions made by 
the Uruguayan and Chilean heads of state?”115 Pion-Berlin, however, notes that 
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interest groups – also known as civil society actors – had little influence on decisions 
regarding prosecution. This section further explores the role of such domestic actors 
and international actors as drivers of decisions regarding prosecution.  
The pursuit of accountability for past atrocities in transitional justice contexts 
often draws the involvement of international actors.  Much has been discussed about 
the role of international NGOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights 
Watch, regional bodies such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
(IACtHR), international tribunals such as the ICC and intergovernmental bodies such 
as the United Nations and its various agencies as some of the key international actors 
that work to promote accountability for past human rights violations. This promotion 
is often conducted through transnational networks made up of these actors and that 
work to ensure accountability at the domestic level where possible, or at the 
international level where necessary.  The prevailing assumption is that international 
– or ‘transnational’ – actors actively seek the fulfillment of a shared global norm – 
that of individual criminal accountability.116 
Transnational Advocacy Networks: Contrasting accounts from Latin America 
 
Margaret E. Keck and Sikkink describe a transnational advocacy network as 
one that includes “actors working internationally on an issue, who are bound 
together by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of information 
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and services…At the core of the relationship is information exchange.”117 These 
networks are often in the form of collaboration between domestic actors such as civil 
society, and international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International, whose reports on human rights violations are disseminated 
internationally to strengthen campaigns to change repressive governments’ 
behaviour.  Transnational networks play a vital role in the initial stages of the 
“socialization of human rights norms” because they help draw international attention 
to the practices of repressive regimes, they start a process of shaming, and they 
empower and strengthen the weak domestic opposition.118 The IACtHR continues to 
play this role in countries that have experienced a long delay in holding former 
regime officials to account, such as in Brazil. In the case of Peru, the rich synergy 
between domestic and international actors in efforts to prosecute former President 
Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) is a testament to the importance of cooperation 
between the domestic and the international.119  
Similarly, Beth Simmons contends that the ratification of international 
human rights treaties influences the probability of mobilisation in two ways. 
Individuals begin to place greater value on the right in question, which, in effect, 
increases the likelihood of successful mobilisation to gain that right. She also 
observes that, following ratification, civil society is more empowered to achieve the 
goals promised in the human rights treaties that their governments have signed, 
making the impact of international human rights treaties on domestic politics at the 
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mass level significant.120 The implications of this argument are that in countries 
where key international human rights instruments are ratified, the likelihood that 
prosecutions will take place increases as opposed to countries that have not ratified 
the relevant international human rights treaties. Sikkink, for example, notes that the 
justice cascade was bolstered by norm entrepreneurs, or “small groups of public 
interest lawyers, jurists and activists.”121 These norm entrepreneurs are supportive of 
such international human rights treaties and form an important part of the web of 
domestic actors that drive and shape prosecutions. 
Furthermore, the interaction of international actors with domestic actors 
depends, according to Sikkink, on the nature of opportunity structures. She argues 
that institutions offer “international opportunity structures” which interact with 
domestic political opportunity structures.122 This means that activists navigate these 
two structures depending on the context within which they are working – if working 
from within a repressive, closed society, they are likely to reach out to international 
venues as a means of gaining access to institutions necessary to support their cause. 
Alternatively, activists may close themselves off to international opportunity 
structures such as international institutions or third-country courts because they 
regard them as invasive – this is what Sikkink labels as “defensive 
transnationalism.”123  
The collaboration between domestic and international actors in efforts to 
prosecute Fujimori is, as Jo-Marie Burt argues, a testament to the importance of the 
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beneficial relationship between the domestic and the international.124 She contends 
that together with international demands for accountability, domestic civil society 
groups in favour of accountability created the pressure that was necessary to bring to 
justice those responsible for past atrocities.125 Similarly, in their account of the 
impact of the justice cascade and foreign human rights trials in Latin America, Lutz 
and Sikkink identify the “intensity of the determination of domestic human rights 
advocates and victims, amply supported by their international counterparts, to 
pressure their government to realize justice for past wrongs” as one of the factors 
that led to decisions to prosecute.126  
Cath Collins challenges Burt, Sikkink, and Simmons’ observations on the 
impact of international law on domestic politics and human rights practices. In her 
discussion on the impact of transnational networks, Collins warns that we should be 
skeptical about the extent to which these transnational networks actually impact 
accountability at the national level.127 Collins defines transnational networks as 
constituting lawyers, victims, activists, and international human rights organizations 
with the aim of overriding domestic judicial processes by pushing for legal action in 
third-country courts.  She uses the case of El Salvador as an example to show that 
third-country litigation against Salvadorian perpetrators was not followed by visible 
domestic change in El Salvador, as happened with Chile after the Pinochet case was 
triggered in Spain.128 Furthermore, Collins points to empirical evidence from Chile 
and El Salvador, which reveals that there was often a clash between outside activists 
and domestic justice efforts. Such a clash existed, for example, between Spanish and 
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Chilean lawyers over the Pinochet case - they “disagreed violently…over the legal 
strategies which ought to be adopted.”129 Collins concludes that, in light of the 
Salvadorian case study, domestic law and politics are more reliable indicators of 
progress towards accountability than is the influence of external actors.130  
While she does not explicitly address the role of civil society in driving 
human rights prosecutions, Naomi Roht-Arriaza lends significance to civil society 
networks as key actors in facilitating access to information that can be used for 
criminal sanctions for past rights violations.131 The implication is that even if civil 
society networks are initially powerless in the face of international politics, their 
work could – and often has - served to advance accountability in the future. Pion-
Berlin, however, is more critical of the role of civil society and places more 
emphasis on the role of governmental politics. In his analysis of the role of mass 
pressures by civil society groups in Argentina, Chile and Uruguay, he concludes that 
the role of civil society in shaping the decision to prosecute was weak, whereas 
strategic calculations made by those countries’ leaderships was strong and decisive. 
He explains:  
The human rights lobbies of the Southern Cone had a negligible impact on 
government policy.  Their pleas for the wholesale punishment of those 
involved in acts of state terror went unanswered.  Each president chose 
measures that were more restrained than those preferred by the human rights 
advocates.  In Uruguay, their demands were ignored entirely.132 
 
Huyse, on the other hand, regards the prospect of membership at the Council of 
Europe as a “strong motive” that drove prosecution decisions in Czechoslovakia, 
Hungary and Poland, each of which “regularly invoked international conventions on 
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human rights when preparing or reviewing criminal or lustration laws.”133 It is clear, 
then, that scholars differ on the extent to which domestic and international actors 
drove decisions regarding prosecution, particularly in the Latin American cases. 
 Consequently, Obel Hansen rightly points out that the diversification of 
transitional justice actors should be taken into account when analysing which actors 
had a significant impact on driving decisions regarding prosecution and other 
transitional justice decisions. He notes that the literature has traditionally placed 
emphasis on political leadership as the leading factor that drove decisions regarding 
prosecution:  
[T]he focus in the early literature was primarily on how various forms of 
political transitions would impact the new leadership’s approach to 
transitional justice, as opposed to how different actors could shape or take 
control of transitional justice solutions devoid of potential political restraints 
arising out of the particular nature of the transition.134  
 
Such an analysis is important for the deconstruction of the use and abuse of 
transitional justice in certain political contexts. The role of socio-political context 
and the nature of transitions are important considerations, but insufficient on their 
own. An examination of the conflicting roles of influential actors in the decisions 
regarding prosecution provides useful insight into the dilemma of transitional justice 
in non-liberal transitions. The role of, inter alia, the judiciary, the military, civil 
society, and of interim governments and elites should therefore be taken into account 
for a fuller picture of how – and why – transitional justice is practiced differently. 
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A Tenuous Global Accountability Norm? 
 The increasingly dominant role of international actors and of international law 
in transitional justice is a trend that has emerged over the last twenty years.135 Hugo 
van der Merwe is critical of the role of the transitional justice industry in pushing for 
the application of a set of predefined instruments to various transitional contexts. He 
remarks that transitional justice has been unfolding within highly contested 
transitions that “remain subject to passionate debate and violent confrontations over 
the fundamental shared basis of the society.”136 Van der Merwe is also critical of the 
culpability of international actors, which is largely unaddressed in transitional justice. 
He refers to Nassar’s discussion on whether and how international financial 
institutions can be held to account for their role in supporting socio-economic rights 
violations.137  
 A closer look at the role of international and domestic actors in driving 
decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders reveals, in certain cases, the 
strength of domestic resistance to the so-called global accountability norm. Jelena 
Subotic argues that domestic elites not only represent a challenge to international 
pressure to pursue transitional justice, but they form part of a complex political web 
of internal opposition. She explains that these domestic and largely governmental 
elites “use transitional justice projects as a domestic wedge issue to score quite 
localized political points,” thereby ignoring international pressure to pursue a certain 
type of transitional justice that conforms to international standards.138 The case of 
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Uruguay is quite useful in highlighting the significant role of domestic politics and 
of domestic civil society actors in driving decisions regarding prosecution. Burt, 
Francesca Lessa and Gabriela Fried Amilivia’s study of Uruguay’s transitional 
justice decisions strongly urges a closer examination of the role of such domestic 
actors and developments “to understand shifts in transitional justice processes” and 
the need for more grounded analyses of “the relative weight of 
international/transnational initiatives on the transitional justice process and the 
relationship between domestic actors and international/transnational networks or 
bodies.”139  
Subotic discusses instances where both international pressure for transitional 
justice and domestic opposition to transitional justice are strong, causing a clash of 
goals. She does not, however, consider scenarios where both international and 
domestic support for transitional justice is strong, but in different ways; for example, 
where domestic support for prosecutions is vengeful and selective, reflecting the 
highly political transition against which the trials take place. Conversely, what are 
the implications of scenarios where domestic pressure for prosecutions is strong, but 
international pressure is not? How do such scenarios impact the status of transitional 
justice and of prosecution decisions in particular? This scenario is in many ways 
relevant to the case of Yemen, where domestic demands to prosecute the former 
president have been crushed by regional and international actors who sought an 
immunity law as a political solution to the crisis.  
Still, domestic civil society activism is, as several scholars have argued, 
insufficient on its own to drive decisions regarding prosecution. The post-transition 
presidential leaderships of Raúl Alfonsin (1983-1989), Carlos Menem (1989-1999) 
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and Nestor Kirchner (2003-2007) in Argentina have each shaped decisions regarding 
prosecution differently.140 President Alfonsin, for example, revoked the military’s 
self-amnesty law in 1983 and created the National Commission on the Disappeared 
(CONADEP).141 The CONADEP helped establish the responsibility of military 
leaders in its final report, “Nunca Más” in 1984. The trial of 9 members of 
Argentina’s military junta took place in Buenos Aires and verdicts were issued in 
December 1985. The trial took 7 months, during which hundreds of witnesses 
testified about torture, disappearances, and other crimes. Almost 300 officers faced 
prosecution in civilian courts. However, there was a military backlash against 
Alfonsin’s government and strong pressure from the military eventually led to the 
1987 amnesty law, which ended the prosecutions. The subsequent government of 
Menem (1989-1999) pardoned the convicted military officers who had been serving 
life sentences in prison.142  However, under Kirchner (2003-2007), Argentina’s 
Supreme Court ruled that the amnesty law was unconstitutional, paving the way yet 
again to prosecutions of former military leaders in Argentina.  
This succession of governments in Argentina and its impact on the ebbs and 
flows of amnesties and prosecutions points to the significance of the political 
leadership’s influence on decisions regarding prosecution. This again does not 
diminish the role of domestic actors, such as mass protests and civil society pressure, 
in pushing for such decisions. As Gary Bass notes, this has been the case for a long 
time:  
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Of course, the decision about whether to seek punishment is not always 
entirely in the hands of elite decision makers. Public opinion weighs in 
powerfully. Even Castlereagh could not afford to shrug off popular outcry 
for the punishment of Bonapartists in 1815; even Prussian and Soviet leaders 
had to take into account punitive pressures from below.143 
 
In Uruguay, the installation of two left-wing governments is regarded as having 
provided little more than “a more permissible opportunity structure” within which 
domestic civil society groups took the lead in strengthening the anti-impunity 
struggle.144  
Finally, the role of international and domestic actors in driving decisions to 
enact amnesty laws presents important questions regarding the tenacity of a global 
accountability norm. Scholars observe that despite an increasing number of 
prosecutions of political leaders, amnesty law enactment has not declined. Some 
argue that the continued adoption of amnesty laws is an indication that “cultures of 
impunity persist even during the age of accountability.”145 Others contend that 
amnesties increase in response to the increased demand for accountability.146 Tricia 
D. Olsen, Leigh A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter describe the increase in both 
amnesties and prosecutions as a “justice balance” rather than a justice cascade: 
Underlying the justice balance approach is the notion that trials and 
amnesties together contribute to improvements in human rights and 
democracy, with or without truth commissions. We consider this crucial 
combination of trials and amnesties as a balance between accountability 
provided by trials and stability guaranteed by amnesty. Accountability 
without stability simply cannot advance human rights and democracy 
objectives. Similarly, stability without accountability also fails to achieve 
those goals. Truth commissions do not get in the way of the justice balance, 
nor do they contribute to it by reinforcing accountability and stability. It is 
the balance provided by these two or three mechanisms in combination that 
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is essential to success.147  
Both trials and amnesties, then, are essential to the improvement of human rights and 
democracy, as Olsen, Payne, Reiter and others have argued. 
Of particular note is Louise Mallinder’s analysis of amnesty law enactment:  
[W]hen states enact amnesty laws for serious human rights violations today, 
they rarely acknowledge the existence of a global accountability norm.  
Instead they argue that the amnesty is necessary to bring peace and promote 
reconciliation.  These rationales are often echoed by international actors who 
support and fund amnesty processes.  This therefore casts doubt on the 
extent to which a global accountability norm has emerged.148  
 
Mallinder adds that the global accountability norm is further weakened by the 
diplomatic and financial support from international organisations and donor states 
for the enactment of amnesty laws.149 This international support for amnesty laws is, 
for example, very much the case in Yemen, where regional and international actors 
clearly supported immunity from prosecution for the former president in exchange 
for a peaceful transition. The decision not to prosecute, as Mallinder concludes, 
“suggests that despite the development of international criminal law and transitional 
justice, a belief persists within states and the international community that in times 
of extreme violence, amnesty may be a necessary compromise to achieve peace.”150 
The international support for amnesty laws, however, is not consistent across states 
even when they share similar degrees of ‘extreme violence.’ This is evident when 
comparing Libya and Yemen, as will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring: Emerging scholarship151 
 
A small body of literature on transitional justice in the Arab region has 
emerged since the emergence of criminal prosecutions there along with efforts to 
establish truth commissions and to draft transitional justice laws. One recent work is 
Fisher and Stewart’s edited volume Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring, which 
examines the unique features of transitional justice in the Arab Spring and presents 
questions for how the Arab Spring is shaping the theory and practice of transitional 
justice more broadly.152 Given the volume’s strong relevance to the subject of this 
thesis, I provide a critical review of its content here, particularly as it relates to the 
challenges of mainstream transitional justice theory and to accountability for socio-
economic rights violations.  
Fisher and Stewart point to the tension between a “fundamentally liberal 
process” and a society driven by illiberal socio-political actors, which they identify 
as the Islamists.153 This tension is a central challenge for transitional justice in the 
Arab Spring.  They question whether, as a result, transitional justice will move away 
from its liberal roots. This remains an open question throughout the book.  In their 
discussion and in subsequent chapters, international actors are understood as 
consistently promoting liberal norms, therefore advocating for accountability and 
justice globally. However, painting the role of international actors with one brush – 
i.e. ‘liberal’ – falls short of explaining the contradictory roles of external actors in 
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both Libya and Yemen. Nassar briefly alludes to this contradictory role of 
international actors in his chapter.154  
Line Khatib’s chapter provides a damning critique of the rise of political 
Islamists in the Arab Spring countries and charges them with harming the 
transitional justice process. She describes the tensions between Islamists, whom she 
deems as inherently illiberal, and the liberal goals of transitional justice. “Islamists,” 
she argues, “incorporate ‘traditional’ elements that are at odds with the values 
fundamental to liberal democracy.” 155  Khatib then makes references to the 
“universality” of human rights and Islamism’s difficulty in navigating between 
tradition and liberal democracy, making it difficult for transitional justice to achieve 
its liberal goals. 156  This presents a number of questions regarding Khatib’s 
theoretical framework, which places international law, democracy and transitional 
justice in a coherent liberal boat in opposition to Islamists, who are inherently 
illiberal.   
First, her analysis contrasting Islamism and liberal democracy falls short of 
explaining how Islamism works in other democracies that are not necessarily liberal 
and that have undergone transitional justice processes. It does not explain the 
Islamist-dominated governments such as Indonesia, Malaysia and Turkey, 
understood in many aspects to be democratically functioning states.157 This perhaps 
means that the tensions Khatib refers to are better described as secular-religious 
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tensions regarding the basis of society rather than a conflict between undemocratic, 
illiberal Islamists and secular, liberal democrats. A discussion on how the Egyptian 
and Tunisian constitution-drafting processes addressed these fundamental tensions 
would have been useful here. Second, Khatib’s analysis falls short of addressing the 
role of the secularist military regime in Egypt in thwarting a democratic transition 
and transitional justice.158  With this in mind, the problem for transitional justice in 
the Arab Spring is perhaps better explained as one of continued authoritarianism, in 
all its religious, military and secular manifestations. Moreover, one could argue that 
it was the Islamists in Tunisia who sought transitional justice the most, given that 
they were heavily repressed under Ben Ali’s regime.159   
Some important questions thus emerge from Khatib’s chapter: what does the 
rise of Islamism in the Arab Spring reveal about the shortcomings of transitional 
justice, or even of international human rights? How should we understand the 
tensions between “communal forms of justice,” as promoted by the Islamists Khatib 
examines, and individual freedoms in the context of transitional justice and political 
Islamism?160 Khatib’s chapter seems to solely explore whether Islamism is an 
appropriate political ideology for the pursuit of transitional justice, while being 
largely uncritical of the so-called universal concepts of justice and of transitional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
158 Examples include the military’s controversial protest law, which places severe restrictions and 
harsh punishments that curb freedom of expression and the right to assemble. See Human Rights 
Watch, ‘Egypt: Deeply Restrictive New Assembly Law’ (26 November 2013) 
<www.hrw.org/news/2013/11/26/egypt-deeply-restrictive-new-assembly-law> accessed 26 July 2015. 
See also Human Rights Watch, ‘All According to Plan. The Raba’a Massacre and Mass Killings of 
Protesters in Egypt’ (12 August 2014) <www.hrw.org/report/2014/08/12/all-according-plan/raba-
massacre-and-mass-killings-protesters-egypt> accessed 26 July 2015. This report documents the mass 
and arbitrary arrests of human rights activists and journalists along with the mass death sentences of 
Muslim Brotherhood supporters in what has largely been deemed a sham trial, and the impunity of 
those responsible for the largest mass killing in Egypt’s modern history, the Raba’a massacre. 
159 Greta Barbone in Noha Aboueldahab, ‘Rapporteur’s Report: Prosecutions, Politics and 
Transitions: How criminal justice in the Arab Spring is shaping transitional justice’ (Panel discussion, 
Durham Law School Durham 6 May 2014) 
<www.academia.edu/8738334/Rapporteurs_Report_Prosecutions_Politics_and_Transitions_-
_How_criminal_justice_in_the_Arab_Spring_is_shaping_transitional_justice> accessed 26 July 2015. 
160 Khatib (n 155) 135. 
	   61	  
justice itself. 161  Nevertheless, her discussion presents difficult and important 
questions about the fundamental basis of transitional societies in the Arab Spring and 
about democracy, all of which strongly warrant further scholarly debate. 
Universality Claims and Complex Local Realities: Overlooking variations in 
transitions 
 
The problem of the presumed ‘universality’ of justice re-appears in other 
parts of Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring. Similar to Khatib, Elham Manea 
contends that the fundamental tension between the liberal foundations of transitional 
justice and non-liberal social actors can and should be resolved by emphasizing the 
“underlying universality of human rights.”162 This take is again uncritical of the 
universality debate and of transitional justice more broadly. While Manea remains 
highly critical of the impact the rise of Islamism has had on gender justice in the 
Arab Spring, she proposes a focus on the “alternative interpretations” of Islamic 
theology to address the problem, but stops short of elaborating on this point.163  
Nassar’s chapter presents a strong analysis of the struggle to accommodate 
the complexity of the Arab Spring contexts while adhering to standardised 
prescriptions of the global transitional justice industry. He critiques the one size fits 
all formulas pushed by the industry’s advocates in the Arab Spring. He also refers to 
the “ambiguous transitions” and their impact on justice choices – not all transitions 
follow a linear shift from authoritarian rule to liberal democratic rule. 164  
Furthermore, Nassar highlights the need for socio-economic accountability and for a 
more inclusive transitional justice process. Nassar contends that the significance of 
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socio-economic concerns in the Arab Spring means that transitional justice will have 
a “broadened purview” in comparison with the way in which it has unfolded in other 
parts of the world.165 He points to another important difference between the Arab 
Spring transitions and others that preceded them: the Arab region is dealing with the 
legacy of atrocities committed under multiple regimes, whereas most transitions in 
the rest of the world have dealt with the legacy of a single regime or conflict. This, 




This literature review has highlighted several principal themes of transitional 
justice scholarship since the early 1990s. Scholars have analysed how the nature of 
transitions – whether ruptured, negotiated, or a mix of the two – has impacted both 
the likelihood and the quality of prosecutions. With the benefit of hindsight, scholars 
have noted that the dichotomous comparisons between ruptured and negotiated 
transitions no longer sufficiently explain subsequent decisions regarding prosecution. 
Moreover, the liberal roots of transitional justice fall short of explaining cases where 
transitional justice is pursued to consolidate non-liberal rule. Pre-existing 
democratically functioning institutions, in particular the judiciary, is a factor that 
both mainstream and critical transitional justice scholars claim as necessary in order 
for adequate prosecutions to take place post-transition. Teitel and Orentlicher 
outlined the merits of the ‘limited criminal sanction’ in ensuring a certain level of 
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accountability without jeopardising the security and stability of the fragile, 
transitional state.167 
However, the ebbs and flows of decisions regarding prosecution over decades 
indicates that additional factors, such as civil society activism, political leadership, 
the economic well-being of the country, and international actors drive and shape 
prosecutions in different ways. Franzki and Olarte argue that transitional justice is 
practiced as part of the ‘demo-liberal’ project that exacerbates social and structural 
inequalities.168 Others argue that insufficient attention has been given to cases where 
socio-economic and corruption crimes were prosecuted while civil and political 
rights violations were left unaccounted for. The diversity of the contexts within 
which prosecutions take place as well as the various actors involved in driving and 
shaping these decisions requires, then, a more rigorous account of whose interests 
transitional justice serves and what ends it aims to achieve.169  
Transitional justice scholarship is under-theorised.170 There is a need for 
more nuanced, context-driven theories of transitional justice that take into account its 
use in non-liberal transitions. Teitel argues that transitional justice has increasingly 
disassociated itself from “the politics of transition,” because of its globalised 
nature.171 The ways in which a heavily politicised transitional justice have been used 
to solidify non-liberal transitions and repression, as my analysis of the Arab Spring 
case studies will demonstrate, challenge this observation. With few exceptions, Latin 
American countries underwent transitions that pushed the military back to the 
barracks and brought in civilian, democratic rule. Prosecutions of those responsible 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Teitel, Transitional Justice (n 19); Orentlicher, ‘Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human 
Rights Violations of a Prior Regime’ (n 40). 
168 Franzki and Olarte (n 78). 
169 Obel Hansen, ‘Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory,’ (n 15). 
170 For discussions on the under-theorisation of transitional justice, see Nicola Palmer, Phil Clark and 
Danielle Grenville (eds), Critical Perspectives in Transitional Justice (Intersentia 2012). 
171 Ruti G. Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice  (OUP 2014) xiv.	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for the heinous crimes committed there are still ongoing, more than three decades 
later. But not all transitions occur in liberalising contexts. The Arab Spring thus 
presents an important opportunity to diversify the theory and practice of transitional 
justice. 
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CHAPTER 2 | METHODOLOGY AND INTRODUCTION TO THE 
CASE STUDIES  
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This chapter presents the methodology used to conduct the research for the 
thesis and the challenges faced by this methodology and how these challenges were 
overcome. It then presents a rationale for the case selection. An overview of the 
status of prosecutions in each case study follows, providing a transition into the 
subsequent chapter in which the findings from each case study are presented. Before 
engaging in a discussion of the methodology, it is worth clarifying what is meant by 
the term ‘political leaders’ as it is used in the research questions addressed in this 
thesis. 
In this thesis, the term political leaders is not restricted to heads of state, as 
in, for example, the work of Lutz and Reiger and others.172 Instead, in addition to 
heads of state, it broadens the category of political leaders to include other high-level 
regime officials, including former ministers, police chiefs and military chiefs. The 
reasons for the expanded focus on political leaders in this way are four-fold. First, 
several high-level government officials other than heads of state have been 
investigated and/or tried, signaling a more extensive criminal accountability strategy 
than one that solely targets heads of state. A more limited focus on heads of state 
only would, then, significantly limit the strength of the explanations surrounding the 
pursuit of transitional justice. Second, scholarly literature on the prosecution of 
political leaders criticises the shortcomings of analyses focused on the prosecution of 
one individual, using the argument that the guilty individual (usually a head of state) 
does not necessarily reflect the wrongdoings of the entire regime. Third, some 
victims and other justice-seekers prefer to see the prosecution of a particular leader 
who is not necessarily the head of state. This is because certain individuals, such as 
the former ministers of interior in all four case studies, are largely regarded as having 
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a more direct role in orchestrating the crimes committed, particularly torture. Fourth, 
the exclusion of certain former high-level officials from prosecution, such as Omar 
Suleiman and Moussa Kousa, former heads of intelligence in Egypt and Libya 
respectively, is in and of itself a question that requires examination. The selection of 
individuals who faced prosecution is a controversial issue in the case studies, 
revealing that various factors played a role in the inclusion and exclusion of certain 
individuals from the trials. The expansion of the term political leaders in this way, 
then, is important for the purpose of addressing one of the thesis’s central research 
questions: what factors shaped the extent of the investigations and trials.  
Triggers, Drivers and Shapers: An explanatory mechanism derived from 
process tracing 
 
The research questions of this thesis played a central role in defining the 
appropriate methodology this thesis adopted. It is useful, then, to briefly re-visit the 
thesis’s two principal research questions. First, what trigger and driving factors led 
to the decision to prosecute and not to prosecute former political leaders? Second, 
what shaping factors affected the content and extent of decisions regarding 
prosecution? Although not explicitly framed as such, process tracing entails the 
identification of factors that play a triggering, driving and shaping role in processes. 
Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown’s definition of process tracing is 
particularly useful here:  
[Process tracing] attempts to uncover what stimuli the actors attend to; the 
decision process that makes use of these stimuli to arrive at decisions; the 
actual behavior that then occurs; the effect of various institutional 
arrangements on attention, processing, and behavior; and the effect of other 
variables of interest on attention, processing, and behavior.173  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Alexander L. George and Timothy J. McKeown, ‘Case Studies and Theories of Organizational 
Decision Making’ in Robert F. Coulam and Richard A. Smith (eds), Advances in Information 
Processing in Organizations (Vol 2 JAI Press 1985) 35. 
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This definition sums up the function of and the relation between the trigger (stimuli), 
driving (decision process responding to stimuli), and shaping (institutional) factors. 
I reflect on the material collected for each case study by identifying what 
factors triggered, drove, and shaped decisions regarding prosecution. I do not claim 
that the trigger-driver-shaper mechanism, derived from the method of process tracing 
as described above, explains the process of prosecution from start to finish. Rather, it 
is a prism through which I make sense of the research collected and by which I 
develop an explanation of how decisions regarding the prosecution of political 
leaders emerged and developed before and during the highly contentious period of 
transition. For instance, the identification of trigger factors provides insight into the 
formative stages of these decision-making processes. It contributes to an inquiry into 
efforts to prosecute in the past – before the 2010/2011 uprisings – which is necessary 
in order to understand the development and execution of the prosecutorial strategy in 
the four countries after the uprisings. In each case study’s conclusion and following a 
detailed presentation of findings from the interviews, I summarise the key triggers, 
drivers and shapers based on these findings. I begin with the trigger factors, which 
pertain to the factors that led to decisions to prosecute and not to prosecute. I then 
discuss the various factors that drove these decisions and pushed and pulled them in 
different directions. Finally, I discuss the shaping factors that impacted the content 
and the extent of the prosecutions.  
The significance of analysing the data through a trigger-driving-shaping 
prism lies in its facilitation of an in-depth understanding of the dynamics of the 
processes within which these factors operate. The primary function of this prism is to 
make sense of the processes that unfolded over time, while taking into account 
various contextual factors. This is particularly useful for a comparative case study 
	   69	  
and helps prevent false generalisations that do not take case-by-case specificities into 
account.  
Data Collection and Research 
 
The arguments in this thesis are based on both primary and secondary 
sources. In addition to a critical analysis of the relevant scholarly literature, I relied 
heavily on national, regional and international media reports to obtain details 
concerning the status of prosecutions in each country. I built an electronic database 
that consists of news articles, reports and commentaries by both individual experts 
and by NGOs for each country throughout the duration of the research – 
approximately four years. Close monitoring of media reports and of new scholarly 
literature, particularly in academic journals, was important because of the developing 
nature of decisions regarding prosecution in the four case studies and the consequent 
emerging literature on the Arab region. 
The core of the data is drawn from interviews I conducted in the four case 
studies. Between 2012 and 2014, I conducted a total of forty-five interviews with 
forty-one different interviewees in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. Twelve 
interviews were conducted in Egypt, seven interviews were conducted in Libya, 
fifteen interviews were conducted in Tunisia, and nine interviews were conducted in 
Yemen.174 The interviews were conducted in Arabic, English and French. I obtained 
research ethics approval from Durham University to conduct all of the interviews for 
this thesis. The interviews were with human rights lawyers and activists, independent 
experts, civil society leaders, national and international NGO officials, United 
Nations officials, government officials, journalists, and legal professionals including 
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lawyers and one judge. I conducted semi-structured interviews to ensure a focused 
comparison of data across the cases.175 This was done through the use of a set of 
questions asked of each individual, followed by additional questions generated by 
the responses received and by the particular context of the case study. Certain 
themes emerged from the interviews, which then helped form the structure of both 
the presentation of my findings in Chapter 3 and the analysis of their implications for 
the broader field of transitional justice in Chapter 4. The interviewees do not 
necessarily share my interpretation of their responses. 
Structured interviews that include some open-ended questions are helpful for 
both within-case analysis and for the comparative case study approach.176 Open-
ended questions allow for the ‘surprising’ stumbling upon causal factors that were 
not previously anticipated.177 When interviewing the Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de 
l’Homme (LTDH)178, for example, I asked about the history of the organisation. This 
is how I then learned about the central role of documenting human rights violations 
by the LTDH and other civil society organisations within a heavily repressive 
political environment. This in turn led to more specific questions aiming to discover 
why Tunisian civil society documented human rights violations over several 
decades, which then revealed that there was the intention to use these documents for 
prosecutions, if and when the day came when trials of regime leaders would be 
possible.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
175 See Appendix I for a sample of the interview questions. 
176 To ensure the evidence collected for this research is replicable, I kept records of detailed field 
notes and contact information for the interviewees. I have also retained the archive of media sources 
that I built throughout the duration of the research and for each case study.  
177 Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel, ‘Process Tracing: From Philosophical Roots to Best 
Practices’ in Andrew Bennett and Jeffrey T. Checkel (eds), Process Tracing in the Social Sciences: 
From Metaphor to Analytic Tool (CUP 2014). 
178 The Tunisian League for Human Rights is Tunisia’s oldest and largest civil society organisation.	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Challenges 
 
 None of the challenges encountered during the collection of research posed a 
significant setback for the development of this thesis. However, certain challenges 
resulted in a limited number of interviews conducted in Libya, in comparison with 
the other case study countries. This was for four reasons. First, the security situation 
in Libya was such that the mobility of some interviewees whose offices were 
difficult to visit was restricted. The first court hearing for Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and 
the thirty-six other defendants coincided with my visit to Tripoli, which created a 
mildly precarious security environment. Precautions, then, were understandably 
taken by certain interviewees and by myself so as to avoid any danger during 
transport between interviews. Secondly, given the high sensitivity of the Saif al-
Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah El Senussi cases and given that there had been several 
assassinations and death threats targeting lawyers and judges who were potentially 
involved in their defense, the Libyan human rights lawyers I interviewed refused to 
discuss the trial of those particular individuals.179 Where such discomfort arose, I 
asked no further questions pertaining to those cases and the interviews promptly 
proceeded to the next question. A third challenge to conducting research interviews 
in Libya was obtaining a visa to travel there. This challenge was eventually 
overcome with the help of friends, acquaintances, the Libyan ambassador to Qatar, 
and the relentless efforts of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) in Qatar, for which I was conducting a short consultancy at the time. 
Finally, the general opacity surrounding the legal cases in Libya made it difficult to 
obtain details on the status of the prosecutions.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
179 Abdullah El Senussi was Muammar Gaddafi’s intelligence chief and brother-in-law. His case is 
discussed in the Status of Prosecutions in the Four Case Studies section in this chapter and again in 
Chapters 3 and 4. 
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 I faced similar challenges with regards to research interviews in Yemen. 
Thanks to the help of a friend and former colleague based in Yemen, I was able to 
obtain a visa and traveled to Sanaa in January 2014. There had been two security 
incidents involving a small bombing and an assassination on the same morning of 
my arrival in Sanaa. This meant that I had to forego an afternoon of interviews, as it 
was safer to stay in the hotel. However, as is often the case in such contexts where 
there are regular fluctuations in the security situation, things went back to normal the 
next day and I was able to conduct more interviews than initially anticipated. I was 
also fortunate to have stayed at the hotel where the final stage of the National 
Dialogue Conference was taking place, which meant that I had relatively easy 
interview access to a number of key individuals who were attending the talks.  
No significant challenges were encountered during my research in Egypt and 
Tunisia. There were, however, certain risks in Egypt, such as surveillance by 
security officers due to the perceived controversial nature of the topic of the 
interviews. To reduce this risk, I conducted the interviews in safe, public spaces (i.e. 
an office or a café) and I had a trusted driver with me at all times in Egypt, Libya 
and Yemen.  
Access to prosecutors in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen proved difficult. 
As a result, none of the interviews were conducted with prosecutors. This stemmed 
from a number of challenges having to do with the ongoing nature of the 
prosecutions and the general lack of security preventing prosecutors from providing 
commentary on such issues. With more funding and a significant increase in the 
amount of time spent conducting field research in each country, I may have been 
able to interview one or more prosecutors. Unfortunately, however, this was not 
possible due to time and financial constraints. 
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 A panel I convened at Durham Law School in May 2014 and the subsequent 
Rapporteur’s Report summarising the interventions during the panel also served as a 
useful source of information for three of the four case studies.180 Experts on Egypt, 
Libya and Tunisia participated in the panel and provided up-to-date information on 
the status of the prosecutions and thoughts on their implications in an environment 
that was free of the restrictions and security concerns outlined above during travel to 
the said countries. 	  
Rationale for Case Selection 
 
The Arab region is important for the development of transitional justice 
research and practice not least because of the varied types of transitions that emerged 
since 2011 and the divergent transitional justice paths pursued. The cases around 
which the transitional justice field was formed are largely drawn from Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, which shaped the “normative assumptions” of the field 
and represented transitions that resemble “Western liberal market democracy.”181 
This contrasts with the varied transitions that unfolded in the Arab region.  
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen share crucial attributes that make the 
comparative study possible. In all four countries, massive uprisings within the same 
time period took place, the leaders were toppled, and a drastic political transition 
ensued. Almost simultaneously, a flurry of activity surrounding the prosecution of 
political leaders unfolded in the four case studies.  The absence of trials in Yemen 
did not mean that the question of prosecution was laid to rest definitively. On the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
180 Noha Aboueldahab, ‘Rapporteur’s Report: Prosecutions, Politics and Transitions: How criminal 
justice in the Arab Spring is shaping transitional justice’ (Panel discussion, Durham Law School 
Durham 6 May 2014) 
<www.academia.edu/8738334/Rapporteurs_Report_Prosecutions_Politics_and_Transitions_-
_How_criminal_justice_in_the_Arab_Spring_is_shaping_transitional_justice> accessed 26 July 2015. 
181 Dustin N. Sharp, ‘Interrogating the Peripheries: The Preoccupations of Fourth Generation 
Transitional Justice’ (2013) 26 Harvard Human Rights Journal 149. 
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contrary, several large protests in response to the immunity law took place, keeping 
the issue of accountability in the limelight.  
The four case studies, however, are also sufficiently different so as to enable 
a meaningful comparative study. Egypt and Tunisia prosecuted their political leaders 
and issued verdicts. Libya’s transition emerged from a violent civil war between 
Gaddafi loyalists and anti-Gaddafi militias and with the aid of the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) military intervention to oust Muammar Gaddafi and 
his regime.  Following arrest warrants issued by the ICC, Libya decided to prosecute 
its leaders domestically and refused to hand over suspects to The Hague.182 It also 
won an admissibility appeal for El Senussi, resulting in the annulment of his ICC 
arrest warrant in July 2014. Former Yemeni President Saleh negotiated his ouster 
with heavy regional and international involvement. Geopolitics figured heavily in 
domestic decisions regarding prosecution in Yemen. The most influential regional 
players were Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and the 
international actors were the United States, the European Union (EU), and the 
United Nations (UN). The Yemeni parliament passed an immunity law, protecting 
Saleh and his aides from prosecution.183  
These varied transitions provide an abundance of material for the re-thinking 
of predominant understandings of transitional justice. From the outset, it is clear that 
the Arab Spring transitions – many of which are still ongoing – already point to the 
shortcomings of the prevailing assumptions of the liberal roots of transitional justice. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
182 The ICC arrest warrants were issued for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah 
El Senussi in June 2011. Following the death of Muammar Gaddafi on 20 October 2011, the ICC 
terminated its case against him. 
183 Law No. 1 of 2012 Concerning the Granting of Immunity from Legal and Judicial Prosecution, 
translated from Arabic to English by Amnesty International in Yemen’s Immunity Law – Breach of 
International Obligations (March 2012) < www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/2012-03-
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There is a fundamental tension between the paradigmatic ‘liberal’ transitional justice 
and the ‘illiberal’ transitional justice processes that unfolded in the case studies.184  
Syria and Bahrain are countries whose anti-government mass uprisings in 
2011 qualified them as Arab Spring countries. Iraq and Sudan are also countries that 
have experienced either a trial of a former leader (Iraq) or efforts to prosecute 
leaders (Sudan) by the ICC. An in-depth study of decisions regarding prosecution in 
Syria, Bahrain, Iraq and Sudan, however, are beyond the scope of this thesis for 
several reasons. One question that arises when considering these cases is whether the 
ouster of political leaders in the Arab region is a necessary condition for any formal 
decision to be taken on whether to prosecute.  Despite the fact that there have been 
recent efforts geared towards the establishment of human rights tribunals for Syria, 
access to the necessary data would have been extremely difficult, given the ongoing 
nature and intensity of the conflict in Syria. Most importantly, the differences in the 
context within which decisions regarding prosecution have taken place in Bahrain, 
Syria, Iraq and Sudan are too great to warrant a comparative case study that extends 
to those countries. Iraq did not experience an ‘Arab Spring’ uprising that toppled its 
leader, Sudan’s leaders are still very much in power despite the ICC arrest warrants 
issued against them, and Bahrain and Syria’s leaders have not been ousted by the 
uprisings that took place there.185   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 Parts of this tension are referred to by several authors in Kirsten J. Fisher and Robert Stewart (eds), 
Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring (Routledge 2014).	  
185 Despite the fundamental differences between Bahrain and the four case studies of this thesis, it is 
important to mention here the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry (BICI), which was 
established by Royal Order No. 28 by King Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa on the 29 June 2011. This 
commission, chaired by Cherif Bassiouni, was tasked with investigating events during the uprising of 
February and March 2011. The report was issued on the 23 November 2011 and recommended the 
establishment of a national, independent and impartial mechanism to conduct effective investigations 
into allegations of torture and into deaths attributed to the security forces. It states that, “These 
investigations should be capable of leading to the prosecution of those implicated, both directly and at 
all levels of responsibility, if the conclusion is that there was a breach of the law.” Bahrain 
Independent Commission of Inquiry, ‘Report of the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry’ (23 
November 2011) <http://www.bici.org.bh/BICIreportEN.pdf> accessed 7 December 2015. Morocco 
	   76	  
Scholars of transitional justice have pursued a similar comparative case study 
approach to illustrate their arguments concerning the relation between the nature of 
transitions and prosecutions. Skaar, for instance, compares Argentina, Chile and 
Uruguay in her book Judicial Independence and Human Rights in Latin America. All 
three countries suffered brutal military dictatorships in the 1970s and 1980s and the 
types of crimes – kidnappings and disappearances – were the same. The political 
leaderships in all three countries issued amnesty laws that initially precluded 
prosecution of the military for gross human rights violations. Argentina and Chile 
eventually began to move in similar directions, whereby there was an increased 
tendency of judges to prosecute military officials. Uruguay lagged behind with no 
prosecutions before 2002. Argentina and Chile successfully reformed their judicial 
systems, whereas Uruguay made a series of unsuccessful attempts at judicial reform. 
This allowed Skaar to examine how judicial reform and judicial activism – and 
indeed their absence – in the field of human rights may be related. Since the three 
countries are in the same region, certain key regional and international factors served 
as a contextual constant within which the judges in all three countries operated.186 
Still, much of the critical transitional justice scholarship is to a large extent 
concerned with the tensions between local versions of transitional justice and 
international toolkits for transitional justice. The tensions between universality 
claims and local realities are indeed important considerations in critiques of 
transitional justice, not least because they challenge some of the underlying roots of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
was the first Arab country to establish a fact-finding commission in 2004. The Equity and 
Reconciliation Commission was established a few years after the death of King Hassan II and during 
the monarchical transition of power to his son, King Mohammed VI. It investigated disappearances 
and state-sponsored violence for a period of 43 years and distributed “almost $85 million worth of 
reparations to 9,799 affected individuals.” < http://www.bici.org.bh/indexcdf1.html?page_id=10> 
accessed 7 December 2015. 
186 Elin Skaar, Judicial Independence and Human Rights in Latin America (Palgrave MacMillan 
2011) 16. 
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the broader international human rights field. 187  As Franzki and Olarte note, 
“mainstream transitional justice scholarship adopts a problem-solving stance in that 
it does not reflect on social and power relationships that brought about its object of 
study.”188  A rigorous inquiry into the transitional justice tensions at the domestic 
level coupled with an in-depth study of the origins of decisions regarding 
prosecution are therefore important ways to better understand the diverse interests 
and ends that guide transitional justice decisions. Before I present the findings of this 
inquiry in Chapter 3, the next section outlines the status of prosecutions in each case 
study.189 
Status of Prosecutions in the Four Case Studies  	  
Egypt 
 
The anti-government uprising in Egypt began on the 25 January 2011. Mass 
demonstrations engulfed the country, when hundreds of thousands of people took to 
the streets and chanted for the removal of former President Mubarak’s regime. 
Mubarak had been in power for thirty years. On the 11 February 2011, the eighteenth 
day of the uprising, Mubarak stepped down and the military took over as the 
governing interim authority until a new president – Mohammed Morsi – was elected 
in June 2012. Morsi was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood until he took the 
presidency. In July 2013, he was removed from office following a military coup, 
which saw the return of military rule in Egypt, this time headed by Abdel Fattah El 
Sisi, who then became president in June 2014.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Sharp, ‘Interrogating the Peripheries’ (n 181) 159-160. 
188 Hannah Franzki and Maria Carolina Olarte, ‘The Political Economy of Transitional Justice: A 
Critical Theory Perspective’ in Susanne Buckley-Zistel, Teresa Koloma Beck, Christian Braun and 
Friederike Mieth (eds), Transitional Justice Theories (Routledge 2014) 217. 
189 The status of prosecutions outlined in this thesis is updated as of July 2015. See Appendix III for 
an explanation of the procedural laws concerning criminal prosecution in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and 
Yemen. 
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The most high-level prosecution that has taken place in Egypt is that of 
former President Mubarak, his two sons, and the former Minister of Interior, Habib 
El Adly. All faced multiple charges of corruption, economic crimes, and human 
rights violations. The human rights prosecutions were limited to the time period of 
the eighteen day uprising – specifically, the killing of protesters, whereas the 
corruption and economic crimes charges included the pre-uprising period.190  
Mubarak and El Adly were sentenced to life in prison in June 2012 for their 
role in the killing of protesters during the uprising. They were charged with 
“complicity in the killing of protesters,” while four other high-level interior ministry 
officials were acquitted. 191 The verdict was appealed and following a re-trial, the 
charges against Mubarak and El Adly over the killing of protesters were dropped in a 
controversial verdict in November 2014. This was again appealed and a third and 
final re-trial will take place in November 2015.  
Mubarak and his two sons Gamal Mubarak and Alaa Mubarak were tried in 
numerous corruption cases.192 In the Presidential Palaces case, Mubarak, his sons 
and four other defendants were accused of embezzling LE125 million in state funds 
to adorn their private properties. In a May 2014 verdict, Mubarak was found guilty 
and sentenced to three years in prison and was fined LE120 million. The verdict was 
appealed and accepted by the Court of Cassation in January 2015. Mubarak and his 
sons were released from this case. The charge against Mubarak and his sons of 
illegal possession of five villas worth LE39 million in Sharm El Sheikh was dropped 
in November 2014 because of a ten-year statute of limitations. This was known as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 See Chapter 3 for an explanation of the very few human rights prosecutions addressing pre-2011 
violations in Egypt.	  
191 BBC News, ‘Mubarak Sentenced to Jail for Life over Protest Deaths’ (2 June 2012) 
<www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-18306126> accessed 26 July 2015. 
192 Gamal Mubarak, who was deputy secretary general of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party was 
active in Egyptian politics and was thought by many to be pushing his way to the presidency, 
following in the path of his father.	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the Sharm El Sheikh villas case. In the Al Ahram gifts case, Mubarak was accused of 
illegally receiving gifts worth LE18 million from the state owned media institution 
Al Ahram. The case was closed, however, in August 2013 following Mubarak’s 
repayment of the value of the gifts. The infamous Israeli gas deal case saw the 
prosecution of Mubarak along with former Petroleum Minister Sameh Fahmy and 
business tycoon Hussein Salem. They were accused of squandering public funds on a 
massive scale and of granting the Eastern Mediterranean Gas company (EMG) the 
right to sell Egyptian gas without a bidding process. They were also charged with 
failing to include provisions in the deal allowing Egypt to change gas prices in 
accordance with changes in international market prices. Nadia Ahmed summarises 
the magnitude of this case: “The 15 year contract with Israel reportedly cost the 
Egyptian economy LE4.2 billion. Hussein Salem allegedly made LE2 billion in 
profit from the deal…” The November 2014 verdict acquitted Mubarak and the other 
defendants on all charges related to this gas deal. While Hussein Salem was 
acquitted in the Israeli gas deal case, he along with his son and daughter were 
sentenced in absentia to ten years in a maximum security prison for their role in the 
Selling Electricity case. They were also fined LE11.125 million. Through the Middle 
East Oil Refining Company (MEDOR), which Hussein Salem chaired and on which 
his son and daughter served as board members, they illegally sold electricity to 
organisations other than the Egyptian Electricity Authority. Hussein Salem lives in 
Spain and reportedly offered to donate half his fortune to President El Sisi’s Tahya 
Masr charity fund in exchange for the dropping of all charges against him.193  
Ahmed Ezz, steel tycoon and former chairman of Mubarak’s National 
Democratic Party (NDP), was also tried in a number of corruption cases. In the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 Nadia Ahmed, ‘Show Me the Money: The Many Trials of Mubarak’s Men’ Mada Masr (25 
January 2015) <www.madamasr.com/sections/politics/show-me-money-many-trials-mubaraks-men> 
accessed 26 July 2015. 
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Money Laundering case, he was released on a LE100 million bail, “reportedly the 
highest bail ever set in Egyptian history,” for laundering LE6.4 billion between 2003 
and 2011 through deals related to his acquisition of the Al-Ezz Dekhelia Steel 
Company.194 In a separate Steel Licenses case, Ezz along with the former Trade and 
Industry Minister Rachid Mohamed Rachid were charged with squandering LE660 
million in public funds by obtaining two free licenses to produce steel instead of 
obtaining the licenses through a public bidding process. In March 2015, Ezz returned 
the second license to the state. He was released in August 2014 after completing his 
three-year prison sentence over previous corruption charges. 
Several other high-level figures from the former Egyptian regime were tried 
for corruption. They include former Prime Minister Ahmed Nazif, former Finance 
Minister Youssef Boutros-Ghali, former Housing Minister Ahmed Al-Maghrabi, 
former Tourism Minister Zoheir Garana and former Information Minister Anas Al-
Fiqqi. 
Three fact-finding committees were formed in Egypt since the 2011 uprising. 
The first was formed in 2011 and was tasked with gathering evidence for crimes 
committed during the 25 January uprising. Headed by Judge Adel Qoura, the 
committee issued its report in April 2011, in which it confirmed that Egyptian police 
used live ammunition against protesters on the 28 and 29 January 2011.195 Former 
President Mohamed Morsi formed the second fact-finding committee in July 2012, 
one month after he took office. This committee consisted of judges, an assistant 
public prosecutor, an assistant interior minister, the head of national security, human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 ibid.	  
195 Ahram Online, ‘Fact-finding committee releases report on the January 25 revolution’ (19 April 
2011) <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/10374/Egypt/Politics-/FactFinding-
Committee-releases-report-on-the-Janua.aspx> accessed 7 December 2015. 
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rights lawyers and relatives of victims.196 The 2012 fact-finding committee’s report 
was never made public, but its confidential findings led Morsi to order the re-
opening of the Mubarak trial. Given that the June 2012 Mubarak and El Adly 
verdicts were appealed in January 2013, a re-trial was set to take place later that 
year. Following the re-trial, the charges against Mubarak concerning the killing of 
protesters were dropped in November 2014. 
The third fact-finding committee was formed in December 2013 by 
presidential decree issued by interim President Adly Mansour. Headed by former 
international judge Fouad Abdel Moneim Riyad, this committee was tasked with 
investigating crimes committed during and immediately after the 30 June 2013 
events, when former President Morsi was overthrown in a military coup backed by a 
sizeable number of protesters. While only an executive summary of the committee’s 
report was made public, Egyptian civil society provided thorough responses to the 
published findings. One Egyptian NGO criticised the committee’s failure to establish 
“enforcement and accountability mechanisms to make it binding for state institutions 
to cooperate with the Commission” as well as its failure to specify whether it has the 
powers of subpoena, search and seizure.197 The committee also apparently did not 
specify which human rights violations fell under its mandate nor did it identify the 
time frame covered in its investigations.198 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196 Daily News Egypt, ‘Morsi expresses gratitude to the army amid demands to release confidential 
report,’ (12 April 2013) < http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/12/morsi-expresses-gratitude-to-
the-army-amid-demands-to-release-confidential-report/> accessed 7 December 2015. 
197 Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, ‘The Executive Summary of the Fact-Finding 
Commission’s Report: Falls Short of Expectations’ (Press Release, 4 December 2014) 
<http://eipr.org/en/pressrelease/2014/12/04/2293> accessed 7 December 2015. 
198 ibid.	  





The anti-government uprising in Libya began on the 17 February 2011. Fathi 
Terbil was among the most prominent lawyers who represented the families of the 
victims of the Abu Salim prison massacre.199 His arrest on the 15 February 2011 
sparked protests in Libya’s eastern town of Benghazi, which then grew into a full-
fledged massive uprising on the 17 February 2011. Mass demonstrations continued 
to take place, calling for the ouster of former leader Muammar Gaddafi and his 
regime. Muammar Gaddafi had been in power for forty-two years. A NATO-led 
military intervention ensued, backed by the United Nations Security Council. This 
intervention started on the 19 March 2011 and ended on the 31 October 2011, eleven 
days after Muammar Gaddafi was captured and killed by Libyan rebels. Gaddafi’s 
son, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, has since been captured and held by Libyan rebels in 
Zintan. Former intelligence chief El Senussi has been detained in Al Hadba prison 
along with over thirty former regime officials. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
199 This massacre and its significance are discussed in Chapter 3. Thousands of political opposition 
activists were imprisoned in Abu Salim, following orders by Gaddafi and his regime. The following is 
a description obtained by Human Rights Watch of the Abu Salim massacre: “[O]n the evening of June 
28 the prisoners protested over harsh prison conditions and captured two guards, one of whom died. 
Guards opened fire, killing six prisoners and wounding about 20. The government sent senior officials 
to negotiate, including Muammar Gaddafi’s brother-in-law and intelligence chief, Abdullah Sanussi. 
Five prisoners met Sanussi to present their demands, including a stop to torture, trials for prisoners, 
and improved food, health care, and family visits. Sanussi said he would meet the prisoners’ 
demands, except for trials, if the prisoners released the other captured guard, one of the prisoner 
negotiators told Human Rights Watch. The prisoners agreed and about 120 sick prisoners were taken 
away, allegedly for medical care. Instead, many of them were shot and killed. The next morning, 
hundreds of prisoners from different cell blocks were brought into a courtyard in the civilian side of 
the prison. Between 10 a.m. and 11 a.m., gunmen on the roofs opened fire with automatic weapons 
for at least one hour. In total over the two days, more than 1,200 prisoners lost their lives.” Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Libya: Abu Salim Prison Massacre Remembered’ (27 June 2012) 
<www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/27/libya-abu-salim-prison-massacre-remembered> accessed 24 August 
2015. 
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Despite the arrest warrants that were issued by the ICC for Saif al-Islam 
Gaddafi and El Senussi on the 27 June 2011, the Libyan authorities insisted that they 
try them domestically, arguing that its judiciary was capable of trying Libyan 
nationals for grave human rights violations.200 The ICC accepted an admissibility 
challenge for El Senussi, filed by Libyan authorities in April 2013: 
On 11 October 2013, Pre-Trial Chamber I decided that the case against Mr. 
Al-Senussi was inadmissible before the Court as it was subject to on-going 
domestic proceedings conducted by the competent Libyan authorities and 
that Libya was willing and able genuinely to carry out such investigation.201 
 
The ICC, however, rejected Libya’s admissibility challenge for Gaddafi. Thirty-five 
other defendants were tried domestically in Libya for charges that include war 
crimes, the killing of protesters, and corruption. Given that he continues to be held by 
Zintan militias, the trial of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi was conducted in absentia. Other 
defendants include former Prime Minister Baghdadi Al-Mahmoudi, former Foreign 
Minister Abdul Ati Al-Obeidi, and former intelligence chief Bouzid Dorda. The first 
domestic trial of a former political figure in Libya started in June 2012. In this trial, 
Dorda faced human rights charges related to the killing of protesters during the 
Libyan uprising. His trial was suspended at the time for technical reasons. 
The trial of the thirty-seven former Gaddafi regime members started in April 
2014 and verdicts were issued in July 2015. Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, El Senussi, former 
Prime Minister al-Mahmoudi and six other defendants were sentenced to death by 
firing squad for committing war crimes during the 2011 conflict.202 Seven others 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
200 The ICC had issued an arrest warrant for Muammar Gaddafi as well, but following his capture and 
death in October 2011, it terminated its case against him.  
201 International Criminal Court, ‘Al-Senussi Case: Appeals Chamber Confirms Case is Inadmissible 
before ICC’ (Press Release, 24 July 2014) 
<www.icccpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/Pages/pr1034.aspx> 
accessed 26 July 2015. 
202 The full list of those sentenced to death is as follows: Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, the colonel's son and 
right-hand man; Abdullah El Senussi, chief of military intelligence; Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi, former 
Prime Minister; Mansour Daw, security chief; Abuzeid Dorda, head of foreign intelligence; Milad 
Salem Daman, head of internal security agency; Brig Gen Mondher Mukhtar al-Gheneimi; Abdul 
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were given a twelve-year jail sentence each and four defendants were acquitted. 
According to a BBC report, “The defendants were accused of incitement to violence 
and murdering protesters during the revolution that eventually toppled Col. 
Gaddafi.”203 
The United Nations International Commission of Inquiry on Libya (2011-
2012) was established on the 25 February 2011 by the United Nations Human Rights 
Council. The Commission investigated alleged violations of international human 
rights law in Libya and produced its first report under the chairmanship of Cherif 
Bassiouni in June 2011 and the second report under the chairmanship of Philippe 
Kirsch in March 2012. Both reports are extensive and include clear recommendations 




The Tunisian anti-government uprising started on the 18 December 2010 and 
ousted former President Ben Ali on the 14 January 2011. Ben Ali was president of 
Tunisia for twenty-three years. He fled to Saudi Arabia, where he has lived in exile 
since January 2011. Calls for his extradition to Tunisia have been repeatedly 
ignored. As a result, his trials were all conducted in absentia. 
The charges in the prosecutions of twenty-two former political leaders are a 
mélange of corruption, financial, and human rights crimes – with the majority of the 
latter pertaining to those committed during the uprising. Some verdicts have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hamid Ammar Waheda, Senussi aide; Awidaat Ghandour al-Noubi, responsible for Col Gaddafi's 
revolutionary committees in Tripoli. Rana Jawad, ‘Libya death sentences cast long shadow over rule 
of law.’ (BBC News, 12 August 2015) <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33855860> accessed 20 
August 2015. 
203 BBC News, ‘Libya trial: Gaddafi son sentenced to death over war crimes.’ (BBC News, 28 July 
2015) <www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-33688391> accessed 20 August 2015. 
204 The two reports of the Commission can be found here: 
<http://mcherifbassiouni.com/investigations/libya/> accessed 7 December 2015. 
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issued, most of which have been light sentences and acquittals, and about forty 
corruption cases that have been filed since March 2011 are still being investigated. 
In addition, four hundred and twenty businessmen were banned from traveling 
outside of Tunisia pending investigation into their alleged involvement in corruption 
crimes.  
Ben Ali was sentenced to sixty-six years in prison for graft and corruption 
charges and in June 2012, he was sentenced to life imprisonment for his role in the 
killing of protesters during the uprising. He was convicted of complicity in willful 
murder and attempted murder in accordance with article 32 of the Tunisian penal 
code.205 Moreover, he along with Abdallah Qallel, a former Minister of Interior, 
were sentenced for the torture of those who participated in the 1991 attempted coup 
plot – a case that is known in Tunisia as the Baraket Essahel case, named after the 
town in which the events took place.206  
Other high-level government officials who were tried and issued prison 
sentences include former Minister of Interior Rafiq Haj Kacem, former Director 
General of National Security Adel Tiouiri, former Director of the Anti-Riot Police 
Jalel Boudrigua, former Director General of Public Security Lotfi Ben Zouaoui, and 
the powerful former Director of the Presidential Guard, Ali Seriati. However, almost 
twenty Ben Ali-era senior government officials were set free, following a significant 
reduction in sentences to time served.207 
Human Rights Watch estimates that a total of fifty-three former government 
officials, including police and security officers, were tried in military tribunals in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Human Rights Watch, ‘Tunisia: Q&A on the Trial of Ben Ali, Others for Killing Protesters’ (11 
June 2012) <www.hrw.org/news/2012/06/11/tunisia-qa-trial-ben-ali-others-killing-protesters> 
accessed 26 July 2015. 
206 See Chapter 3 for more details about this and other cases in Tunisia.  
207 Carlotta Gall, ‘Questions of Justice in Tunisia as Ousted Leaders are Freed’ New York Times (16 
July 2014) <www.nytimes.com/2014/07/17/world/africa/questions-of-justice-in-tunisia-as-ousted-
leaders-are-freed.html> accessed 26 July 2015.  
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Tunisia since late 2011.208 Tunisia was the first Arab Spring country to pass a 
transitional justice law in December 2013. Through this law, a Truth and Dignity 
Commission, covering crimes committed since Tunisia’s independence in 1955 
through 2013, was established. The first victim testimony was heard at the Truth and 
Dignity Commission in May 2015.209 Reparations, vetting, institutional reform and 
national reconciliation are some of the mechanisms that this law intends to enforce. 
Moreover, the law establishes “specialized chambers within the court system to try 
grave abuses committed between July 1955 and December 2013.”210  
Two fact-finding commissions were established in Tunisia in 2011. The first 
was established by former President Ben Ali on the 13 January 2011 – one day 
before his ouster. Its purpose was to investigate human rights violations committed 
during the 2010-2011 uprising. The second commission was established to 
investigate corruption crimes. According to some interviewees, the capacity of these 
commissions to carry out investigations was weak and their reports had little 
influence on the process of prosecution in Tunisia.211 
Yemen 
	  
On the 27 January 2011, Yemenis took to the streets to protest former 
President Saleh’s rule. Violent clashes took place between protesters, security forces, 
and tribesmen both loyal to and in opposition to Saleh’s rule. On the 18 March 2011, 
forty-five protesters were shot and killed during a mass demonstration. This day 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208 Human Rights Watch, ‘Flawed Accountability: Shortcomings of Tunisia’s Trials for Killings 
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209 Agence France Press, ‘Tunisia “Truth Commission” hears victim testimony (27 May 2015) 
<www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/afp/article-3099409/Tunisia-truth-commission-hears-victim-
testimony.html> accessed 26 July 2015. 	  
210 Human Rights Watch, ‘Flawed Accountability’ (n 201) 1.  
211 Interview with Solène Rougeaux, Director, Avocats Sans Frontières, Tunis Office (Tunis, Tunisia, 
25 April 2012); Interview with Anis Mahfoudh, Human Rights Officer, OHCHR, Tunisia (Tunis, 
Tunisia, 27 April 2012).	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became known as the “Friday of Dignity” killings during the uprising. In April 2011, 
Saleh, while still president, dismissed Attorney General Abdullah al-Olfy shortly 
after al-Olfy requested the arrests of key suspects, including government officials, 
for the Friday of Dignity killings.212 Many suspects were acquitted and the trials 
were criticised by organisations such as Human Rights Watch for being flawed.  
For example, forty-three out of seventy-eight suspects indicted in June 2011 
were listed as fugitives from justice. Thirty-one of them were never apprehended and 
the other twelve disappeared after they were provisionally released pending the 
outcome of the trial. Twenty-seven defendants were released on bail. In October 
2011, victims’ lawyers filed a motion in court demanding the indictment of at least 
eleven additional government officials for the shootings, including Saleh, his 
nephew and a former interior minister. This case was sent to the Supreme Court for a 
decision on its validity in light of the immunity law. The trial was thereafter 
suspended. 
In November 2011, the GCC, a political and economic sub-regional body, 
negotiated an agreement that resulted in Saleh’s stepping down in return for 
immunity from prosecution. The Yemeni parliament passed an immunity law for 
Saleh in January 2012 and power was transferred to his Vice President, Abed Rabbo 
Mansour Hadi, in February 2012. Despite his stepping down from the presidency, 
Saleh retained his post as leader of the powerful General People’s Congress Party 
(GPC). 
Following the passing of the immunity law, protests began to re-emerge in 
Yemen in September 2012. These protests specifically called for the reversal of the 
immunity law. In response, Yemen’s government ordered an investigation into 
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human rights violations that occurred during the uprising and set up an investigative 
committee to that effect. In September 2012, the new president Hadi signed a decree 
authorising the creation of a commission of inquiry to investigate human rights 
violations during the 2011 uprising and to recommend accountability measures, 
including prosecutions. The Hadi government ordered the investigation of seventy 
police officers suspected of being responsible for the Friday of Dignity killings 
during the uprising. A trial commenced on the 29 September 2012 in the First 
Instance Court for the Western Capital District in Sanaa.  However, the trial was 
ridden with flaws, as Human Rights Watch observed: “The state prosecution’s 
investigation into the Friday of Dignity massacre was marred by political 
interference a failure to follow leads that might have implicated government 
officials, and factual errors.”213  
Throughout the National Dialogue Conference talks in Yemen, working 
groups debated the drafting of a transitional justice law. One of the key questions 
was whether the law would date back to the beginning of Saleh’s rule in 1978 or to 
the 2011 uprising. Human Rights Minister Hooria Mashhour said that the transitional 
justice law would encourage families of victims of Saleh’s rule since 1978 to 
prosecute him or others either inside or outside Yemen. She also raised the issue of 
the need to hold to account those responsible for the forced disappearances in 
Yemen:  
There were serious violations throughout the president’s rule. It was a 
police-intelligence regime…Revolutionary youth have a list of 129 people 
who disappeared. Their families are crying and saying if they were tortured 
(to death), then give us their bodies.214 
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In October 2012, lawyers for the Friday of Dignity victims filed a motion to 
challenge the immunity law and called for a new investigation, seeking to indict 
former president Saleh and his aides. Judge al-Sanabani, however, decided that the 
motion conflicted with the immunity law and sent the case to the constitutional 
division of the Supreme Court for guidance. There was no response.  
 In the next chapter, I present the findings from the interviews conducted with 
lawyers, civil society organisations, human rights activists, academics, political 
experts, judges, international organisations and journalists in the four country case 
studies. Each country section concludes with a summary of factors that triggered, 
drove and shaped decisions regarding prosecution in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and 
Yemen. An analysis of the implications of these findings for transitional justice 
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Significance of Pre-Transition Decisions Regarding Prosecution 
 
One of the objectives of this thesis is to explain the factors that led to 
decisions to prosecute and not to prosecute political leaders.  This chapter aims, in 
part, to explain what, if any, efforts were pursued to prosecute political leaders 
before, during and shortly after the 2011 uprisings in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and 
Yemen. This question regarding pre-transition decisions to prosecute is important for 
three reasons. First, as explained in the introduction, the timing of this inquiry was 
crucial, as it allowed for interviews with individuals both directly and indirectly 
involved in the prosecutions shortly after they had taken place or, as in many cases, 
while they were still ongoing. This helps to ensure a more accurate explanation of 
the formative stages of the decisions regarding prosecution, thereby avoiding the 
tedious detective work that Sikkink referred to.215   
Second, an inquiry into efforts to prosecute in the past – before the 2011 
uprising – is necessary in order to understand the development and execution of the 
prosecutorial strategies in the four countries after the uprising.216 It provides insight 
into the formative stages of these decision-making processes. This is not to say that 
clear decisions to prosecute political leaders had begun before the ouster of the four 
leaders in 2011. On the contrary, the interview responses show that for a variety of 
reasons, very little was done in terms of attempts to hold political leaders 
accountable in a court of law. However, certain iconic cases that implicated – 
whether implicitly or explicitly – high-level government officials reveal attempts to 
achieve some form of accountability within a difficult and opaque judicial 
environment pre-transition. 
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Finally, an inquiry into the formative stages of decisions regarding 
prosecutions reveals that a variety of factors and actors shaped the decisions. As a 
result, attributing unfair trials to one factor such as a politicised and weak judiciary 
falls short of a more comprehensive explanation. It fails to take into account other 
significant factors such as the nature of the transition, the composition of civil 
society, the role of international actors, legal challenges, and so on that shaped 
transitional justice across the four countries. It is these factors that the research 
conducted for this thesis aims to identify and explain. I begin by presenting the 
findings for Egypt and Tunisia first, followed by Libya and Yemen. This is because 
Egypt and Tunisia are the two case studies that are the most advanced with regards 
to the number of prosecutions and verdicts issued for former political leaders. The 
findings for Libya and Yemen will then demonstrate further similarities with Egypt 
and Tunisia, but will also highlight significant differences in the factors that 
triggered, drove and shaped decisions regarding prosecution there. 
EGYPT	  
The Prosecution of Political Leaders in Pre-Transition Egypt 
 
While there were no successful attempts to prosecute political leaders before 
the 2011 uprising in Egypt, lawyers filed many torture cases with the public 
prosecution.217 These cases, however, targeted mid-level police and interior ministry 
officials and most of them resulted in verdicts based on weak or incomplete evidence 
and questionable judicial procedures.218  The public prosecution blocked many other 
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cases. Interviewees suggested two main reasons for the weak verdicts and for the 
large number of cases that were blocked before 2011. First, there was no political 
will to push the cases forward “because it was the regime that was committing 
torture.”219 A lack of judicial independence, particularly where the public prosecutor 
is allied with the ruling political party, was a major obstacle to criminal 
accountability for both political leaders and mid-level officials. Several interviewees 
also explained that no one was “bold enough” to pursue cases against high-level 
government officials and this is largely due to the systematic nature of torture and 
intimidation tactics employed by amn el dawlah, or state security.220 Human rights 
lawyer and activist Mohamed Al Ansary recalled some testimonies from torture 
victims who said that when they attempted to report torture crimes at police stations, 
state security officials then posed as prosecutors and inflicted torture on them again 
for reporting the original crime.221 This of course created a climate of fear, leading 
an increasing number of victims to refrain from reporting torture crimes. Al Ansary 
added that the difference between calls for prosecution before 2011 and calls for 
prosecution post 2011 is that civil society demands were formerly framed as “we 
need more accountability” rather than the more recent, bolder and specific “Mubarak 
should be prosecuted.” Naming high-level officials was too risky for torture victims 
in particular because of the systematic and widespread nature of torture practices in 
Egypt before 2011.  
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Difficult access to concrete evidence is the second major reason for the lack 
of criminal prosecutions of high-level government officials before 2011.222  As 
Judge Adel Maged explained, the problem with the Egyptian criminal system is that 
it requires ‘direct evidence’, for example in the form of eyewitnesses, for cases to be 
successful.223 Maged explained that “According to the ordinary criminal provisions, 
many cases both before and after 2011 resulted in acquittals because there was 
insufficient evidence according to this evidentiary requirement – direct evidence – in 
the current criminal system.” 224  The absence of a provision for command 
responsibility in the criminal code also makes it difficult, almost impossible, to 
establish the responsibility of leaders.  
Before 2011, there were a few notable prosecution attempts that targeted the 
president, prime minister, ministers, and intelligence chiefs.  For example, a number 
of prominent human rights lawyers, including Khaled Ali and Ahmed Seif El Dawla, 
filed complaints against former intelligence chief Omar Suleiman for the 2008 
violent crackdown on protesters in Mahalla.225 The public prosecutor blocked this 
case from going forward. The high-level corruption cases of Madinaty and Palm 
Hills in 2010 were filed against the president, prime minister, and minister of 
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investment.226 Three influential cases, however, stand out in the string of failed 
attempts at prosecution before 2011. Several interviewees cited the Khaled Said case 
of 2010-2014, the Emad El Kebir case of 2007 and the 2005 sexual harassment case, 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and Interights v Egypt (323/2006). These 
were relatively successful efforts to prosecute officials within the police and ministry 
of interior. 
Khaled Said was a twenty-eight year old man from Alexandria who was 
arrested, beaten and tortured for posting a video on the Internet of police officers 
conducting an illegal drug transaction. Said died as a result of the torture inflicted on 
him. Images of his mangled body went viral on social media and produced 
widespread and international outrage. Wael Ghonim, a computer engineer, started a 
Facebook page called “We Are All Khaled Said” days after Said’s death in June 
2010. We Are All Khaled Said became a powerful social movement in the lead up to 
and during the Egyptian uprising in 2011. The two police officers accused of 
torturing Said to death, Awad Ismail and Mahmoud Salah, were put on trial in July 
2010. The trial was delayed until October 2011, when the officers were sentenced to 
seven years in prison. In March 2014, following a re-trial, the sentence was 
increased to ten years in prison.227  
Emad El Kebir is a bus driver who was kidnapped by police officers in 
Alexandria, Egypt in 2006 and was beaten, raped and tortured while in detention. 
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Videos of police officers beating and torturing El Kebir, recorded by the officers 
themselves, circulated on the internet and triggered widespread public outrage. The 
officers were found guilty, jailed for three years, and El Kebir was also offered 
monetary compensation.228 Although high-level officials were not implicated in this 
case, its widespread publicity both within and outside Egypt turned it into an 
influential case showing that holding the police accountable for their crimes is 
possible.  
In 2013, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereinafter 
the ‘African Commission’ or ‘Commission’) decided that the Egyptian state was in 
violation of several articles of the African Charter for the infamous harassment case 
of four women eight years earlier. On 25 May 2005, Shaimaa Abou Al-Kheir, Nawal 
Ali Mohammed Ahmed, Abir al-Askari and Iman Taha Kamel were beaten and 
sexually harassed at a demonstration outside the Journalists Syndicate in Cairo. 
Opposition groups protesting constitutional amendments that were viewed as an 
attempt to consolidate Mubarak’s authoritarian rule led the demonstration. After a 
series of failed attempts to domestically prosecute those responsible for the 
harassment, the NGO Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights and international 
human rights group Interights filed a complaint with the African Commission in 
2006. 229  The Commission’s decision in early 2013 and its call for Egypt to 
investigate, punish the perpetrators, and provide monetary compensation to the 
victims is largely viewed as a significant victory in the difficult pursuit of 
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accountability targeting Ministry of Interior officials. It also signified the first time 
that the Commission issued a decision on the duty of states to protect women from 
violence.230 Moreover, human rights lawyers again filed complaints with the African 
Commission in 2012, this time against the military’s use of ‘virginity tests’ on 
female protesters in Cairo’s Tahrir Square.231 While the African Commission is not 
regarded as influential as, for example, the IACtHR is in Latin America, it is a legal 
avenue that is increasingly used by Egyptian human rights organisations that are 
unable to effectively pursue criminal justice domestically.232 That said, the decisions 
of the African Commission are yet to be implemented in Egypt. 
Content and Extent of Prosecutions 
	  
 Since the 2011 Egyptian uprising, charges related to the embezzlement of 
state funds, the illegal sale of land, and other illicit gains figured quite heavily in the 
prosecutions’ files. Moreover, these charges dated back to periods from before the 
2011 uprising. On the other hand, charges related to torture, arbitrary detention, and 
other human rights abuses were, with very few exceptions, limited to the eighteen 
day period of the 2011 uprising, leaving previous decades of perpetual civil and 
political rights violations unaccounted for.  Also, certain high-level government 
officials were prosecuted, while others were not. The following analysis addresses 
why the content of the prosecutions – i.e. the types of charges – is focused on 
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corruption and economic crimes and on a very limited set of human rights crimes. 
Using material from interviews with lawyers, activists, judges and civil society 
organisations, this section also explains the selective extent of the trials - why certain 
leaders were put on trial, while others ran free and even became candidates in 
presidential elections. 
 Why did prosecutions place heavy emphasis on corruption crimes as opposed 
to human rights crimes? One explanation pertains to the controlled nature of the 
transition that unfolded in Egypt, whereby the military and other state agencies 
worked to ensure that investigations and trials did not extend ‘too far’ so as not to 
harm their political interests and subject themselves to prosecution. Linked to this 
explanation is the role of a politicised judiciary in blocking certain controversial 
cases. Third, the victims, activists and lawyers who were active in pursuing 
prosecutions were preoccupied with the more recent crimes of 2011 because they are 
‘fresher’ and therefore easier to prosecute.233 Fourth, the absence of an enabling 
legal framework and other legal challenges such as the requirement of direct 
evidence have made human rights prosecutions particularly difficult. Fifth, the 
emphasis on corruption and economic crimes is a means to scapegoat certain high-
level individuals to deflect attention from the lack of accountability for a more 
comprehensive set of human rights violations and their perpetrators. I will take each 
of these explanations in turn. 	  
A Military-Controlled Transition and a Politicised Judiciary 
 
 Many lawyers, activists and NGOs consider the military-controlled transition 
and a politicised judiciary in Egypt as the two underlying and closely related factors 
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that have shaped the content and the extent of prosecutions.234 Mohamed El Shewy, 
programme officer at the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, explains: 
 
The government – the feloul235– controls the prosecutions. The military has 
been trying to control how much is prosecuted, what is prosecuted, how far 
back and how deep the prosecutions are going.236 
 
The focus on crimes of the transition is itself also limited in scope. With few 
exceptions, including the flawed trials of the police officers who shot and killed 
protesters during the November 2011 Mohamed Mahmoud Street demonstrations 
against the military, the majority of the human rights trials strictly addressed the 
eighteen day period of the uprising. This is again attributed to the influential role of 
the military in limiting the extent of the prosecutions and is facilitated by a complicit 
judiciary that has loyalties to the Mubarak regime and to the military.  
Human rights violations have continued and in some ways even intensified 
since the overthrow of Mubarak in February 2011, prompting the head of the 
Egyptian Centre for Economic and Social Rights (ECESR) Nadeem Mansour to sum 
up the situation as follows: “We have the same courts and the same human rights 
violations.”237 Mansour’s statement points to the military-controlled transition in 
Egypt where the former regime still wields significant influence on the shape of the 
transition and its politics. The former regime is often associated with the military 
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because many of its leaders, including Mubarak, hailed from the military. Habib 
Nassar, former director of the Middle East and North Africa programme at the 
International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ) argued that “the army and 
interim authorities are afraid to open the human rights file.” This is because of the 
military’s close ties with the former regime in the decades before the 2011 
uprising.238 Mansour elaborated on the impact of the controlled transition in Egypt 
on the limited nature of the human rights charges:  
The human rights charges in the prosecutions that have taken place in Egypt 
only have to do with the uprising because we are operating on the same 
system as before the revolution. We are dealing with the same system – the 
military which was part of the same violations is the group that led the so-
called transition. It is the same court system that was running under the 
Mubarak regime. So it is very hard to conduct prosecutions, unlike in 
Argentina…The human rights charges are also limited because the 
prosecutions are governed by the prosecutor, who is totally controlled by the 
regime - whether the former or the current one. The whole system is very 
controlled in terms of what is prosecuted and what is not. The court system 
in the last two years has been focusing on resisting this temptation on 
focusing on before the uprising. The prosecution of old [pre-uprising] human 
rights violations would have been more radical for them. It would lead to 
real change in the regime and in the police. The old political violations are 
still being committed. We did not have a change in the governing elite. The 
Muslim Brotherhood joined, but they did not shift. And this is because the 
same political violations still exist.239  
 
El Shewy described a very similar situation in his statements on the nature of the 
transition in Egypt and the consequent ways in which civil society had to adjust their 
advocacy efforts:  
This has been a controlled transition in the sense that there was a willingness 
to go after Mubarak and the National Democratic Party – especially the 
higher echelons of it – but I think that’s where it stops and I think there is a 
lot of unwillingness to go beyond that and into how the 1952 state operated. 
Now of course, there is a lot of interest in trying Morsi and his people – but 
the way the transition has gone, it hasn’t really been a transition. We’ve had 
one leader go, but the whole system is still exactly the same, so it’s difficult 
to talk about a transition. So our belief is that there hasn’t really been a 
transition and so [civil society’s] approach is to go from the bottom up so 
instead of relying on the judiciary, we are attempting to go and archive and 
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document things ourselves and try to have a strong series of cases that we 
can then – when there is political will – use to really have a serious 
transitional justice programme. We are reverting to the strategy we used to 
operate on before 2011 since there isn’t much political will because there 
hasn’t been much of a change.240 
 
Mansour and El Shewy’s observations also point to the problem of a non-
independent judiciary. While a detailed analysis of the history, functioning and 
structure of the Egyptian judiciary is beyond the scope of this thesis, its complex role 
in Egypt’s transition and in the shape of the prosecutions is a significant factor.241 
One example of the alliance between parts of the judiciary and the military is the 
discussions between Tahani el-Gebali, the deputy president of the Supreme 
Constitutional Court, and the military leadership in 2012. El-Gebali advised the 
military to delay the transfer of authority to civilians until a constitution is written so 
that the generals “knew who they were handing power to and on what basis.”242 El-
Gebali’s advice led the military to dissolve Egypt’s first fairly elected parliament.243 
This example is indicative of the controlled nature of the transition in Egypt, 
whereby the military-led government and a fragmented judiciary worked together to 
shape key aspects of the transition, including who gets prosecuted and for what. As 
Tamer Wageeh, the director of the economic and social justice programme at 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights explained, “The judiciary has loyalties to the 
old regime and this has adversely affected the comprehensiveness of cases and 
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investigations...Previous human rights violations are not accounted for because it is 
the same regime.”244  
 In addition to “rampant nepotism,” Sahar Aziz describes the Egyptian 
judiciary as a “formidable deep state institution.”245 Using the example of the 
military’s ouster of former president Mohamed Morsi – Egypt’s first elected 
president following the 2011 uprising – Aziz explains how the split in the judiciary 
along political lines was reinforced by a controlling executive:  
At the moment, over sixty judges who condemned the deposal of Morsi as a 
military coup are being investigated and systematically purged from the 
judiciary…This explains, in part, why Adly Mansour’s military-backed 
government permitted the ordinary judiciary to prosecute Muslim 
Brotherhood members, Morsi supporters that were not members of the 
[Muslim Brotherhood], and youth revolutionaries.  The senior judicial 
leadership’s cooperation with the executive’s crackdown, coupled with a 
critical mass of judges that distrusted the [Muslim Brotherhood], 
transformed the judiciary into a political ally…That the judges would 
suddenly transform into vanguards of transitional justice was improbable. 
Likewise, the prosecutors responsible for investigating the facts of 
prosecutions of Mubarak and his cronies were the same ones who for 
decades had propped up the Mubarak regime for decades. Indeed, most 
judges were members of the same political elites that had benefited both 
financially and politically from the authoritarian state….More than three 
years after Egypt’s uprising, the judiciary has proven to be a formidable deep 
state institution, guarding its material interests in the status quo even if it 
means betraying the rule of law.246 
 
The judiciary thus played a significant role in both allowing and blocking 
prosecutions from taking place without, as Aziz’s damning critique of the judiciary 
shows, any regard for the rule of law. Judicial decisions regarding prosecution were 
thus very much tied to Egypt’s military-controlled transition, fraught with the 
feloul247 of the Mubarak era.  
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 Finally, in activist and writer Wael Eskandar’s remarks on the lack of a 
definitive political transition in Egypt, he distinguishes between social change and 
political change. He explains:  
How would I describe the transition in Egypt? It’s a matter of scapegoating 
faces of the same regime. Let’s compare Egypt to the transitions in Latin 
America. Well, if Egypt didn’t border Israel, things would be different. It 
would be more like Tunisia. It’s too much of an important international 
actor. The change instead happened inside people. There is too much at 
stake with Egypt for a real transition to happen. What needs to happen is for 
there to be a system that reflects the social change that took place on the 
streets. There has been dramatic social change and without bringing people 
to account for what they did and do, there is no transition.  Real criminal 
accountability is what is needed in order to have an effective transition.248  
 
Of note, here, is Eskandar’s reference to Egypt’s geopolitical significance as Israel’s 
neighbour, and the negative impact this has had on the emergence of a complete 
political transition. This in turn has, according to Eskandar, resulted in farcical trials 
as no genuine reform of the judiciary and the political leadership has taken place. 
Popular Demands for Accountability 
	  
The focus on crimes of the transition and on corruption crimes dating to 
periods from before the transition is also a result of the content of the public 
demands during the uprising. In fact, without the large number of people who took to 
the streets to demand prosecutions, decisions to prosecute may not have taken place 
to begin with. Protesters demanded accountability for the killing of demonstrators 
during the uprising and for the “visible” and rampant corruption that plagued the 
country for decades.249 Gamal Eid, lawyer for several victims, and Wageeh both 
explained that protesters emphasised accountability for corruption and on the limited 
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set of human rights violations during the uprising because they are the most recent 
crimes and are still ongoing.  Victims, activists and lawyers are more preoccupied 
with the recent crimes because “it is more practical to deal with crimes that were 
committed during and since the uprising.”250 This, coupled with the difficulty in 
obtaining access to evidence for previous human rights crimes, the lack of an 
independent judiciary and political will, and the continued perpetration of human 
rights violations throughout the transition, significantly shaped and limited the 
content of the prosecutions. 	  
Legal Challenges to Prosecutions of Political Leaders 
 
Moreover, legal challenges further contributed to the limited content and 
extent of the prosecutions. Individuals who were prosecuted were tried under the 
regular criminal code for crimes that require a “different set of legislations that could 
account for this transition.”251 Judge Maged argued that the crimes committed during 
the eighteen day uprising in 2011 are not “ordinary crimes” such as murder.252 
Rather, they are “serious crimes that require special techniques in investigations and 
prosecutions. The current criminal justice system cannot address such types of 
crimes because they are characterised by their systematic and widespread nature – 
especially if these crimes occurred in accordance with state policy, in which case 
they can be classified as crimes against humanity.”253 Judge Maged also highlighted 
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that without the inclusion of command responsibility in Egypt’s criminal code, it 
will remain impossible to establish the responsibility of leaders.254   
As several interviewees explained, access to the evidence necessary to build 
a strong case in court has been extremely difficult. This is because “Evidence is with 
the police, the intelligence agencies, and the old regime – and the judiciary has no 
power to force these actors to submit the evidence they withhold.”255  Judge Maged 
attributed the series of acquittals pre and post 2011 to the lack of evidence sufficient 
to meet the evidentiary requirement in Egypt’s current criminal system and 
summarised the legal challenges to the prosecution of political leaders in Egypt as 
follows:  
The 25 January crimes are grave crimes against protesters - they are not 
‘regular’ crimes – not traditional or classic crimes such as murder, and they 
therefore require special techniques in investigations and prosecutions.  The 
current criminal justice system cannot address such types of crimes, which 
are characterised by their systemic and widespread nature – especially if it 
occurred in accordance with state policy. I argue that these crimes can be 
classified as crimes against humanity. And the problem with the Egyptian 
criminal system is that you have to have direct evidence – such as 
eyewitnesses – to establish that such crimes occurred. To establish the 
responsibility of high-level officials, you need to incorporate in the criminal 
justice system new principles of command responsibilities which enable the 
judiciary to establish the responsibility of leaders….If we had this legal tool, 
we could prosecute/establish criminal responsibility.256   
 
Ali highlighted another challenge regarding the question of direct evidence. He 
argued that the interior ministry and the public prosecution were unwilling to release 
evidence because “to hold El Adly responsible would implicate many other 
people.”257 A strong indication of this deep-seated fear to prosecute is the shredding 
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of thousands of classified documents by intelligence agency officials in March 
2011.258  Ali further explained that as a result, limited prosecutions have taken place 
and they instead focus on corruption because the military, keen on appeasing public 
anger, wanted to give the impression that justice is being sought and that there has 
been a definitive break with the former regime.  
Prosecutions: A Scapegoating Strategy  
 
In a similar vein, the emphasis on corruption and socio-economic crimes 
charges in the trials, is, according to several interviewees, a form of scapegoating.259  
The emphasis on such crimes was a means to shroud the neglect of accountability for 
widespread torture, killings, and other civil and political rights abuses committed for 
decades. These corruption cases, Ali observed, often result in acquittals, worsening 
the problem of impunity in Egypt.260 Only a select group of individuals were 
targeted for prosecution and many corruption cases have been stalled.261 As El 
Shewy noted, “The corruption cases are politicised in that they have excluded certain 
individuals from prosecution. The exclusion of the military in particular, among 
various other elites.” 262  El Shewy continued to explain that the emphasis on 
corruption is “an attempt to individualise what happened rather than look at it as a 
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system…There is an attempt to say Mubarak was corrupt, but not necessarily the 
system he ran.”263  
Mansour, who filed many corruption cases through his organisation ECESR, 
also pointed to the selectivity of the corruption cases, arguing that individuals such 
as Mubarak and his two sons could not be spared from corruption prosecutions 
because “they are highly symbolic individuals.”264 They were convenient scapegoats 
to serve the purpose of showing a break with the former regime. Mansour cited an 
example of corruption cases he had been working on involving around fifty 
ministers, only a handful of which were tried.  He also explained that the ECESR has 
been relatively successful in filing corruption cases because they are filed with the 
administrative courts, which issue rulings on corrupt decisions rather than against 
individuals. The cases are then transferred to the criminal courts to identify the 
individuals who are criminally responsible for the corrupt decisions. However, a 
politicised public prosecutor’s office meant that many of these criminal cases were 
blocked.265  
Moreover, reconciliation deals meant that a greater number of individuals 
implicated in massive corruption crimes escaped prosecution. Given the vast extent 
of corruption, which involved the embezzlement of tens of millions of Egyptian 
pounds, 266  the military and other interim authorities decided to settle for 
reconciliation deals. Business tycoons such as Hussein Salem would pay the state the 
money they gained illicitly and this money would be used to help re-build Egypt’s 
battered economy. Legal steps were taken to facilitate these reconciliation deals, 
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particularly the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) Decree No. 4 of 
2012, which “gives immunity from criminal prosecution to businessmen accused of 
corruption under Mubarak and offers them the chance to settle their cases with 
government commissions.”267 Wageeh explained that the military justified these 
reconciliation deals as a means to protect capitalism and restore economic security. 
On the question of holding the same business tycoons criminally accountable, 
Wageeh responded that the prevailing view of many Egyptians was, “Our economy 
is in tatters - what will you gain from imprisoning them?”268  
The extent of the human rights trials has also been selective. For example, 
despite crimes committed during the interim rule of the SCAF in 2011-2012, no 
military officials have been prosecuted.269 Other high-level former regime members 
also escaped prosecution, which points to a strategy that aims to show only a 
symbolic ‘break’ with the former regime, rather than a real effort to achieve justice 
for past atrocities. Aziz gives an example of the selective extent of the trials: 
[O]nly one police officer is serving a three year sentence for shooting 
protesters during the bloody Mohamed Mahmoud protests in November 
2011 wherein over fifty-one protesters were killed in five days. And only 
two police officers are serving time for the killing of at least 846 protesters 
in the protests of January 2011.270 
 
In effect, individuals such as Mubarak, his two sons, and former Minister of Interior 
El Adly were used as scapegoats to appease public demands for accountability. As 
one interviewee explained, the objective was to “sacrifice a part of the regime to 
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save the regime.”271 Ali gave a similar account of the motives behind the selective 
prosecutions and their link with the controlled nature of the transition:  
We have not taken serious steps in prosecutions because the revolution is not 
yet over. What is happening now is that the regime is prosecuting symbolic 
people just to ‘show’ that they are doing justice. But they are not serious – 
the regime is not individuals, the regime is a network of economic and social 
opportunists – and it’s the same regime that is ruling. We succeeded in a part 
and failed in another part. I am not pessimistic; I am being realistic.272 
 
Teitel’s explanation of the limited criminal sanction is useful here as a point 
of reflection on the politicised prosecutorial strategy employed in Egypt. The limited 
criminal sanction provides insight into the exceptional uses of transitional criminal 
law in classic liberal transitions. It is essentially limited accountability for the sake of 
political liberalisation, security, and peace.273 However, this limited content and 
extent of accountability that has emerged in Egypt has been pursued for safeguarding 
the political interests of a controlled transition, rather than for the preservation of a 
secure, peaceful, liberal, democratic transition.274 I discuss Teitel’s limited criminal 
sanction theory in Chapter 4.	  
Socio-Economic Roots of the Transition 
 
A common contextual factor that several interviewees mentioned is the 
significance of the socio-economic roots of the uprising and their impact on the 
shape of criminal accountability in the transition. Deep socio-economic grievances 
led to partial socio-economic accountability in Egypt.  Judge Maged argued that 
years of rampant corruption and a poor socio-economic situation in Egypt is a 
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significant factor that led to the emphasis on corruption crimes in the trials.  Like 
Wageeh and Eid, he points to the strong demands to end corruption during the mass 
uprising in 2011 and explained that “corruption means money, resources – people 
want to remove corruption because they want the money back.”275 This, in part, is 
what prompted the interim military authority to negotiate reconciliation deals with 
Egyptian business tycoons implicated in massive corruption cases.276  
The poor economic health of Egypt, particularly the soaring unemployment 
rates among youth and significant structural inequalities, have not, then, merely 
served as context or a background to the political developments of the Egyptian 
transition. They have been foregrounded as some of the most central concerns of 
Egyptian society – and this has manifested itself in the trials.  The uprising was 
driven by economic injustices during which years of economic oppression and 
miserable living standards had no prospect of improving because of a severely 
corrupt government and the absence of access to the most basic civil and political 
rights. Here lay the nexus between socio-economic and civil and political rights 
violations. 
Significant socio-economic woes included poverty, high unemployment, lack 
of access to health services, poor working conditions, lack of job security, and the 
repression of unions. This dreary state of economic affairs compounded the 
widespread frustration among Egyptians, which in turn resulted in the outburst of 
mass revolts that ousted Mubarak. However, this explanation is insufficient because 
it does not explain the concurrent high demand for human rights accountability and 
the link between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights that activists 
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had been pushing for.277 The drivers of the uprisings were just as much about socio-
economic problems as they were about human rights problems. This explanation is 
therefore in need of a more comprehensive account that again addresses pre-
transition factors that contributed to the shape of post-transition prosecutions in 
Egypt. 
Role of Workers’ Movements and Labour Unions 
	  
A closer look at the social and political processes that unfolded in Egypt 
reveal that workers’ movements and labour unions played a significant role before, 
during, and after the uprisings. The general strike led by textile workers in the 
Egyptian town of Mahalla in 2008, for instance, led to the formation of the 6 April 
movement, which became an influential workers rights and human rights mobilising 
force. This movement, along with other similar workers’ rights movements, led mass 
protests during and after the Egyptian uprising.  In the lead up to the 2008 general 
strike in Egypt, the 6 April movement and a number of opposition groups and parties 
signed this statement: 
All national forces in Egypt have agreed upon the 6th of April to be a public 
strike. On the 6th of April, stay home, do not go out; Don’t go to work, don’t 
go to the university, don’t go to school, don’t open your shop, don’t open 
your pharmacy, don’t go to the police station, don’t go to the camp; We need 
salaries allowing us to live, we need to work, we want our children to get 
education, we need human transportation means, we want hospitals to get 
treatment, we want medicines for our children, we need just judiciary, we 
want security, we want freedom and dignity, we want apartments for youth; 
We don’t want prices increase, we don’t want favoritism, we don’t want 
police in plain clothes, we don’t want torture in police stations, we don’t 
want corruption, we don’t want bribes, we don’t want detentions. Tell your 
friends not to go to work and ask them to join the strike.278 
 
This statement clearly lays out the socio-economic and other human rights demands 
of the Egyptian opposition and workers’ movements in 2008 – a year that served as a 
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key turning point in the lead up to the uprising of 2011. What is striking about this 
statement is that the demands for social justice and for civil and political rights are at 
par with each other. There is no prioritisation of one set of rights over the other – the 
6 April movement and its supporters clearly viewed socio-economic rights as 
inseparable from civil and political rights. The labour rights movements in Egypt 
continued to actively challenge government policies in the transitional period. 
According to the Egyptian International Development Centre, 1,354 social and 
labour rights protests took place in March 2013 alone, compared to 864 protests 
during the previous month. This meant an average of forty-four protests per day, or 
1.8 protests every hour. 279 
These labour rights movements in Egypt did not operate alone – the Kifaya 
movement in Egypt, for example, was persistent in its calls for transparent 
governance and democracy. Kifaya, a coalition consisting of various opposition 
activists, was established in the run-up to the parliamentary and presidential 
elections in 2005. It called for free elections, civil and political rights, and an end to 
authoritarian rule.280  But the strongest forces of opposition in Egypt were labour 
rights movements.  Those calling for civil and political rights, such as the right to 
freedom of expression, the right to assemble, and freedom from torture and arbitrary 
detention, were severely repressed through massive crackdowns led by the police 
and other state security forces, resulting in a significantly weakened human rights 
movement in Egypt.  In contrast, the labour rights movements were slightly more 
tolerated. 
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The relative success, then, of the Egyptian labour rights movements in 
bringing to the fore demands for social justice and an end to corruption impacted the 
content of the prosecutions. The build-up of their influence over the years played a 
big role in the consequent emphasis on socio-economic crimes charges in the 
prosecutions. Workers’ movements and labour unions thus served as key drivers in 
ensuring some form of criminal accountability for socio-economic rights violations. 
This largely occurred through complaints filed by lawyers working in organisations 
such as the Egyptian Center for Economic and Social Rights and the Hisham 
Mubarak Law Center. On the other hand, the harsh crackdowns on civil and political 
rights activists left a seriously weakened human rights lobby that was largely 
unsuccessful in ensuring criminal accountability for human rights abuses committed 
before, during and after the uprisings. 
 Role of International Actors  
	  
What, if any, was the role of international actors in decisions regarding 
prosecution in Egypt? During the interviews, the term ‘international actors’ was used 
to encompass foreign governments and regional and international NGOs. The 
overwhelming response from the interviewees is that international actors did not 
have a significant impact in driving prosecutions.  Instead, international actors were 
active in monitoring and raising awareness about human rights violations. Nassar 
noted that investigations such as those conducted by Human Rights Watch and 
Amnesty International aided in increasing pressure on governments to improve the 
human rights situation.281 But, he continued, “things happened so quickly that we 
cannot give too much credit to the international human rights movement. Domestic 
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action was swift regarding the prosecutions.”282 Nassar, however, added that the 
proliferation of the international criminal justice movement meant that it was more 
difficult to pass amnesty laws.283  Activists also pointed to the role of international 
actors in supporting domestic civil society campaigns in Egypt by making legal and 
advocacy tools available to support their cause.284 Overall, international actors did 
not have much of a role in driving prosecutions, which were “very much a 
domestically driven process.”285 Regional actors, such as the African Commission, 
had limited influence, but they nonetheless served a facilitating role when domestic 
processes were stalled.286  
For example, Eid explained his organisation’s decision to work with the 
African Commission over a case regarding the cutting of communications in Egypt 
during the uprising. On the 28 January 2011, the government cut access to most 
internet and mobile phone services, resulting in a “90 per cent drop in data traffic to 
and from Egypt.”287 Eid described the gravity of this move and his consequent 
decision to file a case against the Minister of Communications among others:  
We have a case that we are filing with the African Commission - the 
communications case. We want to pinpoint the individual who took the 
decision to cut the communications on the 27 January – 551 people died on 
the 28 January as a result. Between 16-90 individuals died because of 
inability to contact ambulances. This is [the Arabic Network for Human 
Rights Information’s] estimation. Three communications companies and one 
internet company were probably responsible – we are filing for murder 
because of their role in cutting the communications. They keep transferring 
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the case from this unit of the judiciary to that unit of the judiciary to tire us 
out. But we don’t get tired.288  
 
Eid noted that the case was buried by the Morsi government and then stalled with the 
military prosecution for over two years. “This is why,” he said, “we want to take the 
communications case to the African Commission.”289 
Role of Domestic Civil Society 
 
 Civil society documentation of human rights violations repeatedly emerged 
as a topic of discussion in the interviews. When asked for what purpose civil society 
organisations documented human rights violations in Egypt, the responses revealed 
an array of reasons. Many cited the classic reason of raising awareness and putting 
pressure on the government to change its human rights practices. Eid and El Shewy 
explained that despite working with a politicised judiciary, the aim of civil society 
documentation was to have enough evidence so that “one day,” when an independent 
judiciary is in place, “we will be able to prosecute.”290 Eid cited the lack of an 
independent judiciary as one of the strong motivators for documentation and 
explained: “We have archives, we have documents, we have testimonies.  We need 
political will and a new government and an independent judiciary willing to 
prosecute for these crimes for the thirty plus years of Mubarak’s rule.”291 El Shewy 
described documentation as one of the powerful tools of a civil society struggling 
with authoritarian rule. “Since there has been no real transition,” he explained, “our 
approach is to go from the bottom up. Through victims’ families, we are archiving 
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and documenting things ourselves to try and have a strong series of cases so that we 
can then – when there is political will – really have a serious transitional justice 
programme.”292  The 6 April movement said that while civil society documentation 
does not count as evidence in a court of law, it was a powerful means to mobilise 
and pressure the government to respond to grievances.293 
 Most civil society documentation in Egypt addressed torture, police abuses, 
and other civil and political rights violations. However, as El Shewy explained, this 
changed following the 2011 uprising:  
There was never really a focus on how to document abuses of economic and 
social justice violations. We at EIPR began that much more strongly after the 
revolution because we realized [that both sets of rights] were linked – they 
are not mutually exclusive.  They sustained one another. There was a 
realisation that if you simply went around prosecuting civil and political 
rights abuses then you wouldn’t be getting into the structural reasons for why 
the revolution happened – and how Mubarak and his aides were able to 
maintain their power through their system of abuse.294 
 
This link between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights, as discussed 
further in Chapter 4, characterises the transitional justice discourse in Egypt. Unlike 
its predecessors in other parts of the world, the transitional justice that lawyers and 
activists sought in Egypt does not make a distinction between the two sets of rights. 
This is despite the fact that the prosecutions, for the various factors explained above, 
were heavy on corruption charges. 
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 As explained in the Methodology section in Chapter 2, I reflect on the 
material collected for each case study by identifying what factors triggered, drove, 
and shaped decisions regarding prosecution. I do not claim that the trigger-driver-
shaper mechanism, derived from the method of process tracing, explains the process 
of prosecution from start to finish. Rather, it is a prism through which I make sense of 
the research collected and by which I develop an explanation of how decisions 
regarding the prosecution of political leaders emerged and developed before and 
during the highly contentious period of transition.295 I begin with the trigger factors, 
which pertain to the factors that led to decisions to prosecute. I then discuss the 
various factors that drove these decisions and pushed them forward. Finally, I discuss 
the shaping factors that impacted the content and the extent of the prosecutions.  
Triggers 
	  
 Two cases of police torture, one of which resulted in the victim’s death, were 
repeatedly cited as turning points in calls for accountability in Egypt before the 2011 
uprising. The 2006 case of bus driver Emad El Kebir resulted in widespread publicity 
both within and outside Egypt. Although no high-level government or police officials 
were implicated, it became an influential case showing that holding the police 
accountable for their crimes is possible. The torture and killing of Khaled Said in 
June 2010, who quickly became an iconic figure in Egypt because of his widely 
publicised fate, was investigated and two police officers were sentenced to 10 years 
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in a maximum-security prison.296 The case of Khaled Said is widely regarded as the 
trigger for the uprising that took place a few months after his death. It became a 
symbol of police brutality and impunity in Egypt, fuelling public anger and leading to 
the influential We Are All Khaled Said protest movement that was started by Wael 
Ghonim.297 The cases of Emad El Kebir and Khaled Said were thus triggers, or 
turning points, that opened up the possibility of holding a much feared arm of the 
Ministry of Interior – the police – criminally accountable. It is far from a coincidence 
that the Egyptian uprising started on National Police Day – the 25 January. 
 Prior to the Khaled Said incident, two other significant movements that had 
been brewing for years also served as turning points in the rise of the anti-Mubarak 
opposition. These were the Kifaya movement in 2005 and the 6 April movement in 
2008.298 The general strike led by textile workers in the Egyptian town of Mahalla in 
2008 was followed by the formation of the 6 April movement, which became an 
influential workers rights and human rights group. Unlike the Emad El Kebir and 
Khaled Said incidents, which were shocking incidents that triggered sudden and 
widespread public anger, the Kifaya and 6 April movements grew over time and were 
marked by periodic protests – even mini-uprisings – that increasingly drew ordinary 
Egyptians’ attention and attracted widespread support.  
 Emad El Kebir, Khaled Said, the Kifaya and the 6 April movements thus 
served as some of the most influential trigger factors that led to the 2011 uprising and 
stronger demands for criminal accountability. While other factors may have also 
triggered a process that eventually led to decisions regarding prosecution, these 
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triggers were repeatedly cited by interviewees and often emerge in scholarly 
literature on the origins of the Egyptian uprising.299 These triggers strongly represent 
police brutality, impunity, corruption, lack of democratic governance, and economic 
grievances – all of which arguably led to the 2011 uprising and subsequent demands 




 Like the trigger factors discussed above, it is not feasible to account for every 
factor that drove decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders in Egypt. 
The interviewees, however, identified two drivers that they argue had the largest 
impact on decisions regarding prosecution: a.) public pressure, particularly during 
and immediately after the 2011 uprising, and b.) individual plaintiffs, particularly 
those working for established NGOs. Together, these drivers pushed the judiciary and 
interim military authorities to respond by allowing certain prosecutions of high-level 
government officials. Many cases, however, were blocked - the reasons for which are 
explained in the subsequent section on shaping factors.  
 Calls for the ‘fall of the regime’ during the mass protests in January and 
February 2011 were quickly followed by calls for Mubarak to face trial. These 
demands intensified in March and April 2011, when Mubarak’s continued exile in the 
resort town of Sharm El Sheikh angered a public still reeling from the crimes 
committed during his rule. It is no coincidence, then, that Mubarak and his sons were 
arrested in April 2011 and subsequently faced a string of trials that began on the 3rd 
August 2011. El Adly, the infamous former Minister of Interior, had already been 
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arrested on charges for the killing of protesters. His trial was then merged with 
Mubarak and his two sons’ trial, where corruption and human rights charges were 
also merged.  This was an ambiguous legal development that was frowned upon by 
several lawyers.300 Aziz notes the role of public pressure in driving prosecutions and 
the role of the public prosecution in shaping them:  
Because the public’s demand for the criminal prosecutions of Mubarak-era 
officials was too great to ignore, [public prosecutor] Mahmoud had no 
choice but to charge them. However, he sabotaged the trials by assigning 
junior prosecutors to complex corruption cases, conducting poor 
investigations that could not withstand judicial scrutiny, and declining to 
prosecute police and security personnel accused of killing protesters. As a 
result, Mubarak’s conviction and life sentence for complicity in the killings 
of protesters during the January 25th uprisings were reversed on appeal and 
on November 29, 2014 the charges were dismissed in their entirety.301 
 
Certain individual lawyers who are also veteran human rights activists, such 
as Eid, Ali, Seif El Dawla and many others, were influential in successfully filing 
cases against former ministers. Only ten days after the ouster of Mubarak in February 
2011, Eid’s organisation, the Arabic Network for Human rights Information 
(ANHRI), filed complaints against Safwat El Sherif (former Minister of Information, 
former Speaker of the Shura Council and former Secretary General of Mubarak’s 
National Democratic Party), El Fiqqi (former Minister of Information), and Hassan 
Abdelrahman (Minister of Interior). ANHRI also worked with the American Civil 
Liberties Union (ACLU) to try and hold Suleiman, former intelligence chief who 
Mubarak appointed as his first vice president during the uprising, accountable for 
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torturing Guantanamo Bay detainees.302 Given the unlikelihood that a prosecution 
involving Suleiman for crimes committed in Egypt would take place, ANHRI opted 
to work with ACLU on the Guantanamo Bay case as a means to bring Suleiman to 
court.303 Together with Seif El Dawla, Ali also filed complaints against Suleiman for 
the crackdown on the 2008 Mahalla uprising. The public prosecutor blocked this case 
and Suleiman died in July 2012.304 
Shapers 
	  
 A number of factors shaped the content and the extent of decisions regarding 
prosecution. First, there were explicit demands for socio-economic accountability by 
the protesters. Stripped of their resources by a heavily corrupt government, many 
Egyptians in Tahrir Square foregrounded their socio-economic grievances.305 Second, 
a politicised public prosecutor meant that many cases, particularly those targeting 
human rights violations by high-level government officials, were blocked. The 
Egyptian judiciary has struggled for independence in the past, most notably in 2005, 
when some of its senior judges, including Noha El Zeiny, exposed electoral rigging 
and fraud and demanded independence from the executive.306 Years later and after 
the 2011 uprising, the judiciary is still split along several lines, some of which are 
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Human Rights Information (Cairo, Egypt, 8 December 2013). 
303 ibid. 
304 Interview with Khaled Ali, Executive Director, Hisham Mubarak Law Center, former presidential 
candidate (2012), Co-Founder of the Bread and Freedom Party, lawyer and activist (Cairo, Egypt, 9 
December 2013). 
305 Interview with Judge Adel Maged, Vice President, Court of Cassation, Egypt (Cairo, Egypt, 7 
December 2013); Interview with Tamer Wageeh, Director, Economic and Social Justice Unit, 
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights (Cairo, Egypt, 8 December 2013). See also Reem Abou-El-
Fadl, ‘Beyond Conventional Transitional Justice: Egypt’s 2011 Revolution and the Absence of 
Political Will’ (2012) 6 (2) IJTJ 318. As mentioned earlier, these demands went hand in hand with 
demands for the respect of civil and political rights.  
306 See Human Rights Watch, ‘Elections in Egypt: State of Emergency Incompatible with Free and 
Fair Vote’ (2010) <www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/egypt1110WebforPosting.pdf> accessed 
28 July 2015. Noha El Zeiny was a senior judge and published a scathing op-ed in the newspaper Al 
Masry Al Youm on 24 November 2005, describing the electoral rigging she witnessed at a polling 
station in the city of Damanhour. Noha El Zeiny, ‘Rigging Elections Under the Supervision of the 
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staunchly loyal to the former regime and to the military. A divided judiciary thus 
significantly limited the number of human rights cases, the extent of the individuals 
who faced trial, and contributed to the high number of acquittals.   
Third, the weak legal framework within which lawyers must build their cases 
contributed to the problem of acquittals. Judge Maged and others outlined these legal 
challenges clearly, citing difficult evidentiary requirements and a lack of provisions 
for command responsibility as major obstacles to a more comprehensive set of cases. 
Fourth, a military-controlled transition in Egypt has meant that certain individuals, 
particularly from the military, are shielded from prosecution while others are 
scapegoated for the sake of appeasing public anger. The shaping factors affecting 
decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders in Egypt are therefore 
complex: they pertain to deep structural and socio-economic problems as well as 
lingering problems of the ‘deep state,’ whereby powerful actors in the military, the 
judiciary, and state security agencies mould transitional justice to protect their 
interests. 
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TUNISIA  
	  
The Prosecution of Political Leaders in Pre-Transition Tunisia 
	  
 In Tunisia, domestic efforts to prosecute political leaders from before the 
uprising that began on 17 December 2010 were almost non-existent.307 However, 
through universal jurisdiction laws, two cases targeted former interior ministers 
Abdallah Qallel and General Habib Ammar in Switzerland in 2001 and 2003, 
respectively. A third case in 2001 targeted Khaled Ben Said, a police superintendent 
in Jendouba who later became Vice Consul for Tunisia in the French city of 
Strasbourg. 308  Severe repression, widespread torture by security forces, and a 
“judiciary strangled by the regime”309 meant that domestic efforts to prosecute 
political leaders were “impossible.”310 Similar to Egypt, there were calls by well-
known individual human rights activists such as Moncef Marzouki and Hamma 
Hammami for “accountability” rather than for holding specific individuals 
accountable.311 These calls, however, did not materialise into legal cases, they were 
not organised, and those who called for accountability were severely repressed by 
Ben Ali’s regime. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
307 Interview with Messaoud Rhomdani, Vice President, Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme 
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Transitional Justice and Head, Groupe de 25 (Tunis, Tunisia, 25 April 2012); Interview with Solène 
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308 Jendouba is a city in Northwestern Tunisia. Habib Nassar brought my attention to this case, the 
details of which can be found here: Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme, ‘The 
Conviction of Khaled Ben Said: A Victory Against Impunity in Tunisia’ (Report 550a November 
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interview, 23 April 2012). 
310 Interview with Solène Rougeaux, Director, Avocats Sans Frontières, Tunis Office (Tunis, Tunisia, 
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311 Interview with Amor Boubakri, Lawyer and Professor, University of Sousse; UNDP Consultant 
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Baraket Essahel Case: The Prosecution of Abdallah Qallel 
 
 The case of Abdallah Qallel, former Minister of Interior from 1991 to 1995, is 
one of the most well known cases targeting a Tunisian high-level government official 
before the 2010 uprising. While Abdallah Qallel was in a Geneva hospital for heart 
surgery in February 2001, Abdennacer Naїt-Liman filed a complaint with the 
prosecutor of the Geneva canton.  Naїt-Liman was tortured in a Ministry of Interior 
detention cell in Tunisia in 1992, following a violent crackdown by security forces on 
an alleged coup plot in 1991.312 Over 200 members of the Tunisian military suspected 
of ties with the Islamist opposition party Ennahda were detained and tortured by 
interior ministry officials, who claimed that the military was planning a coup to 
overthrow Ben Ali and his regime. This case became known as Baraket Essahel, 
named after the town in which the alleged coup plot took place in 1991. The Swiss 
prosecutor cited the Convention Against Torture, under which any person, including 
foreigners, suspected of the crime of torture must be investigated and prosecuted. 
Following Naїt-Liman’s legal complaint, Abdallah Qallel fled Switzerland before the 
police were able to arrest him.  
The Baraket Essahel case remained dormant until 2011, when several victims 
in Tunisia filed a case against Abdallah Qallel and other government and security 
officials for their alleged role in the torture of those detained in Baraket Essahel. The 
Permanent Military Court of Tunis sentenced Abdallah Qallel, along with Mohamed 
Ali Ganzoui, the interior ministry’s Director of Special Services from 1990 to 1995 
and security officials Abderrahmen Kassmi and Mohamed Ennacer Alibi to four 
years in prison in November 2011. In April 2012, the Court of Appeal of the Military 
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Tribunal of Tunisia reduced these sentences by half.313 Moreover, these officials were 
charged with “violence against others either directly or through others” as opposed to 
torture.314 This is in part because, as Human Rights Watch argues, the crime of 
torture was not incorporated into Tunisian law (Law No. 89/2 August 1992) until 
1999, eight years after the Baraket Essahel incident took place. Abdallah Qallel was 
also charged with embezzlement in 2011. He, along with Ali Seriati, former Director 
of Presidential Security Service, and Rafiq Haj Kacem, former Minister of Interior in 
2010, were freed in 2014 when an appeals court reduced their sentences to time 
served.315 
The Case of General Habib Ammar 
 
The case of General Habib Ammar, Commander of the Tunisian National 
Guard from 1984 to 1987 and Minister of Interior in 1987, did not proceed as far as 
that of Baraket Essahel. Ammar was infamous for turning the offices of the interior 
ministry into “centres of detention and torture.”316  As a result, in September 2003, 
TRIAL and the Organisation Mondiale Contre la Torture (OMCT) filed a criminal 
complaint against Ammar with the attorney general of Geneva. As a member of the 
Tunisian delegation to the International Telecommunications Union, however, the 
attorney general stated that Ammar benefited from immunity.317 
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<www.hrw.org/news/2012/05/03/tunisia-reform-legal-framework-try-crimes-past> accessed 28 July 
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The Khaled Ben Said Case 
 
A third Tunisian case – that of Khaled Ben Said – took place years before the 
2010 uprising and again through the mechanism of universal jurisdiction laws, this 
time in France. As a police superintendent in the Tunisian town of Jendouba, Ben 
Said allegedly beat and tortured Zoulaikha Gharbi, a Tunisian lady, in October 1996. 
Gharbi was detained for questioning with regards to her husband and several others, 
who were suspected of having Islamist affiliations. Gharbi’s husband, Mouldi 
Gharbi, had suffered a similar fate at the same Tunisian police station in 1991, after 
which he became a political refugee in France in May 1996. The Fédération 
Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme (FIDH) provides a concise 
summary of the ensuing legal saga that led Gharbi to make use of France’s universal 
jurisdiction laws to attempt to prosecute Ben Said:  
In October 1997, Mrs. Gharbi decided to leave Tunisia and went to the 
police station in order to get her passport. On this occasion, she recognised 
Khaled Ben Saïd, who was delivering her passport.  
On October 22, 1997, Mrs. Gharbi left Tunisia with her children in order to 
join her husband and settle in France.  
On May 9, 2001, having learned that Khaled Ben Saïd was on French soil in 
the capacity of Vice-Consul at the Tunisian Consulate in Strasbourg, Mrs. 
Gharbi, with her lawyer, Eric Plouvier, decided to file a complaint against 
him.  
A preliminary enquiry was initiated following this complaint, after which the 
superintendent in charge of the investigation contacted Khaled Ben Saïd on 
November 2, 2001 in order to inform him that a complaint had been filed 
against him and to summon him to a hearing. Khaled Ben Saïd never 
complied.  
In February 2002, the FIDH and its member ogranisation in France, the 
Ligue des droits de l’Homme (LDH), represented by Patrick Baudouin, 
lawyer and Honorary President of the FIDH, became parties civiles in the 
proceedings.  
On February 14, 2002, the judge in charge of the preliminary investigation 
attempted to contact Khaled Ben Saïd and was told by the Tunisian 
Consulate in Strasbourg that the Vice-Consul had returned to Tunisia.  
That same day, the judge issued an international arrest warrant against 
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Khaled Ben Saïd, which was never enforced, similarly to the letter […] 
issued a few weeks later.  
In spite of these obstacles, and after seven years of investigation, the 
indictment before the Criminal Court was finally issued on February 16, 
2007.318  
In December 2008, the Strasbourg Criminal Court found Ben Said guilty of torture 
and sentenced him to eight years in prison. The decision was appealed shortly 
thereafter and in September 2010, the Criminal Court of Nancy confirmed Ben 
Said’s conviction, increased his sentence to twelve years imprisonment, and issued 
an international arrest warrant against him.319  
Of the three cases outlined above, the Baraket Essahel case against Abdallah 
Qallel seems to have had the largest impact on the pursuit of high-level government 
officials in Tunisia following the 2010 uprising. The initiation of the case in 
Switzerland in 2001, followed by its revival ten years later in Tunisia, is a strong 
indication of the case’s importance for the victims and its symbolic value for many 
Tunisians, particularly during the transition. This is likely because of the terrible 
reputation of the Ministry of Interior and the highly symbolic value in targeting its 
chief. Recent judicial decisions, however, have undermined the momentum to 
prosecute political leaders in Tunisia: “Of the approximately 20 former senior 
officials detained in the aftermath of the uprising, almost all are now free.”320 
Content and Extent of Prosecutions 
	  
As in the case of Egypt, there was a significant emphasis on corruption and 
socio-economic crimes in Tunisia and a much more limited focus on human rights 
crimes in the investigations and prosecutions that took place. Corruption charges 
spanned a period dating back to years before the uprising, while the human rights 
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trials were mostly limited to crimes committed during the uprising in December 
2010 and January 2011. This is of course with the important exception of the Baraket 
Essahel case explained above. What explains this limited content and extent of the 
trials? Why were most high-level officials released? A number of explanations 
reveal a combination of the relative success of workers’ movements, a history of a 
very visible and rampant corruption, specific public demands for prosecution, a weak 
judiciary and legal framework, and the anticipation of a truth and reconciliation 
commission that would address a more comprehensive set of crimes. A pre-
occupation with political stability immediately following the uprising also stalled 
decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders for human rights violations. 
Workers’ Movements and Labour Unions: The Leading Role of the UGTT 
	  
	  
The social and political processes that unfolded in Tunisia point to the 
significant role workers’ movements and labour unions played before, during, and 
after the uprising. Prior to the eruption of the Tunisian uprising in December 2010, 
the General Union for Tunisian Workers (UGTT) played a leading role in 
challenging government policies for years. It was the country’s strongest 
opposition.321 The mass revolt against unemployment and economic inequality in the 
Tunisian town of Gafsa in 2008, which resulted in several deaths and many injured, 
is widely seen as a turning point in the lead up to the uprising two and a half years 
later.322 “This six month revolt,” Messaoud Rhomdani explained, “may have opened 
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employee, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (24 April 2012).  See also Gilbert 
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the door to what happened in Sidi Bouzid.”323 Gafsa and its aftermath helped chip 
away at the fear barrier that prevented many Tunisians from challenging the 
regime’s repressive policies. It also demonstrated the strength of mobilisation in the 
face of an often brutal police force. The UGTT led a general strike during the 
uprising and oversaw the sit-ins at the Casbah thereafter, all of which strengthened 
their influence and stature as the government’s most serious opposition.  The fight 
against economic injustice in Tunisia was therefore well established from before the 
outbreak of the mass uprising of 2010 and was led by the UGTT and other workers’ 
movements during and in the aftermath of the uprising. 
These labour rights movements in Tunisia did not operate alone – human 
rights activists such as Moncef Marzouki, Sihem Bensedrine, Hama Hammami and 
others were persistent in their calls for democracy and respect for human rights. But 
the strongest forces of opposition in Tunisia were labour rights movements, at the 
head of which was the UGTT.  Those calling for civil and political rights, such as the 
right to freedom of expression, the right to assemble, and freedom from torture and 
arbitrary detention, were severely repressed through massive crackdowns led by the 
police and other state security forces, resulting in a significantly weakened human 
rights movement in Tunisia.  In contrast, the labour rights movements were slightly 
more tolerated. The UGTT’s complicated relationship with the Ben Ali regime, for 
instance, often meant that the union’s executive office was staffed with individuals 
loyal to the regime.324 
The relative success, then, of the Tunisian labour rights movements in 
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324 Interview with Anis Morai, Lawyer, Professor, Columnist and Host of 'Dans le Vif du Sujet' 
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bringing to the fore demands for social justice and an end to corruption impacted the 
content of the prosecutions. The build-up of their influence over the years played a 
big role in the consequent emphasis on socio-economic crimes charges in the 
prosecutions. Like Egypt, workers’ movements and labour unions thus served as one 
of the drivers that ensured some form of criminal accountability for socio-economic 
rights violations. On the other hand, the harsh crackdowns on civil and political 
rights activists left a seriously weakened human rights lobby that has been largely 
unsuccessful in ensuring criminal accountability for human rights abuses committed 
both before and during the uprisings. 
Rampant Corruption and Socio-Economic Grievances 
 
The visibility of corruption throughout Ben Ali’s reign is, as several 
interviewees explained, a major factor that fuelled public demands for 
prosecution.325 Abderrahman El Yessa argued that the demography of the protesters 
during the uprising directly impacted the content of the demands for prosecution:  
The human rights charges are limited to the period of the revolution because 
the demands of the protesters were limited in this way.  This is because most 
of the protesters were young and leftist and they see themselves as the 
owners of the revolution.  Their vision is therefore limited to the violations 
that they faced during ‘their’ uprising.326 
 
As a result, the demands for human rights prosecutions were largely focused on the 
killing of protesters during the uprising, whereas demands for socio-economic justice 
spanned the twenty-three years of Ben Ali’s rule.  
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El Yessa added that the poor economic situation in Tunisia also prompted 
jurists to propose reconciliation deals with hundreds of business tycoons banned 
from traveling, as a way to help improve the country’s development. When it comes 
to corruption, El Yessa explained, “everyone is a victim.”327 Amor Boubakri, a 
Tunisian academic, lawyer and United Nations consultant, echoed this explanation: 
“People want to hold [political leaders] accountable for poverty and widespread 
socio-economic malaise. To prosecute them would help resolve economic 
problems.”328 Anis Morai, a Tunisian legal and political expert, suggested that the 
scale of corruption and poverty meant that other rights were not a priority for the 
average Tunisian: “Tunisians do not dwell on freedom of thought, on the freedom to 
form an association. And I can understand that, because it is they who are 
hungry.”329  
 Much like the “young” and “leftist”330 protesters had specific demands 
regarding what should be prosecuted, the Islamists and Youssefists also voiced 
specific demands for accountability. Habib Bourguiba was Tunisia’s first president 
from 1957 to 1987. Salah Ben Youssef was a nationalist who led an opposition that 
was against the diplomatic solution Bourguiba pursued to end the French occupation 
of Tunisia. Ben Youssef thus became Bourguiba’s arch-enemy and his supporters, 
the Youssefists, were regularly detained, beaten and tortured in Bourguiba’s prisons. 
The Islamists, on the other hand, were Ben Ali’s largest opposition and they also 
suffered repression including torture under his rule. As a result, the Youssefists and 
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the Islamists emerged as the most vocal actors with demands for the prosecution of 
leaders who oversaw widespread torture since Tunisia’s independence.331 
Legal Challenges, the Transitional Justice Law and Lack of Political Will 
  
The absence of certain critical reforms to Tunisia’s criminal code severely 
limited prosecutions in two ways. First, all trials have taken place in military courts 
because they involve actions by military personnel. Human Rights Watch explains 
the problem of military jurisdiction in Tunisia:  
[T]he Tunisian president appoints civilian judges to serve in military courts 
by decree, pursuant to the recommendation of the ministers of justice and 
defense. The general military prosecutor is appointed by the minister of 
defense and works under his supervision. All prosecutors and investigative 
judges who serve in the military courts are members of the military. Thus, 
military courts cannot be considered as structurally independent from the 
executive branch. This lack of independence of military courts 
understandably heightened suspicions among victims and their families that 
the courts remained susceptible to political pressure, leading to lenient 
sentences for those convicted in relation to the uprising killings and the 
acquittal of other accused.332  
 
Second, the lack of the principle of command responsibility in Tunisia’s penal code 
significantly weakened the extent of the prosecutions and resulted in many 
acquittals. While Ben Ali was found guilty of failing to stop the killings of protesters 
in his capacity as commander of security forces, the military courts did not use the 
same legal reasoning in the trials of the former minister of interior and other high-
level officials. In its 2015 report on accountability in Tunisia, Human Rights Watch 
observed:   
The military appeals court sentenced former president Ben Ali to life in 
prison when delivering its April 12, 2014 verdict. It found that as head of 
state he commanded the security forces, in accordance with article 2 of law 
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70 of 1982 specifying that the president has direct or indirect supervision of 
all of Tunisia’s security forces…The court did not follow this same 
reasoning with regard to the former minister of interior and the former 
directors general of the security forces. The court sentenced these defendants 
to three years in prison for “dereliction of duty” or “failure to act.” This 
discrepancy between the severity of the sentence imposed on Ben Ali and 
the leniency of the sentences imposed on other former senior officials 
underscores the court’s failure to analyze the command and control 
structures of the Ministry of Interior in depth, in order to determine the 
responsibility of each defendant.333  
The report also notes that the military appeals court did not take into account 
elements that it had itself listed as evidence for the trials of other senior officials. It 
adds that: “Article 32 of Tunisia’s penal code encompasses the notion of aiding and 
abetting, stating that an accomplice is someone who assisted the offender in the 
commission of a crime.”334  
Finally, a lack of political will together with a weak judiciary and a weak 
legal framework contributed to the limited scope of the content and extent of 
prosecutions in Tunisia. The majority of the complaints filed against former leaders 
were instigated by individual plaintiffs and by a group of lawyers called the Groupe 
de 25. The Groupe de 25 was formed on the 14 January 2011 – the day that Ben Ali 
was ousted from power. Amor Safraoui, the head of the Groupe de 25, explained 
initial efforts aimed at prosecution:  
Between the 14 January 2011 and the 8 February 2011, we were waiting for 
the Public Prosecutor to begin the process of prosecution. We were also 
waiting for the Minister of Justice to take action. As a group of concerned 
lawyers and citizens, we met often during this time period. We realised that 
there was no political will to prosecute, and so we decided to act on the 8 
February 2011. Although [this was not our role as lawyers], we…decided to 
take the place of what should have been the Public Prosecutor and we went 
ahead and filed a complaint against two former ministers of interior and the 
former president for corruption crimes and human rights violations 
committed during the uprising.335 
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A lack of action on the part of the public prosecutor thus led the Groupe de 25 to 
initiate prosecutions. When I asked the Groupe de 25 why they were more active in 
filing for corruption rather than human rights crimes, Charfeddine Kallel, a human 
rights lawyer for several victims of the uprising and prominent member of the 
Groupe de 25, cited capacity and expertise challenges:  
We, the Groupe de 25, have limited capacity. We are unable to pursue 
human rights violations on the same scale as financial corruption cases 
because first of all, we do not have the resources and second, we need the 
training on how to prosecute crimes such as torture.336 	  
	  
Furthermore, while Tunisia’s transition was not as tightly controlled as in Egypt, 
many figures from the Ben Ali era – the “anciens nouveaux”337 – retain power. Beji 
Caїd Essebsi, for instance, held senior government positions in both Bourguiba and 
Ben Ali’s governments and is now Tunisia’s President. 338  Since winning the 
presidency in December 2014, Essebsi nominated three Ben Ali regime officials to 
senior political positions, including Habib Essid as Prime Minister.339 Concerned 
about the consequences of opening up “too many” human rights cases implicating 
senior figures from a deeply entrenched and repressive regime meant that these 
incoming elites, many of whom have ties to the former Ben Ali regime, “might not 
be spared” from prosecution.340 A public prosecution allied with the ruling political 
party has thus meant that many human rights cases continue to be blocked.341 
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While the lack of an enabling legal framework to prosecute for serious 
human rights crimes was a major challenge that limited the content of prosecutions, 
the transitional justice law adopted in December 2013 aims to redress this. It has also 
tamed demands to prosecute decades of torture crimes. This is because specialised 
chambers will be established to try serious crimes between July 1955 and December 
2013.342 The law also set up a Truth and Dignity Commission that will cover crimes 
committed during the same time period. Amna Guellali observed that: “in the 
beginning, popular demand for prosecutions was focused on social justice, but then it 
also encompassed demands for justice for human rights abuses. The reason for this 
limited content is that everyone is waiting for the Truth and Dignity 
Commission.”343 Boubakri and El Yessa made similar arguments, stating that the 
Islamists and the Youssefists took the lead in pressuring the interim governments to 
expand the scope of the Truth and Dignity Commission to ensure that it addresses 
the crimes committed against them between the 1950s and the 1990s.344 
Role of International Actors  
The role of international actors in steering Tunisia’s decisions regarding 
prosecution was, as in Egypt, minimal. Several lawyers and civil society activists 
noted that prosecutions of political leaders were domestically driven, with little 
involvement from external actors. Messaoud was emphatic in his response to the 
question of international actors’ involvement: “The decision to prosecute was 
directly in response to the demands of civil society and the protesters. It was entirely 
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domestically driven – there has been no role played by the international human rights 
movement in the decision to prosecute.”345 Despite this, Messaoud continued to 
argue for the importance of working with international actors to advance transitional 
justice in Tunisia, as well as reforming the judiciary:  
Tunisians do want transitional justice for torture and corruption crimes, but 
they don’t quite understand how important it is to do it right. Transitional 
justice is not necessarily understood well – some consider it ‘turning the 
page’ and not dealing with the crimes of the past. We must learn from the 
experiences of Latin America, South Africa, Portugal and Spain. Morocco’s 
experience with its truth and reconciliation commission has not been 
thorough. We need to work both internationally and nationally.  But justice 
has been slow. The snipers, for instance, have not been held to account. We 
have a very corrupt judicial system. The Groupe de 25 has done a good job 
of fighting this, but a lot still needs to be done.346  
 
While the role of international actors was minimal in the immediate 
aftermath of Ben Ali’s ouster in January 2011, however, it was much more 
prominent in the decade leading up to the uprising. Prior to the uprising, 
international NGOs such as Human Rights Watch, FIDH and Amnesty International 
were influential in raising awareness about human rights violations in Tunisia and in 
documenting abuses. As head of the Groupe de 25 Safraoui explained: “We reached 
out to the international community in the past: FIDH, the Paris Bar, etc., in an effort 
to put pressure on the European Community to put pressure on the Ben Ali 
government to respect human rights.”347 Moreover, the use of universal jurisdiction 
laws in Switzerland and France were critical in triggering prosecutions pre-uprising 
and also in raising awareness among Tunisians regarding criminal accountability for 
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its leaders.348  Post-uprising, international actors have largely taken on a training 
role, rather than one that triggers or drives decisions to prosecute.349  
The systematic documentation and monitoring of human rights abuses, 
particularly with the help of international actors has, however, had a significant 
impact in the post-uprising transition period. For instance, Amnesty International 
worked relentlessly with the United Nations Committee Against Torture, Tunisian 
victims and civil society organisations on a gruelling twenty-two year-long 
campaign to establish the truth and ensure justice for the torture case of Faysal 
Baraket.350 The exhumation of Baraket’s body took place in March 2013, twenty-two 
years after his death from torture by police officers. While at the time of writing 
nobody has been prosecuted, the collaboration between international actors and 
Tunisian actors has been critical in moving Faysal’s case forward.351 Still, the 
pervasive repression throughout Ben Ali’s police state in Tunisia meant that 
international and domestic civil society actors faced massive challenges in ultimately 
ensuring prosecutions, particularly of high-level officials.  
Strikingly, none of the interviewees mentioned any role or impact of 
Tunisia’s accession to the Rome Statute on 24 June 2011.  A senior employee at the 
Middle East and North Africa section of OHCHR stated that his office banked on the 
transition period immediately following Ben Ali’s ouster and, together with 
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international human rights groups, launched a campaign calling on the interim 
authorities to join the ICC.352 He added that the timing of the campaign – when 
government policies were in flux – was key to its success. When I specifically asked 
whether Tunisia’s accession to the Rome Statute has had any impact on domestic 
decisions to prosecute, Safraoui, on the other hand, replied:  
People are not so much interested in the goings-on of the international 
criminal justice movement, even after Tunisia ratified the Rome Statute. At 
the moment, Tunisians are caught up with internal politics – particularly the 
Islamists vs. the secularists discourse that has become so dominant now.353 
 
Safraoui’s observation, however, came just over one year after the ouster of Ben Ali 
and a few months short of Tunisia’s one-year anniversary of its accession to the 
Rome Statute.  
Role of Domestic Civil Society 
	  
	  
 The preservation of historical memory and the documentation of human 
rights abuses guided the work of Tunisia’s civil society in the decades before the 
uprising.  Working within a repressive environment, civil society organisations such 
as LTDH began to document and disseminate information, particularly following a 
1978 general strike by labour unions.354 As a result of this strike, labour union 
members were tortured and faced other repressive measures. This, Rhomdani argued, 
is what motivated the LTDH to make it its goal to document and disseminate 
information on human rights violations. It also marked the start of a Tunisian civil 
society that was predominantly made up of labour union activists. Rhomdani 
explained: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
352 Interview with anonymous senior employee, Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(24 April 2012).	  
353 Interview with Amor Safraoui, Coordinator, National Coalition for Transitional Justice and Head, 
Groupe de 25 (Tunis, Tunisia, 25 April 2012). 
354 Interview with Messaoud Rhomdani, Vice President, Ligue Tunisienne des Droits de l’Homme 
(Tunis, Tunisia, 25 April 2012). 
	   139	  
Trade and labour unions in Tunisia have historically played an important 
role in politics. Because of the severe repression practiced by the RCD 
[Rassemblement Constitutionnelle Démocratique], Tunisia’s ruling political 
party, it was extremely difficult to form political parties. Political dissidents 
thus either joined the LTDH or the trade unions. A number of ‘governmental 
NGOs’ were formed, but they were just that – GONGO’s.355 
	  
While there were very few explicit attempts by civil society to trigger prosecutions 
of political leaders before the 2010-2011 uprising,356 documentation of abuses 
signified anticipation of a time when prosecutions would be possible. As an 
anonymous Tunisian interviewee explained:  
[Civil society documented abuses] because they knew one day that the 
dictatorship would fall. Also, they did it for the sake of historical memory. 
The CNLT developed a list of who they thought was responsible for abuses 
from the 1990s. OCTT has also documented testimonies. We all knew one 





At least three events in Tunisia’s recent past served as turning points in the 
momentum behind decisions to prosecute the country’s leaders. The 1978 general 
strike, the Baraket Essahel torture practices in 1991 and the Gafsa revolt of 2008 
each fuelled resistance to repression and civil society advocacy for accountability for 
human rights violations. The Baraket Essahel case specifically led to the initiation of 
a case against former Minister of Interior Abdallah Qallel in Switzerland in 2001, 
and was reignited domestically in Tunisia in 2011. As Rhomdani argued, the general 
strike in Tunisia in 1978 was critical in that the torture that took place at the time 
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triggered a civil society movement for accountability.358 The six-month revolt in 
Gafsa, violently repressed by state security forces in 2008, had a similar if not even 
more significant impact on later decisions to prosecute leaders. While there may not 
have been calls aimed specifically at the prosecution of leaders for the repression 
that marked both the general strike and Gafsa, they were still cited regularly as early 
turning points that triggered a movement that ultimately turned into a call for 
criminal accountability.359 Speaking about Gafsa, an anonymous interviewee stated, 
“It was the spark.”360 
Immediately following the ouster of Ben Ali in January 2011, individual 
plaintiffs and groups of lawyers such as the Groupe de 25 filed complaints on behalf 
of victims and against former leaders for both human rights violations and 
corruption. These actors were key in initiating the process of prosecution. However, 
pressure from ‘the street’ during the uprising and also immediately following Ben 
Ali’s ouster was, as several interviewees noted, the strongest trigger that led to 
decisions to prosecute.361 This demonstrates the significant role of mass mobilisation 
and repeated calls by civil society for accountability, particularly following a long 
period of repression. As Nassar declared, “Impunity is one reason the uprisings 
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started.”362 He added that the timing of popular calls for prosecution was key, despite 
the fact that they were not organised and without a clear prosecutorial strategy.363 
The Groupe de 25 echoed this observation.  
Drivers 
	  
  Some of the trigger factors described above also served as drivers of 
decisions regarding prosecution. In particular, the Groupe de 25’s early efforts, 
immediately following Ben Ali’s ouster, were successful in pushing for 
prosecutions. Continued protests and pressure from victims’ families made it 
difficult for interim authorities to ignore the question of prosecutions for former 




 The demands for human rights prosecutions were largely focused on the 
killings of protesters during the uprising, whereas demands for socio-economic 
justice spanned the twenty-three years of Ben Ali’s rule. Moreover, most of the 
twenty senior officials from Ben Ali’s regime who were prosecuted have been set 
free. Several factors shaped this limited content and extent of the prosecutions. 
Poverty, inequality and widespread corruption contributed to the emphasis on 
accountability for socio-economic crimes in the mass protests of 2010-2011. The 
highly symbolic tragedy of Mohamed Bouazizi’s self-immolation, the spark of the 
Tunisian uprising, illustrates this state of affairs well. The government’s plans to 
establish a Truth and Dignity Commission that will cover crimes committed since 
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Tunisia’s independence in 1955 further contributed to the very limited scope of the 
human rights charges in the prosecutions. Moreover, a corrupt judiciary and a 
politicised public prosecutor, along with the use of military jurisdiction to try former 
leaders put into question the legitimacy of the legal steps taken to ensure criminal 
accountability. A lack of command responsibility provisions led to many acquittals 
and light sentences. Finally, a transition that increasingly saw the return of the 
anciens nouveaux meant that human rights prosecutions in particular, but also 
corruption prosecutions, would be limited to protect those with former regime ties. 
In much the same way that prosecutions were used to sacrifice a part of the regime to 
save the regime in Egypt, former Minister of Interior Abdallah Qallel prosecuted for 
the Baraket Essahel case was, as his daughter proclaimed, “designated as a scapegoat 
for torture” while other former ministers were exempted from prosecution.365 
LIBYA 
The Prosecution of Political Leaders in Pre-Transition Libya 
 
 The Gaddafi regime had a tight grip on all state institutions and prevented 
political opposition by adopting Law No. 71 in 1972, which banned political parties. 
Such dictatorial laws and severe repression and intimidation of critics of the Gaddafi 
regime meant that there were no significant efforts to prosecute political leaders in 
Libya before the uprising and civil war broke out in 2011.366 However, as veteran 
human rights lawyer Azza Maghur explained, there were politicised and unsystematic 
steps taken by Muammar Gaddafi to allow prosecutions and to establish mechanisms 
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through which victims could file human rights complaints. These efforts seriously 
lacked legitimacy and ultimately served as political tools to restrict opposition. For 
example, Muammar Gaddafi tried to bring cases against other government officials 
who were no longer under his control. In 2003, the Gaddafi International Charity and 
Development Foundation (GICDF)367 filed charges against the minister of interior for 
human rights violations.368 In 2004, the Ministry of Justice assigned a body to receive 
complaints against the Ministry. These efforts were, as Maghur explained, nothing 
more than overtly political maneuvers by the Gaddafi regime to clamp down on 
opposition and critics of the regime.369 Maghur also mentioned the efforts of human 
rights lawyer Salwa Bugaighis, who filed several “political cases against the state 
during Gaddafi,” particularly requesting compensation for the detained.370 
The Search for Accountability for the 1996 Abu Salim Prison Massacre 
 
Following the massacre of approximately 1,200 prisoners at the Abu Salim 
prison in 1996, the Gaddafi regime took some superficial steps to improve its 
international image and to show that there were efforts to hold the perpetrators 
accountable. This massacre, widely documented by the media and international 
human rights organisations, became a powerful symbol of the Gaddafi regime’s 
repression. It also contributed to the momentum that led to the popular revolt to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
367 The following description is from the GICDF’s website: “[GICDF] is an international non-
governmental organization, carries out developmental and humanitarian activities in the social, 
economic, cultural and human rights fields. GICDF was established in 2003 through the signing of its 
article of association in Geneva, Switzerland. Its chairman is Saif Al Islam Al Gaddafi… The 
Foundation adopts principles that define and guide its functions such as maintaining and protecting 
human rights, and fundamental liberties, developing civil society and its organizations, promoting 
charitable voluntary work, establishing cooperation relations among societies to consolidate the team 
work supporting the oppressed, the downtrodden, and the vulnerable segments in the community, 
such as the poor, the needy, orphans, and the handicapped. It also provides humanitarian aid for war 
and disaster victims wherever they are.” Gaddafi International Charity and Development Foundation, 
<www.gicdf.org> accessed 30 July 2015. 
368 Newspaper article source for this is on file with Azza Maghur. Interview with Azza Maghur, 
Veteran Lawyer and Human Rights Activist (Tripoli, Libya, 17 September 2013). 
369 ibid. 
370 ibid. Salwa Bugaighis was killed in her home in 2013. 
	   144	  
topple Muammar Gaddafi in February 2011. As a result, pre-2011 efforts to hold to 
account the perpetrators of the Abu Salim massacre have trickled into post-2011 
efforts to prosecute, much like the Baraket Essahel and Khaled Said cases did in 
Tunisia and Egypt, respectively. 
 Ali al Kermi was a political prisoner for thirty years, most of them spent at 
Abu Salim. He successfully sought financial compensation from the courts following 
his release in 2002. He had filed a claim in 2005 against the state for the torture and 
beatings he suffered in detention. Following the success of his claim, he became 
president of the Libyan Association for Prisoners of Conscience, where he advocated 
for reparations. As Amnesty International reported, “In 2012, a law providing for 
financial compensation to political prisoners detained between September 1969 and 
February 2011 was finally adopted.”371 No individual political leaders were charged 
following al Kermi’s complaint. According to an Amnesty International report, 
financial compensation was offered to the victims of Abu Salim on the condition that 
they would abandon their pursuit of judicial redress.372 “No member of the [Internal 
Security Agency],” the report continues, “is known to have ever been charged or tried 
for committing human rights violations, including torture.”373 
As a result, public pressure had been mounting for years to obtain the truth about 
the Abu Salim massacre. Protests took place every Saturday for four years. In 
response, Muammar Gaddafi appointed an investigative judge, Mohamed Bashir Al 
Khaddar, in 2008.374 Nothing came of this judge’s work. Maghur described him as 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
371 Amnesty International, ‘Rising from the Shadows of Abu Salim Prison’ (26 June 2014) 
<www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/06/rising-shadows-abu-salim-prison/> accessed 31 July 
2015. 
372 Amnesty International, ‘Libya of Tomorrow: What Hope for Human Rights’ (June 2010) 11-12. 
373 ibid 31. 
374 Interview with Azza Maghur, Veteran Lawyer and Human Rights Activist (Tripoli, Libya, 17 
September 2013); Interview with Dao Al Mansouri, Veteran lawyer and human rights activist 
(Tripoli, Libya, 18 September 2013). 
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“a disaster.”375 However, human rights lawyers and activists continued to push for 
accountability for Abu Salim. Fathi Terbil was among the most prominent lawyers 
who represented the families of the Abu Salim victims. His arrest on the 15 February 
2011 sparked protests in Libya’s eastern town of Benghazi, which then grew into a 
massive uprising on the 17 February 2011. Terbil’s arrest and the protests that 
ensued signify that the Libyan uprising was triggered by both the government’s 
aggressive campaign against criminal accountability and by the victims’ families’ 
desire to bring the Abu Salim perpetrators to justice. As Amel Jerary noted, “The 
aim of the revolution was to establish a state of law and to achieve justice for the 
Abu Salim victims.”376  
On the subject of the establishment of mechanisms through which victims 
could file human rights complaints, Maghur referred to qanun mahkamit el sha’ab, or 
the establishment of the People’s Court in 1971. Maghur explained:  
Gaddafi initiated this court because he proclaimed he wanted to stop human 
rights violations. Then he started to amend the law [that established the 
Court] until it itself became a human rights violation. Still, many people 
brought forth cases to this court for the disappeared, tortured, and killed.377  
 
The People’s Court was set up to try members of the former royal family, which 
Muammar Gaddafi overthrew in a coup in 1969. This Court tried prime ministers and 
other – over two hundred – officials from the deposed monarchy, including former 
King Idris, who received a death sentence in absentia. 378  Law 5 of 1988 
institutionalised the Court, making it even more politicised. Human Rights Watch 
explained the problem with the People’s Court:  
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Many cases involved charges of illegal political activities that should have 
been protected under the rights to free association or speech, in particular, 
alleged violations of Law 71, which bans any group activity based on a 
political ideology opposed to the principles of the 1969 revolution that 
brought al-Qadhafi to power.  Some cases also were against state employees 
accused of graft.379 
 
The People’s Court was finally abolished in 2005, following pressure from Libyan 
lawyers who refused to take part in its arbitrary and politicised procedures. The 
People’s Court, then, served as a prosecution tool for the Gaddafi regime, rather than 
as a mechanism through which victims of the Gaddafi regime could attain justice.  
Content and Extent of Prosecutions 
	  
 The very few prosecutions that took place in Libya since Muammar Gaddafi’s 
ouster primarily focus on crimes committed during the 2011 conflict. This is with the 
exception of the Abu Salim charges faced by El Senussi and others. Some former 
regime officials also faced corruption charges. Given the difficulty of access to the 
trials, the list of charges remains ambiguous.380 However, known charges include the 
embezzlement of public funds, amounting to USD2.5 billion by former Foreign 
Minister Al Obaidi and former head of the General People’s Conference Mohamed El 
Zway. These were the first verdicts issued against high-level officials since 
Muammar Gaddafi’s ouster.381  These funds were used to compensate families of 
those killed in the 1988 Lockerbie plane bombing, as a way to get them to drop legal 
claims against Libya.382 However, this corruption charge, which notably dates to a 
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380 Elham Saudi, for example, explained that her organisation, Lawyers for Justice in Libya, faced 
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Report: Prosecutions, Politics and Transitions: How criminal justice in the Arab Spring is shaping 
transitional justice’ (Panel discussion, Durham Law School Durham 6 May 2014). 
381 BBC News, ‘Lockerbie Compensation: Libyan Officials Acquitted’ (17 June 2013) 
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period from before the 2011 uprising, was dropped and Al Obaidi and El Zway were 
acquitted in June 2013. No explanation was given by the judge for their acquittal.383  
Al Mahmoudi, who was Libyan Prime Minister from 2006-2011, was charged 
with funneling USD25 million of public money to Tunisia to help Gaddafi forces 
fighting in the 2011 conflict. Saif al Islam Gaddafi and his brother Saadi Gaddafi 
were also accused of “plundering state coffers to fund extravagant playboy lifestyles 
abroad.”384 The number of corruption charges, however, does not match those of the 
prosecutions in Egypt and Tunisia. The charges are, however, overwhelmingly 
focused on crimes of the transition, particularly the killing of protesters and mass 
rape.  
While some former high-profile regime officials were extradited to Libya to 
face trial, some escaped prosecution, thereby limiting the extent of the trials. Of note 
is Moussa Koussa, Libya’s notorious head of intelligence from 1994 to 2009 and 
former Foreign Minister from 2009-2011. Koussa fled to London soon after the 
uprising erupted, after which he spent some time in Qatar.  Media reports from 
October 2013 indicate that he was then recruited by the Saudi intelligence agency as 
an advisor.385 This is despite Mustafa Gheriani’s call in March 2011 for Koussa’s 
extradition to Libya from London to face trial. Gheriani was the rebel leader at the 
time and stated that Koussa should face trial for murder and crimes against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
383 El Obaidi and El Zway remained in detention, however, for other human rights charges. 
384 Chris Stephen ‘Gaddafi Sons War Crimes Trial Begins in Libya Amid Security Fears’ (The 
Guardian,13 April 2014) <	  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/apr/13/gaddafi-sons-war-crimes-
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humanity.386 This call was made six months before the capture and killing of 
Muammar Gaddafi in October 2011. 
Three main factors help explain the limited content and extent of the 
prosecutions. First, an enabling legal framework that is equipped to prosecute serious 
crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity is absent. Second, victims 
and their families do not trust the judiciary to independently carry out investigations 
and trials, which has limited the number of legal complaints filed. There is also a 
serious lack of awareness and understanding among victims, lawyers, judges and the 
elite regarding the “concept of justice” as enshrined in international treaties.387 Third, 
a dangerous security situation means that many judges and lawyers fear for their lives 
when asked to represent Gaddafi regime officials and loyalists.  
The history of efforts to achieve justice for the Abu Salim massacre and its 
significant symbolic value in triggering the Libyan uprising ensured that the Abu 
Salim charges would emerge in the post-2011 prosecutions. El Senussi was charged 
for his involvement in the Abu Salim massacre as well as in crimes committed during 
the 2011 conflict. In fact, the pool of individuals implicated in the Abu Salim 
massacre significantly expanded since 2011. Amnesty International estimates that 
approximately 170 guards and officials suspected of involvement in the Abu Salim 
killings were detained since 2011.388  
However, apart from the Abu Salim charges faced by El Senussi, no pre-
transition human rights violations have figured into the post-2011 trials. Similar to 
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Egypt and Tunisia, the human rights trials are limited to crimes committed during the 
uprising because, as journalist Rana Jawad argued:  
[T]hey’re easier to prove. A lot of archive material was lost during the war. 
The memory was so fresh and alive post-war, that they’re looking to address 
those issues first. The only old issue that we see resurfacing is Abu Salim 
because it was one massive thing that happened […] but the other crimes, 
such as systematic torture and so on – they’re very hard to pursue unless 
they track down the people who were directly involved.389  
 
Maghur was emphatic about the need for appropriate legal mechanisms to prosecute 
human rights violations in which the state is implicated. She underlined the need for 
either a change in Libya’s current penal code, or the establishment of a transitional 
justice mechanism to address crimes of a massive scale: 
It is very difficult to prove human rights violations. First, it is a problem of a 
lack of professionalism. Second, you are prosecuting according to old laws – 
the old penal code. You cannot prosecute political leaders for human rights 
violations under the current laws. You have to really have a specialised team 
to work on that. We do not have this. We are using the same prosecutors 
who were also responsible for human rights violations. The same prosecutors 
who jailed people contrary to human rights standards. These special crimes 
are addressed as normal crimes – not as human rights violations in which the 
state took part. How will we establish responsibility of the state? It is very 
stupid of them to prosecute these people under normal laws.390 
 
No Peace Without Justice (NPWJ)’s Libya Program Coordinator Stefano Moschini, 
however, noted that Libya decided not to establish a special court or mechanism to 
try former regime members. Instead, the normal courts are handling these cases and 
organisations such as NPWJ were helping the judiciary with how to prosecute war 
crimes and crimes against humanity.391  
Also, given the long history of Libya’s politicised public prosecution, victims 
and their families continue to refrain from filing human rights complaints for lack of 
trust in the judiciary. As Moschini explained: 
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Victims’ demands for justice are quite limited because they still do not trust 
the institutions and the judiciary. There is no access to the trials. There was 
instead massive popular pressure for the political isolation law392, but not the 
same pressure for prosecutions. Also, Libyans are more focused on 
compensation and the return of their properties. Finally, there is a lack of 
awareness regarding their rights. Somebody might not even recognise torture 
as such.393 
 
Lydia Vicente echoed this observation when she noted: “The concept of justice in 
Libya is missing. They don’t even know what a crime against humanity is.”394 The 
lack of awareness and understanding among ordinary Libyans, lawyers, judges and 
the elite regarding the ‘global concept of justice’ is what prompted NPWJ and other 
international NGOs to implement training programmes in Libya.395 The International 
Crisis Group (ICG) makes an important observation regarding the type of justice that 
is expected by Libyan victims and their families and the consequent distrust of the 
judiciary:  
The main problem emerging from these prosecutions is that they are too few 
and – from the perspective of many armed group members – too slow. These 
complaints feed into the already widespread feeling that the state is unable to 
carry out justice. That these delays and referrals might be a healthy sign of 
commitment to due process often is ignored. Similarly, rather than being 
praised as a positive development ensuring respect for civil liberties, the 
December 2012 Supreme Court order that criminal courts follow proper 
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procedures often is viewed as evidence of the judiciary’s ongoing collusion 
in defence of Qadhafi-era officials. Many fighters as well as ordinary 
citizens insist on quick retribution against these officials, even if they were 
not directly implicated in repressing the uprising, viewing them as guilty for 
standing by Qadhafi. For others, swift justice for political opponents is 
simply the only type of justice they know.396 
This kind of fast, retributive justice is a key characteristic of the way in which 
transitional justice has been pursued not just in Libya, but in other Arab Spring 
countries as well.397 
 The dire security situation in Libya has significantly affected decisions 
regarding the prosecution of political leaders. There has been a string of targeted 
assassinations of judges and prosecutors in Libya, including the former General 
Prosecutor in February 2014.398 Almost all interviewees referred to the fact that 
judges and lawyers who accepted to be involved in or to defend Gaddafi regime 
officials have received death threats. So much so, that when asked specifically about 
the trial of Saif Al Islam Gaddafi and El Senussi, some lawyers quietly responded 
that they prefer not to speak about those cases for security reasons. They added that 
they were approached to become involved in those cases, but that they refused out of 
fear for their safety. Dao Al Mansouri, a prominent human rights lawyer who served 
as Dorda’s defense lawyer, recalled:   
When the Dorda trial started, there were lots of threats against those 
involved in the case. Many of the accused were unable to find lawyers to 
represent them because of the security situation. The judiciary in Libya is not 
politicised. The judge cannot, however, work properly while the gun is 
aimed at his head. There are major threats from the government against the 
judiciary.399  
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Similarly, prosecutors are afraid to indict rebel leaders, who issued a controversial 
amnesty law in May 2012 to protect themselves from prosecution:  
Law 38 of 2012 on certain matters relating to transitional justice includes a 
complete amnesty for any “acts made necessary by the 17 February 
revolution” for its “success or protection”, whether such acts are of a 
military, security or civil nature… this law has terrifyingly familiar echoes 
of the Gaddafi era…Impunity for violations of human rights and war crimes 
resulting from a sense of revolutionary legitimacy is dangerous and 
perpetuates the culture that existed under the Gaddafi regime, where all was 
justified in the name of the 1969 Revolution.400 
 
The relatively small population of Libya – approximately six million – also means 
that many policemen are ex-fighters from the conflict. Consequently, accountability 
becomes even more difficult when perpetrators join the police force as law enforcers. 
Elham Saudi, Director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya, noted, “When a person 
claims they were tortured by a member of a militia, they go to the police and they 
find that their torturer is there, working as a policeman. It significantly reduces the 
possibilities for accountability.”401 
Role of International Actors and Domestic Civil Society 
	  
While the role of international actors in Libya was minimal prior to the 2011 
revolt against Muammar Gaddafi, the conflict that ensued quickly became an 
international one with the military intervention of NATO and other foreign 
governments. Moreover, the ICC’s arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif-al-
Islam Gaddafi, and El Senussi in 2011 marked a crucial turning point in decisions 
regarding prosecution of political leaders in Libya. The interviewees differed in their 
opinion on whether or not the domestic prosecution of the thirty-seven former 
regime members would have taken place had the ICC arrest warrants not been 
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issued. Jerary, former Director of Communications for former Libyan President Aly 
Zeidan, argued that some Libyans were relieved that Muammar Gaddafi was killed 
because they did not want a chaotic and sham trial “such as the Mubarak trial in 
Egypt.” However, Jerary continued, Muammar Gaddafi, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi along 
with other former regime officials would have been prosecuted regardless of the 
ICC.402 Moschini echoed this view of the minimal impact of the ICC on domestic 
prosecutions in Libya:  
I don’t think the ICC has had a positive or negative impact on the speed of 
prosecutions in Libya. The Saif-al-Islam case would have taken place 
without the ICC, but perhaps not Senussi. There has otherwise been no real 
impact by international actors. Collaboration between local and international 
NGOs is quite sensitive. There is a fear of foreign intervention.403 
 
Jawad made a similar observation regarding the non-impact of international 
actors:  
Whether the ICC was involved or not, former regime members would have 
still been arrested in Libya. People need closure and accountability, 
regardless of the intervention of the ICC and international NGOs.404 
 
Still, others, such as Al Mansouri, argued that the ICC triggered domestic decisions 
to prosecute political leaders in Libya. He described the domestic prosecutions as a 
reaction to the ‘foreign’ ICC and the international community: “They want the world 
to see they can do it.”405 Similarly, Vicente stated, “There is a sense of ‘we want to 
do things our way’ in Libya, with limited help from abroad.”406 
Saudi discussed the importance of Libyan fears of the ‘foreign intervention’ 
that Moschini and others alluded to. While there are international actors with big 
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budgets to spend on developing Libyan civil society, holding events, and so on, the 
same international actors tread carefully in Libya because, unlike in Tunisia and 
Egypt, it is still unclear who the powerful domestic actors are.  It is not yet clear 
which militias will be the new political parties.  Saudi said, “Although [Libya] is 
fragile and open to international influence, Libyans have lived in paranoia for more 
than forty-two years and sixty-seven per cent of us were born under Gaddafi, so we 
know nothing other than paranoia.  So there is this mechanism where on the one 
hand we welcome international intervention, but we are always suspecting its 
motives at the same time.”407 
Advocacy networks linking Libyan and international civil society 
organisations during Muammar Gaddafi’s rule between 1969 and 2011 were 
extremely weak. Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International were – and 
continue to be - active in documenting human rights violations in Libya and in 
raising public awareness to put pressure on the Libyan government to address these 
violations. The highly authoritarian and repressive policies of the Gaddafi regime, 
however, made it extremely difficult for such international NGOs to have any real 
impact on criminal accountability for high-level government officials.  
With the fall of the Gaddafi regime and in the aftermath of the 2011 uprising, 
this has started to change – international NGOs such as NPWJ have been actively 
working to train Libyan legal professionals and the judiciary to improve 
accountability for human rights violations in Libya.  The United Nations Support 
Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) has also been training and encouraging the Libyan 
government to devise a prosecutorial strategy.408 Lawyers for Justice in Libya, a 
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group that was formed by Libyan lawyers in the diaspora and which now includes a 
network of lawyers in Libya, has also been actively monitoring legal developments 
and making recommendations to the Libyan government. Civil society organizations 
within Libya have been growing, but the level of engagement with international 
actors has remained low. 409  Given the legal and security challenges to the 
prosecution of political leaders mentioned above, most civil society organisations 
called for reconciliation as opposed to prosecutions.410 Moschini noted the initial 
growth of civil society soon after the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi, which was 
quickly followed by their decline because of restrictions imposed by the government: 






 “Had credible prosecutions been successfully carried out, the revolution 
would never have happened.”412 
 
Maghur’s statement refers to the significant role that impunity for perpetual human 
rights violations had in triggering the mass revolt against Muammar Gaddafi’s forty-
two year-old regime.  She echoed former Prime Minister Abdurrahim al-Keeb, who 
declared, “proper justice is one of the reasons why this revolution started and one of 
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the reasons why we ended where we are.”413 At the centre of popular frustration was 
the shocking Abu Salim prison massacre in 1996, which resulted in a series of efforts 
by victims and lawyers to hold the perpetrators to account. It also resulted in the 
acquisition of financial compensation for some victims, which was, in the face of 
major legal and political obstacles, considered a successful attempt at ensuring some 
form of justice.414 Despite the politicised nature of the move, Muammar Gaddafi’s 
appointment of a juge d’instruction for Abu Salim was nevertheless in response to 
popular demands for justice.415 Abu Salim was thus a highly influential trigger that 
led to decisions regarding prosecution, particularly for former head of intelligence El 
Senussi. At the time of this writing, it along with Al Obaidi and El Zway’s 
corruption trial are the only pre-transition crimes that have figured into the post-
transition prosecutions.   
The efforts of individual lawyers such as Salwa Bugaighis, Dao Al Mansouri, 
and Fathi Terbil in pursuing accountability for human rights, particularly in the last 
decade of Muammar Gaddafi’s rule, were crucial. The highly symbolic arrest of 
Fathi Terbil on the 15 February 2011, widely regarded as the spark of the Libyan 
uprising, attests to this critical role of individual lawyers in triggering decisions 
regarding prosecution. Moreover, despite differences of opinion on the impact of the 
ICC’s indictments against Saif al Islam Gaddafi and El Senussi, the tug of war 
between Libya and the ICC and references to Libya’s eagerness to show that it can 
conduct the trials domestically cannot be dismissed as irrelevant factors. Libya’s 
successful appeal regarding the admissibility of the Senussi case at the ICC, which 
resulted in the Court’s approval that the Senussi trial be held in Libya, is a strong 
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indication of how domestic decisions regarding prosecution were heavily impacted 
by the intervention of the ICC.416 
Drivers  
	  
These individual lawyers also served as key drivers of decisions regarding 
prosecution. In addition, despite the difficult and opaque conditions within which 
both international and local NGOs worked pre-transition, the advocacy efforts of 
organisations such as Amnesty International were vital to pressuring the government 
to respond. The case of Ali al Kermi is an example of this.417 Moreover, persistent 
public pressure – mostly by families of the victims of Abu Salim and of other torture 
crimes in Libya – proved crucial to keeping the issue of impunity for human rights on 
the radar of both ordinary Libyans and the government. The tug of war for 
jurisdiction between Libya and the ICC is an additional factor that has had a driving 
role. The shadow of the ICC418 intensified certain Libyan authorities’ defiant stance 




Legal challenges, a precarious security situation, and a deep mistrust of the 
judiciary’s ability to operate independently and effectively have contributed to the 
limited charges in the prosecutions. Moreover, a pre-occupation with the crimes 
committed during the 2011 conflict, coupled with the adoption of a transitional 
justice law in December 2013, further limited the charges. Although none of the 
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interviewees mentioned the role of the transitional justice law, its adoption has 
expanded the time period of the crimes addressed. It led to the cancellation of the 
statute of limitations for crimes committed before 1997 for political and security 
reasons and allows for the investigation into the Abu Salim prison massacre, which 
took place in 1996.419 Finally, the continued violence that has gripped Libya since 
2011 and chaotic militia politics have formed a transition whose direction is 
uncertain. Significant questions of political stability plague the country, which have 
effectively stalled decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders.  
However, Minister of Justice Salah Marghani reached out to the ICC in July 
2014, asking it to investigate crimes committed by Zintani and Misrati militias.420 
While at the time of writing, there have been no major developments following this 
request other than the verdicts that were issued in July 2015, it is indicative of two 
things. First, despite strong resistance to the involvement of the ICC for the case of 
Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and El Senussi, domestic political developments such as the 
deterioration of the security situation and an almost collapse of the state partially 
reversed this resistance, at least at a certain level of the political leadership. While 
Marghani did not raise the issue of Saif al-Islam Gaddafi’s arrest warrant, the fact 
that the ICC has been called upon by the Minister of Justice to intervene means that 
decisions regarding prosecution are still on the political agenda. The shape of 
domestic prosecutions in Libya is therefore still in flux and the ICC is not completely 
out of the picture.  
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The Prosecution of Political Leaders in Pre-Transition Yemen 
	  
 Despite a provision in Yemen’s constitution that allows for the prosecution 
of political leaders, no such prosecutions took place before the uprising that ousted 
President Saleh from power in 2011.421 Article 111 of Yemen’s 1991 constitution 
allows for the prosecution of the Prime Minister, his deputies and ministers 
following a vote of support by two-thirds of the House of Representatives.422 In 
subsequent amendments to the constitution, the President was added to the list of 
government officials who could face prosecution. However, as all the interviewees 
stated, no high-level government official was prosecuted in Yemen for either 
corruption or human rights crimes. This was because, as activist Manal Al Qudsi and 
human rights lawyer Ahmed Barman put it, “no one would dare.”423 Political 
commentator Tamer Shamsan added, “Here in Yemen, if we try to hold someone 
accountable, we risk our lives.”424  
However, human rights lawyers pointed out that since 2005 there have been 
increasing efforts to prosecute senior officials in the security agencies and in the 
police. An example is the 2006 case of Anisa Al-Shuaibi, who was accused of 
murdering her ex-husband and was taken into police custody where she was 
repeatedly raped and beaten. Rizq Al-Jawfi, head of the Criminal Investigation Unit 
was interrogated for his role in Al-Shuabi’s illegal detention and abuse while in 
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prison. Barman described Al-Shuaibi’s relentless efforts to hold a police chief to 
account in a court of law as a “key case” that raised a lot of awareness in Yemen.425 
This is despite the verdict that was issued for Al-Shuaibi: she was found innocent, 
but was ordered to pay one million Yemeni riyals in compensation. Ahmed Arman 
described this verdict as “strange, but still regarded as a success.”426 That the Al-
Shuaibi case was considered a positive step towards criminal accountability for one 
senior police official points to the difficult environment that made even the initiation 
of a prosecution targeting a minister or head of state unthinkable. As with Mubarak, 
Ben Ali and Muammar Gaddafi, Saleh’s authoritarian regime of thirty-three years 
did not tolerate opposition. The repressive consequences for those who did criticise 
the regime meant that there were no efforts to prosecute political leaders in pre-
transition Yemen. 
Factors Shaping the Decision not to Prosecute in Yemen 
 
 Unlike Egypt, Tunisia and Libya, however, Yemen passed an immunity law 
to protect former President Saleh and his aides from prosecution.427 This meant that, 
with the exception of some preliminary hearings for the 18 March 2011 killings, 
there were no prosecutions of former political leaders in Yemen after Saleh’s ouster. 
The 18 March killings are known as the “Friday of Dignity” killings, during which 
Yemeni security forces allegedly killed over forty-five peaceful protesters and 
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wounded over 200 people. 428  There were attempts by lawyers to seek the indictment 
of Saleh and several of his aides for the Friday of Dignity killings case, but the 
presiding judge responded that he could not proceed because of the immunity law 
and the case was subsequently closed.429 This section, then, will discuss the various 
factors that shaped the decision not to prosecute former leaders in Yemen.  
 International actors, geo-politics, legal challenges and a fairly ambiguous 
transition all contributed to the decision not to prosecute. The Yemeni parliament 
passed Law No.1 in January 2012, institutionalising immunity for the former 
president and his aides.430  This immunity law was the product of negotiations that 
GCC led together with the United States, the European Union, the Russian 
Federation, and the United Nations Special Adviser to the Secretary General, Jamal 
Benomar (hereinafter the ‘GCC initiative’).431  After several months of mass protests 
calling for the ouster of former President Saleh in 2011, he agreed to the terms and 
conditions set forth in the GCC initiative, which entered into force in November 
2011. Key to this initiative was the guarantee of immunity from prosecution for 
Saleh and his aides, provided that they cease their involvement in Yemeni politics:  
On the 29th day after the Agreement enters into force, Parliament, including 
the opposition, shall adopt laws granting immunity from legal and judicial 
prosecution to the President and those who worked with him during his time 
in office.432 
 
The subsequent passing of the immunity law includes the following articles:  
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Article (1): Brother Ali Abdullah Saleh, President of the Republic, shall 
hereby be granted complete immunity from legal and judicial prosecution. 
 
Article (2): Immunity from criminal prosecution shall apply to the officials 
who have worked under the President – in state civil, military and security 
agencies – in connection with politically motivated acts carried out during 
the course of their official duties; immunity shall not apply to acts of 
terrorism.433 
 
While the passing of this law had the full support of the international powers that 
negotiated the GCC initiative, it generated deep disappointment among domestic and 
international human rights NGOs, such as the Yemeni Center for Transitional Justice 
(YCTJ), Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, and the Coalition for the 
International Criminal Court (CICC).434  It also angered the victims of the Friday of 
Dignity killings.  
Despite the immunity law, the Friday of Dignity victims continued to file 
legal complaints with the public prosecutor in an attempt to hold those who ordered 
and carried out the killings accountable. The case was originally opened in 2011 and 
when it became clear that the attorney general at the time, Abdullah al-Olfy, was 
taking the independence of the investigation seriously, he was sacked by Saleh. The 
court proceedings since then were conducted in a haphazard manner and marred with 
hasty acquittals and with a questionable selection of ‘suspects’ that did not include 
any high-ranking security or government officials.435  
Navigating the GCC Initiative 
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Curiously, the United Nations consistently called for the implementation of 
the GCC initiative in Yemen (which specifically grants immunity from prosecution 
for Saleh and his aides), all while also calling on Yemen to pursue transitional justice 
measures that include criminal accountability for human rights violations.436 A string 
of United Nations documents immediately preceding and following the signing of 
the GCC initiative reflect this bizarre contradiction, which warrants a close look at 
the following excerpts: 
77. Launch transparent and independent investigations, in line with 
relevant international standards, into credible allegations of serious human 
rights violations committed by the Government security forces, including, 
but not limited to, the killing of civilians, excessive use of force against 
civilians, arbitrary detention, and torture and ill treatment; ensure that 
perpetrators are held accountable… 
 
95. Recognizing that in the present climate of violence and counter 
violence, much-needed investigations, particularly into excesses or abuses 
by the military, the security services or their affiliates will not be seen as 
credible or impartial, ensure that international independent and impartial 
investigations are conducted into incidents which resulted in heavy loss of 
life and injuries;437 
 
These calls for accountability are reiterated in the Human Rights Council resolution 
of 14 October 2011, which notes Yemen’s commitment to launch independent 
investigations into human rights violations that adhere to international standards. 
However, the same resolution makes the following statement:  
7. Calls upon all parties to move forward with negotiations on an 
inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led process of political transition on the basis 
of the initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council;438  
 
The resolution therefore calls on Yemen to pursue two conflicting goals: the 
fulfillment of its international human rights obligations on the one hand, and the 
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conditions set forth in the GCC initiative on the other, which prevent the prosecution 
of the former president and his aides. This contradictory call reappears in subsequent 
United Nations documents:  
Taking note of the Human Rights Council resolution on Yemen 
(A/HRC/RES/18/19), and underlining the need for a comprehensive, 
independent and impartial investigation consistent with international 
standards into alleged human rights abuses and violations, with a view to 
avoiding impunity and ensuring full accountability, and noting in this regard 
the concerns expressed by the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights, 
 
Welcoming the statement by the Ministerial Council of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council on 23 September 2011 which called for the immediate signing by 
President Saleh and implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
initiative, condemned the use of force against unarmed demonstrators, and 
called for restraint, a commitment to a full and immediate ceasefire and the 
formation of a commission to investigate the events that led to the killing of 
innocent Yemeni people… 
 
4.   Reaffirms its view that the signature and implementation as soon as 
possible of a settlement agreement on the basis of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council initiative is essential for an inclusive, orderly, and Yemeni-led 
process of political transition…439 
 
United Nations Security Council Resolution 2051 (2012) repeats conflicting 
demands for accountability and for compliance with the GCC initiative that calls for 
immunity:  
1. Reaffirms the need for the full and timely implementation of the 
GCC Initiative and Implementation Mechanism in accordance with 
resolution 2014 (2011); 
 
7.   Stresses that all those responsible for human rights violations and abuses 
must be held accountable, and underlining the need for a comprehensive, 
independent and impartial investigation consistent with international 
standards into alleged human rights abuses and violations, to prevent 
impunity and ensure full accountability;440 
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Despite these clauses in the United Nations documents that call for conflicting paths 
to individual criminal accountability in Yemen, the Transitional Justice Working 
Group at the National Dialogue Conference made use of these documents to 
advocate for criminal accountability. The Working Group essentially referred to the 
clauses that call on Yemen to fulfill its international legal obligations by ensuring 
those responsible for human rights violations are held accountable. This strategy, 
according to Hamza Al Kamali, a prominent member of the Transitional Justice 
Working Group, is a means to circumvent the immunity law by citing these clauses 
in the Working Group’s recommendations to the National Dialogue Conference. Al 
Kamali explained, “The UN is a tool for us – the youth and civil society – an 
important tool to put pressure on the president to set up an investigative commission 
and to ensure accountability.”441 Such attempts to circumvent the immunity law in 
Yemen are akin to the circumvention strategies pursued in Chile, Argentina and 
Uruguay to overcome those countries’ amnesty provisions. As Engstrom and Pereira 
observe, “[I]n many countries, amnesty provisions are circumvented rather than 
overturned.”442 
Moreover, the immunity law in Yemen is, according to some interpretations, 
not as all encompassing as it might initially appear. George Abu Al Zulof, for 
instance, explained that the transitional justice working group’s recommendations 
aimed to link the immunity law with political activity by ensuring that politically 
active individuals would be stripped of their immunity. Here, ‘politically active’ 
means “to take high positions in the government, or manasib ‘olyah.”443 In other 
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words, the immunity law currently in place only pertains to high-level government 
officials:  
This means that we can – despite the immunity law – address human rights 
violations committed by other personnel from the previous regime, such as 
the security forces. There are other political groups, such as Islah, that were 
part of the 1994 civil war and they worked with the previous regime and 
they committed violations as well. So this means that if there are 
investigations conducted, their leaders, or those who were involved and 
decided to continue to be involved in the political scene in the country could 
be held accountable and prosecuted. Or, from the very beginning, they could 
choose either to step down from political life or face prosecution.444  
 
Whether such other mid to low ranking officers will be prosecuted in Yemen 
remains an open question, particularly given the fragile security situation and the 
judiciary’s weak and politicised disposition. Moreover, it leaves unresolved the 
question of lack of accountability for high-level officials at both the domestic and 
international level.  
Role of International Actors and Geo-Politics 
	  
 Human rights lawyers argue that the political interests of certain international 
and regional actors directly led to immunity for high-level government officials in 
Yemen. Arman, for instance, stated: “The immunity law is a product of politics at 
the international level.”445 Belkis Wille of Human Rights Watch agreed: “The reason 
that the immunity law exists is because of international actors.”446 Abu Al Zulof 
provided three explanations regarding the question of the role of international and 
geo-political actors in Yemen in severely limiting the prospects for prosecuting 
former leaders: 
First, Yemen’s location in the Arabian Peninsula – being close to the Gulf 
States and Saudi Arabia – means that any instability in Yemen will affect the 
neighbouring countries. So I think the GCC countries are very much 
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concerned that what will happen in Yemen will negatively affect them. They 
are doing their utmost to reach an agreement peacefully. They are against the 
prosecutions because they were allies with the previous regime.  
 
Secondly, the GCC countries didn’t pay a lot of attention to the complete 
dismantlement of the previous regime because the previous regime shares 
half of the authority over the country. The reason is that the alternative was 
not acceptable to the GCC countries. The alternative was the key opposition 
group – al-Islah, which is the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
From a political point of view, they were not so much motivated to have a 
regime that is Muslim Brotherhood. There is the right wing of al-Islah, such 
as the Zindani. Their ideology is very much in line with Al Qaeda. So there 
is an extremist wing in al-Islah so they were concerned that this would have 
bad consequences for instability in Yemen.  
 
The third reason is related to the international community. For Europe, the 
EU, and the United States the key concern was Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula’s (AQAP) unification with the Saudi branch and their ability to 
build their own bases. For the Western countries, any instability in Yemen is 
an opportunity for AQAP to expand and control more areas. So the political 
agenda supersedes the human rights agenda for these powers.  
 
The impunity law was the price to be paid for stability in Yemen. This is 
what makes Yemen different from other countries. In Libya, NATO 
intervened. This wasn’t possible in Yemen. In Yemen you have weak 
government and institutions, more than 50 million pieces of small arms in 
Yemen. On top of that you have Al Qaeda and the tribal powers.  All these 
elements pushed towards a scenario not to have the international community 
come and end the conflict. It’s a different kind of international 
intervention.447  
 
Others commented on the role of specific actors, such as Saudi Arabia, in directing a 
substantial part of domestic politics in Yemen to suit their interests. For example, 
Shamsan criticised several international actors for contributing to the decades-long 
political chaos in Yemen:  
Saudi Arabia doesn’t want to see a stable and successful state in Yemen 
because they don’t want the Saudi people to see a successful, democratic 
model elsewhere…The UN is controlled by big powers which are run by 
institutions, not individuals. They build their decisions based on studies. 
Europe views us – the Third World – as barbaric, reactionary. They’re fine 
with an almost collapsed state – it’s in their interests. So long as it is ‘stable’ 
enough not to cause too many problems for them.448 
 
Omar Own lamented this state of affairs by referring to the weakness of Yemeni 
President Hadi: “Ten states control Yemen. Our president merely acts as the 
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coordinator.”449 Shamsan also charged Yemenis – and Arabs in general – with 
failing to build a democratic state that could hold its leaders accountable. “We in the 
Arab world,” Shamsan observed, “make a dictator out of a democratic leader. And 
that is because we don't have democratic institutions to ensure a leader remains 
democratic.”450 In sum, Yemen’s grappling with internal tribal politics451 while also 
fielding external power wrangling meant, “the impunity law was the price to be paid 
for stability in Yemen.”452 
Legal Challenges and a Weak Tribal Justice System 
 
 Weak institutions are a significant factor that shaped decisions not to 
prosecute in Yemen. Lawyers and activists explained that while the Public 
Prosecutor at the time of the uprising tried to ensure independent investigations, 
particularly for the Friday of Dignity killings case, the government responded by 
removing him from his post.453 Split along tribal and factional lines, the judiciary 
rarely takes action with regards to controversial cases that implicate high-level 
officials. Barman noted, “The judiciary in Yemen has many challenges. You will 
find a good judge, but he’s also corrupt. You will find a good judge, but he is not 
powerful. You will find a powerful judge, but he is not knowledgeable.”454 This 
politicisation of the judiciary, coupled with corruption and nepotism, left Yemenis 
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with a weak judicial institution to which very few turned in their quest for justice. 
The aborted Friday of Dignity killings case is a tragic illustration of this.  Barman 
also noted that many of his organisation’s archives were destroyed by security forces 
during the revolution, making it particularly difficult to provide the evidence 
required to prosecute.455  
Moreover, problems of security in Yemen have also infiltrated the judiciary. 
Judges and prosecutors have been – and continue to be – assassinated.456 The strong 
involvement of the military in politics is yet another factor that has severely 
restricted progress towards prosecutions. As a result, even in cases where officials 
who hold high-level governmental positions are supportive of the push for criminal 
accountability of political leaders, their goals are quashed by other more powerful 
actors. Wille explained that the Ministry of Legal Affairs and Ministry of Human 
Rights are strongly against the immunity law and support a comprehensive 
transitional justice law and the ratification of the Rome Statute. However, they are 
the two weakest ministries in terms of power, and thus have had little, if any, 
influence on decisions regarding prosecution.457 A high-level government position 
does not equal a position of power. 
Finally, there is a serious problem of capacity in the judiciary. Apart from the 
absence of war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide in the criminal code, 
the prosecution of ordinary crimes is highly unlikely. As Arman explained, there are 
only 700 judges in Yemen and 2,700 members of the judiciary who take a four-
month annual leave. He added, “This is a very, very low number of judges for a 
population of twenty-two million. One judge has 200 or more cases per month. 
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There is no time to deal with all these cases. There is also a problem of law 
enforcement – the police do not enforce judicial decisions. Judges are powerless.”458 
As a result, many cases have lingered with the judiciary for twenty or more years.459 
While the Supreme Judicial Council in Yemen has control over the judicial budget – 
something which other countries in the region continue to struggle for – its weak 
capacity overshadows its ability to perform its functions effectively. As Hesham 
Nasr, Jill Crystal and Nathan J. Brown note:  
There are 223 offices with human working power of 800 prosecutors. In this 
regard, Yemen has particular need of infrastructural development…In 
Yemen, there is particular need for work related to buildings, equipment and 
human resources (administrative and judicial) in order to provide for the 
basic needs of effective public prosecution function.460  
 
It is not surprising, then, that even lower profile prosecutions in Yemen since the 
2011 uprising have not progressed, given the judiciary’s weak capacity and the 
complex tribal loyalties within the justice system.  
Content and Extent of Decisions Regarding Prosecution 
 
Despite the immunity law and the challenges discussed above, there are 
efforts in Yemen to seek accountability for political leaders – whether in the form of 
prosecutions, truth commissions, or through other transitional justice mechanisms. 
Al Kamali’s explanation of the Transitional Justice Working Group’s efforts, 
described above, is one example of this. However, when asked about the time period 
of the crimes to be covered within a transitional justice framework, the picture 
begins to look similar to that of Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. A focus on crimes of the 
transition, namely, the killing of peaceful protesters in 2011 has left the subject of 
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pre-transition crimes to be dealt with by the non-existent transitional justice law. A 
number of explanations for this limited scope of crimes emerged.  
First, prosecuting crimes committed during the 2011 uprising is, as Al 
Kamali explained, easier and more practical. It is easier because “all the various 
political factions who continue to wield power in Yemen were involved in pre-2011 
crimes. 2011 crimes are more straightforward – the killing of protesters, full stop.”461 
Letta Tayler observed that the question of how far back the transitional justice law 
should go was a “key sticking point” for the same reasons that Al Kamali identified. 
Consequently, Tayler explained, “Our position is…ideally start with the most recent 
violations because they are fresh and easiest to prosecute…We’d rather see that than 
no [transitional justice] law at all.”462 Efforts have emerged, however, to include as 
many of the pre-2011 crimes as possible. Abu Al Zulof explained some of the 
maneuvers taken to try and ensure a more inclusive set of crimes are addressed by 
the transitional justice law that was under negotiation in 2013 and 2014. He 
described these efforts by referring to the example of enforced disappearances and 
land confiscations, of which there are many in Yemen. He stated that: 
As an office, we are supporting expansion of the [transitional justice law’s] 
mandate to include crimes committed before 2011. But there are so many 
limitations, including the text of the GCC agreement. We are trying to 
overcome these limitations through the national dialogue. The decision they 
reached now is that the grievances of the past – their impact is still ongoing 
today and will be addressed in the new draft of the transitional justice law.  
For example, for cases of enforced disappearances, the families are still 
suffering from this ongoing crime. The president will consider the national 
dialogue recommendations and those who were affected will at least be 
compensated.  
	  
Abu Al Zulof emphasised that enforced disappearances and land confiscations are 
both ‘ongoing’ crimes and that “families are still suffering as a result of these crimes, 
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so there is a need [for the transitional justice law] to address these grievances, which 
have been around since 1994 and not 2011.”463 Barman also discussed the inclusion 
of ‘ongoing’ crimes: “The transitional justice working group will go back to 
previous years but only for ‘ongoing crimes’ – land confiscation, enforced 
disappearances, and so on. Not torture and extra judicial killings. This is because the 
current political forces in Yemen are implicated in these crimes.”464 
Secondly, a lack of direct evidence linking Saleh and other high-level 
government officials to crimes such as the Friday of Dignity killings significantly 
weakened prospects for prosecution. The destruction of evidence that Barman 
mentioned is also a contributing factor.465 Third, and perhaps most importantly, is 
that the chaotic and ambiguous nature of Yemen’s transition has significantly 
impacted decisions regarding prosecution. This factor warrants further elaboration.  
The overtly negotiated transition in Yemen and the country’s long history of 
tribal politics resulted in a number of major obstacles to both the inclusion of pre-
2011 crimes and the prosecution of political leaders in general. The most obvious is 
the immunity law. However, despite the fact that the immunity law was negotiated as 
a compromise that would see Saleh’s removal from power – and from politics 
altogether – a different transition unfolded in Yemen. As Tayler explained: “This 
deal may have avoided bloodshed in the immediate term, but it certainly did not 
remove Saleh and his allies from power in the dramatic way that I think many who 
backed this immunity deal had hoped.”466 Saleh continued to head the GPC, his 
political party, and made sporadic political appearances, giving many reason to 
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believe that he still wields power in Yemen. Al Qudsi made a similar observation: 
“The problem is that our current government is a partner of the former regime – they 
are avoiding accountability for prior human rights abuses.”467 Barman summarised 
the Yemeni transition as follows: 
[T]here was a political agreement between the old regime and the 
revolutionary parties. The old regime is still very present in today’s state 
security. We’ve removed the heads and the families of the old regime, but 
its supporters are still there and they are influential…In Yemen, the faces 
of the regime changed, but the mentality of the old regime persists…We 
don’t actually have a new regime in Yemen – it’s the same people. If you 
want to create a change and open a new page, you should do it with new 
agents of change. Not with the same agents of the past. With them, you 





 It is clear that external actors’ preoccupation with the preservation of political 
stability in Yemen, considered necessary to ensure regional and international 
stability, triggered the decision not to prosecute political leaders in Yemen. It 
produced an immunity law that contradicted the provisions of the Yemeni 
constitution and went against the wishes of victims and their families.469 Unlike 
Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, popular demands to hold Saleh accountable for crimes 
committed before and during the uprising rang hollow. These demands, however, 
could also be regarded as triggers that prompted regional and domestic politicians to 
issue the immunity law so as to lay the question of prosecuting Saleh to rest. 
Drivers 
	  
A corrupt judiciary, a weak and tribal justice system, internal and external 
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politics are some of the principal drivers behind decisions not to prosecute. Wille 
mentioned that international actors in support of the immunity law would not fund 
local organisations that seek criminal accountability.470 There are, then, active efforts 
to steer away from decisions to prosecute political leaders in Yemen. However, civil 
society and human rights activists, particularly those who participated in the 
Transitional Justice Working Group of the National Dialogue Conference, worked 
hard to find ways around the immunity law and to ensure some form of 
accountability – even if this meant through the use of a transitional justice 
mechanism other than prosecutions. Al Kamali’s account of these efforts regarding 
the navigation of the GCC initiative and the various United Nations mechanisms 
attests to this.471 
Shapers 
	  
The shaping factors that impacted the decision not to prosecute in Yemen, 
including the limited scope of crimes addressed in the negotiations are similar to the 
factors that triggered and drove the decisions. As human rights lawyers explained, 
senior security and police officials are essentially the only individuals who could be 
held accountable for crimes. International actors and internal politics played a major 
role in limiting the content as well as the extent of potential prosecutions in this way. 
They helped ensure that high-level government officials, particularly Saleh and his 
regime, would not be tried. But the ambiguous nature of the transition itself 
significantly shaped decisions regarding prosecution in Yemen. From the removal of 
the Public Prosecutor presiding over the Friday of Dignity killings case, to the 
negotiators of the immunity law, to the continued assassination of judges and 
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prosecutors, it is clear that while Saleh was removed from his position as head of 
state, he and individuals loyal to him continued to exert influence on the transition 
itself. As a result, they also influenced the direction of decisions regarding 
prosecution. Moreover, the precarious security situation in Yemen, often described 
as being on the brink of another civil war, further compounded efforts to ensure that 
the immunity law remains in place.  
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CHAPTER 4 | RE-THINKING TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: 
Implications of findings from Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and 
Yemen for transitional justice theory and practice 
  




This chapter provides a critique of mainstream transitional justice theory with 
a focus on prosecutions. Using scholarly literature and the findings generated from 
interviews in each of the four case studies as presented in Chapter 3, this chapter 
challenges the predominant understanding that transitional justice uniformly occurs 
in liberalising contexts. The findings of this research therefore build on the growing 
literature that claims that transitional justice is an under-theorised field and needs to 
be developed to take into account non-liberal and complex transitions.472  
I make four principal arguments. First, the complex nature of the transitions 
that took place in the Arab region warrants a re-thinking of transitional justice and its 
pursuit in various contexts. Transitions that are at once ruptured as well as 
negotiated, where the heads of state were ousted but politically controversial state 
institutions remained intact, produced a complex set of decisions regarding the 
prosecution of political leaders. Moreover, the shift to a renewed form of repressive, 
non-liberal rule in several Arab region transitions undermines mainstream 
transitional justice theory’s presumption of a “return to a liberal state.”473  
Second, the Arab region cases demonstrate that both domestic and 
international actors pursue competing accountability agendas, thereby weakening 
global accountability norm claims. Domestic and international wrangling over if, 
when and how to pursue prosecutions points to the diverse goals of transitional 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472 Thomas Obel Hansen, ‘Transitional Justice: Toward a Differentiated Theory’ (2011) 13 Oregon 
Review of International Law 1; Nicola Palmer, Phil Clark and Danielle Grenville (eds), Critical 
Perspectives in Transitional Justice (Intersentia 2012). See also Laurel E. Fletcher and Harvey M. 
Weinstein, ‘Writing Transitional Justice: An Empirical Evaluation of Transitional Justice Scholarship 
in Academic Journals’ [2015] Journal of Human Rights Practice 
<http://jhrp.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2015/05/17/jhuman.huv006.abstract> accessed 15 July 
2015, in which they suggest that transitional justice is under-theorised.  
473 Ruti G. Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice: Essays for the New Millennium (OUP 2014).	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justice actors. The contradictory role of international actors in Libya and Yemen – 
pushing for criminal accountability in the former and immunity in the latter – 
exemplifies the need to deconstruct the varied objectives of transitional justice 
actors. Some actors pursue prosecutions within a transitional justice framework that 
is advocated by international human rights organisations. Many other actors, 
however, use transitional justice as either a façade to appease public anger without 
achieving meaningful accountability or as a weapon to silence political dissent post-
transition. Both scenarios are a product of transitions that, unlike their Latin 
American counterparts, are marked by a return to – or a renewed form of - repressive 
rule and continued human rights violations.474  
Third, the limited content and extent of the investigations and prosecutions 
that have taken place in all four case studies further underline the need to develop 
transitional justice theory. The emphasis on accountability for corruption and socio-
economic crimes and a much more limited form of accountability for civil and 
political crimes in Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, points to a practice of 
scapegoating certain crimes in order to avoid the prosecution of a more 
comprehensive set of crimes. This practice of scapegoating is used by political 
leaderships with the aim of producing an authoritative image of a break with the 
former regime. In reality, however, the influence of the feloul in Egypt, the anciens 
nouveaux in Tunisia and former President Saleh’s political maneuverings in Yemen 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
474 Tunisia is often cited as the exception to this. Nevertheless, the flawed prosecutions, continued 
politicisation of the judiciary and the re-emergence of ancien regime officials in Tunisia’s leadership 
warrant a cautious assessment of the Tunisian transition. See, for example, Human Rights Watch, 
‘Flawed Accountability: Shortcomings of Tunisia’s Trials for Killings during the Uprising’ (January 
2015) 1 <www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/12/flawed-accountability/shortcomings-tunisias-trials-
killings-during-uprising> accessed 26 July 2015.  More optimistic accounts of the Tunisian transition 
as a role model for other Arab Spring countries include Boston Globe, ‘Tunisia Becomes a Beacon of 
Hope’ (Editorial, 17 February 2015) <www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/editorials/2015/02/16/tunisia-
becomes-beacon-hope/q4ZJ0VuX6LljqmYXjcj4pK/story.html> accessed 31 July 2015; Middle East 
Eye, ‘Tunisia Polls Offer Arab Spring Ray of Hope’ (28 October 2014) 
<www.middleeasteye.net/news/tunisia-polls-offer-arab-spring-ray-hope-1988403914> accessed 31 
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reveal otherwise. The very limited human rights prosecutions that have taken place 
thus point to the controlled nature of the transitions. Moreover, the focus on crimes 
of the transition in the investigations and trials that have taken place leaves decades 
of human rights violations unaccounted for.475 This contributes to the propagation of 
conflicting narratives regarding legacies of past injustices, furthering the use of 
transitional justice to entrench authoritarian rule.  
Fourth, the Arab region cases demonstrate the perils of pursuing prosecutions 
during highly contentious transitions. Weak and politicised judiciaries crippled by 
executive power meddling and inadequate legal frameworks are a principal 
challenge to the pursuit of fair prosecutions. I therefore argue that a re-thinking of 
transitional justice needs to take into account the absence of pre-existing democratic 
structures and what this means for criminal accountability prospects in such 
transitional contexts.  
In Chapter 3, I identified the key factors that triggered, drove and shaped 
decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and 
Yemen. As explained in the Methodology section in Chapter 2, the trigger-driver-
shaper mechanism is used as a general prism through which I make sense of the 
research collected and by which I develop an explanation of how decisions regarding 
the prosecution of political leaders emerged and developed before, during and after 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
475 These human rights violations have been documented by many Egyptian civil society 
organisations, including the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (www.eohr.org); the Cairo 
Institute for Human Rights Studies (www.cihrs.org); the Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 
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the highly contentious period of transition.476 First, it is worth briefly reiterating the 
triggers, drivers and shapers identified in each case study. An analysis of the 
implications of the case study findings for transitional justice will follow. 
Egypt 
	  
The cases of Emad El Kebir and Khaled Said were triggers that opened up the 
possibility of holding the police, a much-feared arm of the Ministry of Interior, 
criminally accountable. In addition, the Kifaya movement in 2005 and the 6 April 
movement in 2008 served as triggers in the form of social movements that grew over 
time and were marked by periodic protests, or ‘mini-uprisings’.477 Emad El Kebir, 
Khaled Said, the Kifaya and the 6 April movements thus served as some of the most 
influential trigger factors that led to the 2011 uprising and stronger demands for 
criminal accountability.  
Public pressure during and immediately after the 2011 uprising and 
individual plaintiffs, particularly those working in established NGOs, were the major 
drivers of decisions regarding prosecution in Egypt. Given that public pressure and 
individual lawyers played a significant role in initiating prosecutions, they also 
served as triggers. Together, these triggers and drivers pushed the judiciary and 
interim military authorities to respond by allowing certain prosecutions of high-level 
government officials. 
A number of shapers impacted the content and extent of decisions regarding 
prosecution in Egypt. Explicit demands for socio-economic accountability by the 
protesters, a politicised judiciary and public prosecutor, a weak legal framework, and 
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477 The Mahalla strike and protests in 2008 is often described as an uprising or revolt. See Osman El 
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a military-controlled transition all shaped the limited content and extent of 
prosecutions in Egypt.  
Tunisia 
	  
 At least three events in Tunisia’s past triggered the momentum behind 
decisions to prosecute the country’s leaders. The 1978 general strike, the Baraket 
Essahel torture practices in 1991, and the Gafsa revolt of 2008 each fuelled 
resistance to repression and civil society advocacy for accountability for human 
rights violations. Moreover, public pressure during the uprising and also 
immediately following Ben Ali’s ouster was, as several interviewees noted, the 
strongest trigger that led to decisions to prosecute.478  
The Groupe de 25’s early efforts, immediately following Ben Ali’s ouster, 
were successful in driving decisions regarding prosecution. Continued protests and 
pressure from victims’ families made it difficult for interim authorities to ignore the 
question of prosecutions for former leaders. The appeasement of public anger was 
therefore also a key driver of decisions regarding prosecution.479 
The shapers in Tunisia included the dire socio-economic situation, which led 
to an emphasis on corruption and economic crimes in the charges, and the prospect 
of a Truth and Dignity Commission, which many relied on as the mechanism that 
would cover the human rights violations that the prosecutions thus far failed to 
address. Much like Egypt, a politicised judiciary and public prosecutor also limited 
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the content and extent of prosecutions. Furthermore, a lack of command 
responsibility provisions led to many acquittals and light sentences. Finally, a 
transition that increasingly saw the return of the anciens nouveaux – ex-Ben Ali 
regime officials – meant that human rights prosecutions in particular, but also 
corruption prosecutions, would be limited to protect those with former regime ties. 
Libya 
	  
The 1996 Abu Salim prison massacre and the impunity its perpetrators 
enjoyed for years served as a powerful trigger for subsequent decisions regarding 
prosecution. Moreover, the highly symbolic arrest of Fathi Terbil on the 15 February 
2011, widely regarded as the spark of the Libyan uprising, attests to the critical role 
of individual lawyers in triggering decisions regarding prosecution. The ICC’s arrest 
warrants for three Libyan high-level officials also triggered domestic decisions to 
prosecute.  
Individual lawyers similarly served as key drivers of decisions regarding 
prosecution. In addition, the advocacy efforts of organisations such as Amnesty 
International were vital to pressuring the government to respond. Persistent public 
pressure – mostly by families of the victims of Abu Salim and of other torture crimes 
in Libya – were also influential in driving decisions to prosecute.  
Legal challenges, a precarious security situation, and a deep mistrust of the 
judiciary’s ability to operate independently and effectively all contributed to the 
limited charges in the prosecutions. The continued violence that has gripped Libya 
since 2011 and chaotic militia politics have formed a transition whose direction is 
uncertain and in which decisions regarding prosecution are in flux. 




International actors, preoccupied with the preservation of political stability in 
Yemen and the region, triggered the decision not to prosecute political leaders in the 
form of an immunity law.480 Unlike Egypt, Libya and Tunisia, popular demands to 
hold Saleh accountable for crimes committed before and during the uprising rang 
hollow. These demands, however, could also be regarded as triggers that prompted 
regional and domestic politicians to issue the immunity law so as to lay the question 
of prosecuting Saleh to rest. A corrupt judiciary, a weak and tribal justice system, 
internal and external politics are some of the principal drivers behind decisions not to 
prosecute. International actors and internal politics played a major role in limiting 
both the content and the extent of potential prosecutions. They helped ensure that 
high-level government officials, particularly Saleh and his regime, would not be 
tried. But the ambiguous nature of the transition itself significantly shaped decisions 
regarding prosecution in Yemen. From the removal of the Public Prosecutor 
presiding over the Friday of Dignity killings case, to the negotiators of the immunity 
law, to the continued assassination of judges and prosecutors, it is clear that while 
Saleh was removed from his position as head of state, he and individuals loyal to 
him continued to exert influence on the transition itself.481 As a result, they also 
influenced the direction of decisions regarding prosecution. Moreover, the precarious 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
480 Law No. 1 of 2012 Concerning the Granting of Immunity from Legal and Judicial Prosecution, 
translated from Arabic to English by Amnesty International in Yemen’s Immunity Law – Breach of 
International Obligations, (March 2012) <www.amnesty.ca/sites/default/files/2012-03-
30mde310072012enyemenimmunitylaw.pdf> accessed 10 July 2015. 
481 PRI The World, for example, reports: “Saleh, a strongman who ran Yemen for 33 years, stepped 
down in 2011 after a wave of popular protests. But if demonstrations drove him from office, they 
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security situation in Yemen, often teetering on the brink of another civil war, further 
compounded efforts to ensure that the immunity law remains in place.  
____________ 
The factors identified in each case study above reveal that while the triggers 
and drivers – particularly in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia – are marked by the traditional 
motives for a more just, liberal democratic order, the shapers paint a more complex 
picture that presents a significant challenge to mainstream transitional justice theory. 
The various shaping factors that pushed and pulled decisions regarding the 
prosecution of political leaders in different, and even opposing, directions are a 
strong indication that different actors have been fiercely battling each other for 
competing visions of transitional justice – and of criminal justice in particular.  
Notably, rather than serving as a ‘liberalising ritual’, transitional justice can 
be – and indeed has been – employed by both pre and post-transition leadership 
figures as a political tool to consolidate or renew repressive rule.482 On the other 
hand, actors such as domestic human rights organisations and individual lawyers 
push for prosecutions within a transitional justice framework that they regard as an 
opportunity for genuine accountability for past atrocities. For the leadership figures 
exerting control over the transition so as to preserve the status quo or to consolidate 
their power, the absence of independent judicial institutions to carry out 
investigations and trials is an essential factor that aided their cause. For human rights 
actors vying for individual criminal accountability for former leaders and other high-
level government, police, and military officials, weak and politicised judiciaries have 
obviously posed a major obstacle to their cause.  
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Non-Paradigmatic Transitions 
 
The complex nature of the transitions that took place in the Arab region 
warrants a re-thinking of transitional justice and of its pursuit in various contexts. 
The Arab transitions do not fall within the paradigmatic framework for transitions 
that is marked by a shift from authoritarian to liberal democratic rule. Ahmed Nader 
Nadery warns that, “we must take care to distinguish the nature of each transition, 
lest we mistakenly import the lessons of one context into another.”483 Transitions 
that are at once ruptured as well as negotiated, where the heads of state were ousted 
but politically controversial state institutions remained intact, produced a complex 
set of decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders. They are, as Nassar 
and others have described them, “ambiguous transitions.”484 The ambiguity in Libya 
and Yemen primarily lies in the uncertain direction of the politics of the transitions, 
the ongoing violent conflicts there, and the actors that hold sway in decisions 
regarding prosecution. In Egypt and Tunisia, the continued presence of certain 
influential political actors and institutions, despite dramatic changes at the head-of-
state level, has shaped decisions regarding prosecution. The police, military, state 
security agencies and the judiciary are among such institutions that escaped reform 
and have morphed into renewed versions of authoritarianism.485  
The shaping role of these contextual factors significantly undermine the 
predominant theory and practice of transitional justice and of prosecutions in 
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particular.486 It points to the diverging objectives of various transitional justice 
actors, which puts into question the merits of the transitional justice industry’s 
advocacy for accountability mechanisms rooted in liberal values. Lingering, or 
remnant political actors include, but are not limited to, the judiciary, military and 
Mubarak loyalists in Egypt; the judiciary and the anciens nouveaux politicians in 
Tunisia; and Saleh and his political and tribal loyalists in Yemen. Cherif Bassiouni 
usefully summarises the ambiguity of the Arab Spring transitions:  
The difficulty in the Arab world is that there have not been fundamental 
changes in the different countries’ political systems because previous 
regimes, whenever removed, have either simply survived, morphed into the 
new regimes or continued to hold influence over what appear to be new 
regimes. Consequently, there is a vested interest in both the old and new 
regimes to avoid publicizing past misdeeds and to cover up human rights 
violations and, for that matter, crimes under national and international 
law…the interests of actors in prior regimes remain powerful in those Arab 
states where change has occurred. 487  
 
It is important to note here that the ambiguity of the Arab Spring transitions is not 
new. The initial tendency of transitional justice scholars to explain the likelihood of 
prosecutions based on whether or not the country in question experienced a ruptured 
or a negotiated transition has rapidly started to wane. As scholars took a closer look 
at what happened in the Latin American transitions, it became clearer that even in 
the orthodox ruptured case of Argentina, where an explicit military defeat took 
place, the transition was both ruptured and pacted. The Argentinian military and the 
post-transition governments negotiated decisions regarding prosecution, resulting in 
the initial wave of amnesties which were then followed by many prosecutions – 
some of which are still taking place at the time of this writing. Skaar’s account of the 
role of judicial reform over time is an important contribution to this area of research, 
as it highlights the relationship between the ebbs and flows of prosecutions in 
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loyalists.	  
487 M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Editorial’ (2014) 8 IJTJ 325, 335-336. 
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Argentina and developments in the establishment of the independence of the 
judiciary over time.488 The “paradigmatic transition” from “violent conflict to peace 
and democracy,” then, is no longer an adequate framework for the analysis of varied 
transitions and their transitional justice decisions.489 
Many of the challenges to the prosecution of political leaders in pre-transition 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen are, with a few important exceptions, similar to 
the post-transition challenges to prosecution. These challenges include lack of 
judicial independence, crimes that continue to be orchestrated and/or perpetrated by 
the regime, victims’ fear of the repercussions for filing complaints against high-level 
government officials, and legal obstacles such as lack of access to direct evidence 
and the absence of command responsibility provisions. The continued existence of 
these challenges is indicative of the ambiguous nature of the transitions and the role 
this plays in shaping decisions regarding prosecutions and making them more 
limited. In other words, without a definitive resolution of these challenges, the so-
called transition offers no real change in its institutions and human rights practices. 
Consequently, decisions regarding prosecution remain severely limited and 
politicised.  
 Despite these challenges, however, pre-transition efforts to hold perpetrators 
to account have, with the exception of Yemen, trickled into post-2011 efforts to 
prosecute. Egypt’s Khaled Said case, Tunisia’s Baraket Essahel case, and Libya’s 
Abu Salim prison massacre case are all examples of prosecutions targeting mid to 
high-level government and police officials that, despite an exceedingly difficult and 
repressive environment for civil society to work within, were revived post-
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transition.490 Of note here is that the incidents that led to these iconic cases were also 
cited as major triggers that eventually led to decisions to prosecute high-level 
officials in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. These triggers, which were marked by the 
public outrage they created and the tireless efforts of civil society and individual 
lawyers to ensure accountability for them, were milestones in the long and difficult 
road to accountability for political leaders in these countries. This is why it is crucial 
to identify pre-transition triggers and to analyse their impact, if any, in subsequent 
decisions to prosecute former political leaders. They point to the significant role that 
public pressure and civil society efforts play in sustaining the momentum behind 
certain iconic cases, which also in one way or another served as triggers of post-
transition decisions to prosecute political leaders. 
Nassar points to an important difference between the Arab Spring transitions 
and others that preceded them: the Arab region is dealing with the legacy of 
atrocities committed under multiple regimes, whereas most transitions in the rest of 
the world have dealt with the legacy of a single regime or conflict.491 Nassar’s 
observation is important as it indicates the impossibility of a “return to a liberal 
state”492 because in all four case studies there was no liberal state to begin with. The 
decades of atrocities committed under multiple regimes, as Nassar argues, will 
require creativity that today’s transitional justice models do not offer.493 This is 
another attribute of the Arab region transitions that contributes to their complexity, 
as transitional and post-transitional political actors are often implicated in the 
multiple legacies of atrocities, making accountability measures that much more 
difficult to pursue.  
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This question of transitioning from what and transitioning to what has been 
briefly examined by scholars and is worth visiting here.494 Catherine Turner, for 
instance, draws attention to what she calls the temporality of transitional justice in 
the critical scholarship. She refers to “the extent to which we can ever speak of a 
before and after of transition, and the ways in which past, present and future intersect 
in the transitional context.”495 Rosemary Nagy’s account of the South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission and of the Saddam Hussein trial in Iraq is also 
insightful in that she points out the selective focus on crimes committed within a 
certain period as well as the problem of continued political violence, human rights 
violations, and socio-economic inequalities. Nagy explains: 
Transitional justice…implies a fixed interregnum period with a distinct end; 
it bridges a violent or repressive past and a peaceful, democratic future. 
Notions of ‘breaking with the past’ and ‘never again’, which align with the 
dominant transitional mechanisms, mould a definitive sense of ‘now’ and 
‘then’. This can problematically obscure continuities of violence and 
exclusion. … In Iraq and Afghanistan the transition is constructed as being 
‘from’ a repressive police state under Saddam Hussein or ‘from’ cycles of 
war and repression culminating in the Taliban regime. This neatly avoids the 
current matter of foreign military intervention and implies that the 
transitional problem has to do with ‘then’ and not the ‘now’ of occupation, 
insurgency, and the war on terror…Although prosecution, vetting, reparation 
and truth-telling are taking or will take place in the midst of violence and 
insecurity, the concern of these transitional mechanisms is the history before 
2001 in Afghanistan and before 2003 in Iraq. The ‘to’ of transitional justice 
is thus insulated from the current reasons for instability.496  
 
The question of time, then, emerges as a contentious feature of transitional justice 
decisions, which, as Nagy illustrates above, already has a history of limiting 
decisions regarding prosecution. The patchy extent of the prosecutions in Egypt and 
Tunisia demonstrate that decisions regarding prosecution have for the most part been 
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Research Handbook on Transitional Justice (Edward Elgar, forthcoming).  
495 Catherine Turner, ‘Transitional Justice and Critique’ in D Jacobs (ed), Research Handbook on 
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guided by a reckoning with the transition itself, rather than with what brought about 
the transition to begin with.  
Despite these challenges, decisions to prosecute former leaders have been 
taken in three of the four case studies. If transitional justice were only pursued in a 
liberalising direction, what explains the opaque and politicised prosecutions of 
Mubarak, Ben Ali, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and their aides? While there is no single 
answer to this question, Obel Hansen’s call for greater attention to the various claims 
of transitional justice is important for a better understanding of the motives behind 
prosecution decisions in the Arab region: 
[M]ost observers think of transitional justice as something that is inherently 
"good," at least to the extent it preserves the rights of victims and 
perpetrators…there is a need for more rigorous scrutiny of the intentions 
behind establishing transitional justice mechanisms and, in particular, at the 
level of the general scholarship, a need for adjusting the perception that 
transitional justice generally aims at, and achieves, liberalization and 
democratization.497 
 
Rather than serve as a mechanism to help transitional societies overcome past 
atrocities, decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders in the Arab region 
exhibit a divergence in objectives from the classical cases of Latin America and 
elsewhere. They largely represent transitions to non-liberal and repressive rule, 
contrary to the liberalising ritual of transitional states elsewhere.498 
In the case of Egypt, for instance, transitional justice has been used to 
entrench repressive rule and to propagate conflicting historical narratives regarding 
legacies of injustice. Since the toppling of former President Mubarak in 2011, both 
military-backed transitional governments (2011-2012 and again in 2013-2014) and 
the one-year rule of President Morsi (2012-2013) oversaw widespread human rights 
abuses.  In November 2012, Morsi issued a highly controversial presidential decree 
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that effectively removed the separation of powers.499 A repressive protest law, which 
grants security forces sweeping powers to ban protests through the use of lethal 
force, effectively putting an end to any kind of dissent and freedom of assembly, was 
issued in 2013 under the then interim President Adly Mansour.500 Moreover, the 
biggest mass killing in Egyptian modern history, the Raba’a massacre of August 
2013 where over 800 Muslim Brotherhood supporters were allegedly killed by 
security forces, continues to be marked by impunity.501 Since the ouster of President 
Morsi by the military in July 2013, thousands of people have been arrested and 
detained without trial, while crackdowns on student protesters, journalists and the 
media, and NGOs are endemic and have become institutionalised.502 At a mass trial 
in April 2014, the judge sentenced 683 alleged Muslim Brotherhood supporters to 
death – the largest mass death sentencing of its kind in recent times.503 The trial was 
a mockery of justice: it lasted eight minutes, the majority of defendants were absent, 
the judge did not review evidence, and defense lawyers were not allowed to cross-
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examine witnesses.504 The trial was presided over by Judge Saeed Yousef, fittingly 
also known as al gazzar, or ‘the butcher.’   
In Tunisia, most of the twenty senior government officials who faced 
prosecution have been set free.505 Ousted Tunisian President Ben Ali continues to 
live in Saudi Arabia, which has ignored extradition requests from Tunisia. In Libya, 
thirty-seven former regime officials, including Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and El Senussi, 
continue to be held in detention with the first verdicts having been issued only in 
July 2015. In Yemen, repeated calls for Saleh to be put on trial have been ignored. 
Saleh’s continuous violation of the terms of the immunity agreement – namely, that 
he disengage from practicing politics – has been met with silence.  
It is clear, then, that the Arab region transitions do not constitute a return to a 
liberal state, nor do they constitute a transition in a new liberalising direction. 
Instead, they are marked by regimes that have “survived, morphed into the new 
regimes or continued to hold influence over what appear to be new regimes.”506 
Despite this ambiguous state of affairs, a definitive break with the past has taken 
place in each case study and formal decisions to prosecute and not to prosecute 
political leaders have been taken. The toppling of leaders as a result of a massive 
uprising and the subsequent initiation of a political transition constitute this 
definitive break. They are also significant attributes shared among these complex 
transitions, which warrant further comparative research on their impact on 
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transitional justice theory more broadly.507 
Whose Transitional Justice?  
 
Globally, the number of prosecutions of political leaders has increased 
significantly in the last two decades.508 Between 1990 and 2008, sixty-seven heads 
of state have been prosecuted.509 This phenomenon has been described as a “justice 
cascade” that originated in Latin America and reverberated worldwide, leading to an 
increase in universal jurisdiction laws.510 Indeed, the prosecution of Mubarak and 
Ben Ali contribute to these numbers. But the statistic on its own overlooks the 
complex motives behind such trials and, perhaps more importantly, it overlooks how 
and why various actors struggle for competing visions of transitional justice. Teitel 
argues that due to its globalised nature, transitional justice is increasingly 
disassociated from politics. 511  The politically charged unfolding of transitional 
justice in the Arab region, particularly decisions regarding prosecution, challenge 
this observation. Martti Koskenniemi’s rejection of the “neutrality” of law is relevant 
here, as he argues: “It is impossible to make substantive decisions within the law 
which would imply no political choice.”512 This is particularly true in transitional 
situations, which are highly contentious and political. 
As the case studies demonstrate, various factors pushed and pulled decisions 
regarding the prosecution of political leaders in different and even opposing 
directions. These drivers and shapers are thus a strong representation of the different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
507 See Methodology section in Chapter 2 for a detailed explanation of the merits of this comparative 
research.	  
508 Ellen L. Lutz and Caitlin Reiger (eds), Prosecuting Heads of State (CUP 2009). 
509 ibid 2. 
510 Ellen L. Lutz and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Justice Cascade: The Evolution and Impact of Foreign Human 
Rights Trials in Latin America’ (2001) 2 Chicago Journal of International Law 1, 5. 
511 Teitel, Globalizing Transitional Justice (n 473). 
512 Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (Bloombsury Publishing 2011) 61. 
	   194	  
actors that fiercely battled each other for competing visions of transitional justice – 
and of criminal justice in particular. Obel Hansen rightly urges a closer examination 
of the “horizontal expansion” or “proliferation” of transitional justice actors to better 
understand these competing transitional justice discourses and practices.513 The Arab 
region cases present an important contribution to this particular scholarly discussion. 
The key domestic actors involved in decisions regarding prosecution were individual 
lawyers, civil society organisations and victims on the one hand, and the judiciary, 
transitional and post-transitional leadership officials on the other.514 The former 
group of actors tends to share the similar motive of criminal accountability for 
former leaders. The latter group of actors has largely played a role in blocking 
prosecutions or at least severely limiting their content and extent. As a result, a 
highly contentious process of prosecution took shape in the Arab region cases, with 
these two groups of actors often clashing with each other. Subotic identifies three 
domestic groups of actors in the overall process of decisions regarding prosecution, 
which are also useful in describing the competing domestic actors in the Arab 
region:  
[H]ow elites go about engaging in transitional justice is the result of specific 
domestic power structures and coalitions.  The contested process of 
transitional justice adoption defines domestic elites along three major 
groups: justice resisters, justice instrumentalists and true believers.  Which 
domestic group comes out on top in the domestic political battle will 
determine what approach to transitional justice elites undertake and to what 
policy effect.515  
 
The various civil society actors, lawyers, interim elites, military actors, and judges 
largely fall within the three categories outlined by Subotic above. The unfolding of 
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decisions regarding prosecution before, during and immediately after the Arab 
Spring uprisings is thus marked by such tensions between what Subotic describes as 
justice resisters, instrumentalists, and true believers. 
 The interview responses across the four case studies indicate that civil society 
actors advocated for fair and effective prosecutions of former leaders. Given the 
repressive environment within which civil society actors had to work, however, their 
primary role particularly in the pre-transition period was to document human rights 
violations by the regime and its associated state agencies. The objective was to raise 
awareness and put pressure on governments to change their human rights practices. 
Eid and El Shewy explained that despite working with a politicised judiciary, the 
aim of civil society documentation was to have enough evidence so that “one day,” 
when an independent judiciary is in place, “we will be able to prosecute.”516 As a 
result, documentation was the “most powerful tool” for a civil society struggling 
with authoritarian rule.517 As we have seen in the literature review, scholars differ on 
the extent to which civil society actors impact decisions regarding prosecution. The 
findings from the Arab region cases largely confirm Pion-Berlin’s and others’ 
contention that political leadership preferences trump those of “interest groups,” or 
civil society and other domestic actors.518 
 As mentioned in Chapter 2, access to prosecutors for interviews proved 
extremely difficult mainly because they and other members of the judiciary in all 
four case studies faced security threats. A review of government and ministry 
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websites in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen reveals little more than general 
descriptions of the function of public prosecutors in the four case studies. At the time 
of writing, it was difficult to find official statements issued by the public prosecution 
concerning transitional justice and the prosecution of political leaders in particular. 
This is perhaps not surprising, given the ongoing nature of the prosecutions as well 
as the assassinations of former Libyan prosecutor general Abdelaziz al-Hasadi in 
February 2014 and of former Egyptian prosecutor general Hesham Barakat in June 
2015, both signifying the highly controversial nature of their mandate and of the 
prosecutions in general.  
The title of Egypt’s Ministry of Transitional Justice changed four times since 
its establishment in 2011.519 The swearing in of a new cabinet in September 2015 
resulted in the abolishment of this ministry altogether. Commentators have gone so 
far as to describe this move as a sign that “the country’s transitional justice process is 
over.”520 In Tunisia, the Ministry for Human Rights and Transitional Justice was 
created in January 2012 and one of its principal tasks was to oversee the drafting of 
Tunisia’s transitional justice law, which was subsequently passed in December 2013. 
No such ministry was established in Libya or Yemen, although the ministries of 
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human rights and legal affairs in Yemen have called for transitional justice and 
criminal accountability in the past.521 In April 2013, Yemen’s General Prosecutor Ali 
Al-Awash ordered an investigation into alleged acts of terrorism committed by 
former President Saleh, his son Ahmed Ali Abdullah Saleh, his brother Ali Saleh Al-
Ahmar and their aides.522 At the time of writing, no major developments emerged 
following this prosecutorial order. 
However, discussions in the emerging scholarship on transitional justice 
decisions in the Arab region largely overlook the proliferation of actors that drive 
and shape transitional justice decisions. One example is Khatib’s critique of the rise 
of political Islamists in the Arab Spring countries and the allegedly harmful 
challenge they pose to the transitional justice process.523 The deconstruction of the 
various domestic actors involved in decisions regarding prosecution is thus vital to 
understanding that the origins of competing agendas of transitional justice are much 
more complex.  
Domestic and International Actors: Advocates of competing visions of 
transitional justice 
	  
The pursuit of individual criminal accountability for past atrocities in 
transitional justice contexts often draws the involvement of international actors.  
Much has been discussed about the role of international NGOs such as Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch, regional bodies such as the IACtHR, 
international tribunals such as the ICC and intergovernmental bodies such as the 
United Nations and its various agencies as some of the key international actors that 
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work to promote accountability for past human rights violations. This promotion is 
often conducted through transnational networks made up of these actors and that 
work to ensure accountability at the domestic level where possible, or at the 
international level where necessary.  The prevailing assumption is that international 
– or ‘transnational’ – actors actively seek the fulfillment of a well-established and 
shared norm – that of individual criminal accountability, or the global accountability 
norm.524  
While domestic elites use transitional justice to score political points as 
Subotic observes, international actors also pursue conflicting justice agendas.525 One 
of the key factors responsible for the existence of the immunity law in Yemen but 
not in the other Arab Spring countries, for instance, is the particular role of 
geopolitics in the Yemeni transition. Arman’s statement was clear: “The immunity 
law is a product of politics at the international level.”526 Wille of Human Rights 
Watch agreed: “The reason that the immunity law exists is because of international 
actors.” 527  Subotic discusses instances where both international pressure for 
transitional justice and domestic opposition to transitional justice are strong and 
therefore clash. Yemen, however demonstrates the opposite case: domestic support 
for justice – particularly in the form of prosecutions - is strong, but international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524 See Cath Collins, ‘Grounding Global Justice: International Networks and Domestic Human Rights 
Accountability in Chile and El Salvador’ (2006) 38 Journal of Latin American Studies 711; Margaret 
E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional 
Politics’ (1999) 51 (159) International Social Science Journal 89; Paige Arthur, ‘How ‘Transitions’ 
Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional Justice’ (2009) 31 Hum. Rts. Q. 321, 
359; Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider-Outsider 
Coalition’ in Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow (eds), Transnational Protest and Global 
Activism: People, Passions and Power (Rowman & Littlefield 2005); Martha Finnemore and Kathryn 
Sikkink, ‘International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,’ (1998) 42 (4) International 
Organization 887; Francesca Lessa and Leigh A. Payne (eds), Amnesty in the Age of Human Rights 
Accountability: Comparative and International Perspectives (CUP 2012).  
525 Subotic (n 515) 134-135. 
526 Interview with Ahmed Arman, Lawyer and Executive Secretary, National Organisation for 
Defending Rights and Freedoms (Sanaa, Yemen, 22 January 2014). 
527 Interview with Belkis Wille, Yemen and Kuwait Researcher, Human Rights Watch (Sanaa, 
Yemen, 22 January 2014). 
	   199	  
pressure is not.528  The long-standing peace versus justice debate in transitional 
justice and international criminal law scholarship may explain the decision not to 
prosecute in Yemen.529  
Sharp usefully explains how the “transitional justice as peacebuilding” 
narrative only works where the concepts of justice and peace are synonymous with a 
liberal justice and a liberal peace. He argues:  
[I]nsofar as the goals of liberal international peacebuilding and the historical 
goals of transitional justice are essentially one and the same, transitional 
justice as peacebuilding may be little more than a dressed up tautology. 
More darkly, an amorphous ‘transitional justice as peacebuilding’ narrative 
may prove useful to autocratic regimes that would seek to use the tools and 
rhetoric of transitional justice to consolidate abusive regimes in the name of 
peace, just as victors have often done in the name of justice.530  
Nevertheless, further research is needed on how the conflicting justice agendas 
between domestic and international actors affect transitional justice theory, which 
rests on the global accountability norm that many scholars claim is gaining ground.  
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International actors, particularly in the case of Libya and Yemen, thus 
constitute another set of influential actors that drove and shaped decisions regarding 
prosecution. Their objectives, however, were not monolithic as the supporters of the 
so-called global accountability norm would contend. Libya and Yemen demonstrate 
that the influence of international actors on domestic decisions regarding prosecution 
can – and indeed has – had very different outcomes.  The involvement of the ICC in 
Libya, although fiercely resisted by certain domestic actors, drove domestic 
decisions to prosecute tens of members of the former Gaddafi regime.531  The GCC, 
the United States, the European Union, and the United Nations had the opposite 
effect in Yemen: the negotiation of a deal granting immunity for the former president 
and his aides. Thanks to this immunity law that was passed in Yemen, domestic 
efforts to launch prosecutions of former political leaders for human rights violations 
committed before and during the 2011 uprising have been continuously blocked.532 
Just as there are competing objectives regarding criminal justice among domestic 
actors, so there are competing accountability preferences among international actors. 
The starkly opposing justice strategies in Libya and Yemen, then, weaken the 
international community’s claim to a global accountability norm.  
Why did some of the same international actors who advocated for criminal 
accountability in Libya almost simultaneously back an immunity deal in Yemen? An 
analysis of this difference in the preferences of international actors with regards to 
the pursuit of prosecutions in these two countries is crucial to understanding how 
such actors can have a significant and divergent impact on the shape of transitional 
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custody, have been the most strongly opposed to ICC intervention.  
532 Law No. 1 of 2012 Concerning the Granting of Immunity from Legal and Judicial Prosecution, 
translated from Arabic to English by Amnesty International in Yemen’s Immunity Law – Breach of 
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justice in different countries. The United Nations Security Council requested the ICC 
to investigate crimes committed in Libya while stopping short of such a request with 
regards to Yemen. While the Security Council was swift in its issuance of resolution 
1970 (2011) which referred the situation in Libya to the ICC, no such action was 
taken with regards to Yemen, despite the commission of grave crimes.533 Eager to 
prevent instability and violence in Yemen that could threaten the stability of its 
neighbouring countries, particularly with the active presence of Al Qaeda in the 
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen, the GCC countries along with the United 
States and the European Union had decided that “the impunity law was the price to 
be paid for stability in Yemen.”534 The geopolitics of Libya, on the other hand, are 
such that the international community’s endorsement of the ICC’s involvement and 
of domestic efforts to prosecute were deemed less risky to the stability of Libya and 
the region.535  
The Libyan and Yemeni cases reveal that, even in circumstances of severe 
domestic repression and limited interaction between domestic and international civil 
society, international actors can still significantly influence accountability decisions 
at the domestic level. At the same time, those same international actors exercise 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
533 This is particularly true for the ‘Friday of Dignity’ attack that took place in Yemen on 18 March 
2011. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Unpunished Massacre: Yemen’s Failed Response to the “Friday of 
Dignity” Killings’ (February 2013) < https://www.hrw.org/report/2013/02/12/unpunished-
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varying degrees of power that yield different outcomes related to prosecutorial 
decision-making. In the case of Yemen, for instance, the GCC was an external actor 
whose accountability preference (immunity for Saleh and his aides) overwrote 
domestic civil society’s accountability preference (prosecution of Saleh and his 
aides). In the Libyan case, the ‘shadow of the ICC,’ or the threat of the ICC’s 
involvement stirred some domestic judicial activity, albeit within a complicated 
political and security environment.536 
It is worthwhile to revisit Koskenniemi’s analysis of the politics of 
international law and the consequent selectivity of international actors. For instance, 
he refers to the Security Council’s “notorious selectiveness”537 when pushing for 
collective security actions in certain countries and not in others. “Selectivity,” he 
argues, “is unavoidable.”538 While Koskenniemi makes this statement in the context 
of his discussion on collective security, it is applicable to international criminal law 
as well. It points to his overarching argument that law is a product of politics: 
It is an uninteresting truism that delegations couch decisions in legal 
garb to make them look respectable. That is the point of law…The 
question is never about security versus something else, but about 
“whose security” and “at what cost?”539 
 
It is crucial, then, to examine the divergent objectives of not only transitional justice 
actors, but especially of transitional justice actors in varying transitional contexts. 
The stark contrast between the accountability preferences of the so-called 
international community in Libya and Yemen is an example of competing 
accountability agendas. The international community’s divergent goals regarding 
Libya and Yemen may, perhaps, seem less contradictory when cast in the light of the 
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537 Koskenniemi, The Politics of International Law (n 512) 84. 
538 ibid 88. 
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peace versus justice debate.540 The immunity deal in Yemen was inspired by a strong 
desire on the part of the GCC to ensure a relatively peaceful transition on the basis 
that Saleh would remove himself from politics. On the other hand, the Security 
Council referred the Libyan situation to the ICC, signifying a clear preference for 
criminal accountability, even whilst the conflict was raging.541 
Different types of international actors have different accountability agendas. 
Many prominent international human rights NGOs, such as Amnesty International, 
continue to advocate for prosecutions whether in Libya, Yemen, or elsewhere. The 
role of transnational advocacy networks as described by Keck and Sikkink, then, 
needs to be reviewed by taking into account the competing agendas of international 
actors with political interests at stake.  The hierarchy between governmental and 
non-governmental actors at the international and domestic levels, for instance, must 
be taken into account when assessing the likelihood of success of transnational 
advocacy networks. Keck and Sikkink rightfully acknowledge the divergent goals of 
different transnational actors: 
[D]ifferent transnational actors have profoundly divergent purposes and 
goals.  To understand how change occurs in the world polity we have to 
unpack the different categories of transnational actors, and understand the 
quite different logic and process in these different categories.   The logic of 
transnational advocacy networks, which are often in conflict with states over 
basic principles, is quite different from the logic of other transnational actors 
who provide symbols or services or models for states.542 
 
Subotic, on the other hand, points to a shortcoming of Keck and Sikkink’s 
transnational advocacy network model. She argues that, “it underestimated the 
strength of domestic elite resistance to international norms and overestimated the 
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541 The ICC arrest warrants for Muammar Gaddafi, Saif-al-Islam Gaddafi and Abdullah El Senussi 
were issued in June 2011. At the time, the conflict was still ongoing and neither Gaddafi nor any of 
the other senior Gaddafi regime members had been captured. 
542 Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and 
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power of norm supporters – domestic allies of transnational groups, such as NGOs 
and civil society.” 543  Of the four case studies, Libya perhaps most strongly 
exemplifies Subotic’s observation of the strength of domestic resistance to so-called 
international norms regarding accountability. Also, despite repeated calls by both 
domestic and international human rights organisations such as Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch on Egypt and Tunisia to pursue more comprehensive and 
fairer prosecutions of former leaders, domestic elite preferences – or the justice 
instrumentalists – prevailed.  
 The literature on the growing interdisciplinary relationship between 
international law and international relations provides a broader angle from which the 
Libyan and Yemeni cases can be considered. Power relations and the question of 
fixed versus changing state interests provide a possible explanation for the 
divergence of decisions regarding prosecution in Libya and Yemen. Put simply, it 
could be argued that Libya is an example of the use of international law to advance a 
particular course of international politics – the definitive rejection of the Gaddafi 
regime – while Yemen is an example of the rejection of international law, or of the 
‘culture of accountability’ to protect certain political interests, power relations, and 
geopolitical stability. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew Tulumello and Stepan Wood 
argue for a collaborative research agenda between international relations and 
international law scholars and provide examples of such collaboration between 
domestic and international courts:  
[B]oth national and international courts are attracting increased attention in 
terms of their actual or potential relationship with one another, either as 
partners in enforcing international rules or as participants in a larger dynamic 
process of socialization in the service of compliance.544 
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However, this collaboration is not the case when viewed through the Libyan and 
Yemeni cases where domestic and international demands regarding prosecution have 
clashed. The fundamental tension between international relations and international 
law, as it has unfolded in these two cases, thus requires further examination. As the 
authors suggest, “what counts as a theory or explanation of action may be extremely 
context dependent, raising the question of whether the goal of research can be to 
develop a single theory of action.”545 International law in the form of the ICC served 
political interests in the context of Libya, resulting in the Security Council’s referral 
of the situation to the ICC. In the case of Yemen, international law in the form of 
accountability norms did not serve political interests and instead resulted in the 
issuance of the immunity law.  
Libya and Yemen: A TWAIL Perspective 
 
 From yet another broader perspective, the difficulty of a universally 
applicable theory of transitional justice becomes even more prominent when viewed 
through the body of critical legal scholarship known as Third World Approaches to 
International Law (TWAIL). While TWAIL does not and indeed cannot fully 
explain why accountability in the form of prosecutions is sometimes pursued and 
sometimes not, it nevertheless provides a useful critical framework through which 
the divergent strategies of international actors in Libya and Yemen can be 
understood. I will first outline the main tenets of TWAIL followed by a brief 
analysis of how it applies to the Libyan and Yemeni case studies. 
 The most recurrent Third World protest to the practices of the dominant 
international human rights system is the inconsistency between legal text and legal 
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practice.  The importance of TWAIL lies in its ability to reveal that the practices of 
international institutions with regards to Third World issues are inconsistent with the 
international community’s ode to equality as enshrined, for example, in the Preamble 
of the Charter of the United Nations.546 TWAIL seeks an explanation for the 
continued Third World resistance to established international human rights norms 
deemed universally applicable by what appears to be a relatively small but powerful 
section of the international community, the hegemonic ‘West.’ 
Caution, of course, must be taken against the overly simplified use of the 
Third World versus West distinction.  Resistance to international human rights 
norms is not exclusive to the Third World, but can also be found in the West, 
although the resistance in both cases is waged from within different contexts.  The 
Third World context of resistance is linked to the region’s shared anti-colonial 
history and its post-colonial present.547  Western resistance to international human 
rights norms emerges both from its fear of being held accountable by an international 
human rights system largely of its own making and from its refusal to risk the 
fulfillment of its political and economic interests for the grander sake of protecting 
human rights.  It must also be mentioned that far from homogenous in cultural and 
political ideals, Third World states are similarly culpable of exploiting the 
international human rights system in ways that further their own national goals, 
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especially those of national elites, at the expense of the protection of the larger 
majority’s human rights. An example of this instrumental use of human rights that 
has been cited throughout this thesis is the scapegoating of certain former political 
leaders in court in order to avoid more comprehensive prosecutions for a more 
comprehensive set of crimes. 
By virtue of its purpose to ensure criminal accountability and to counter 
impunity, the ICC’s mandate falls nicely within the liberal transitional justice 
paradigm. However, these liberal values were deemed harmful by the regional and 
international actors negotiating the transition in Yemen. Aside from the fact that the 
possibility of prosecutions was effectively eliminated through the immunity law, no 
notable efforts were made by international actors for alternative forms of justice in 
Yemen. No truth commissions and other reconciliation methods were pursued or 
materialised. The precarious security situation has also, of course, prevented 
progress in this regard, but challenges such as lack of security and ongoing conflict 
did not preclude prosecutions and other transitional justice mechanisms from taking 
place in other parts of the world, including in the former Yugoslavia and indeed in 
Libya.  
This again brings to the fore the question of whether the global accountability 
norm is as strong as its proponents contend. As Gerry Simpson argues, ““The fear 
[…] is that the ICC may become another particularistic institution and part of the 
deepening constitutionalism of the liberal project; aspiring to universality but 
remaining relevant only to the good citizens of the international order.”548 Shamsan’s 
views on the role of international – read Western – actors in Yemen and in the Arab 
region in general are worth repeating here:  
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The UN is controlled by big powers which are run by institutions, not 
individuals. They build their decisions based on studies. Europe views us – 
the Third World – as barbaric, reactionary. They’re fine with an almost 
collapsed state – it’s in their interests. So long as it is ‘stable’ enough not to 
cause too many problems for them.549 
 
Shamsan’s comments reflect the clash of international law and international relations 
described earlier. The rejection of international law in Yemen to protect the power 
relations and geopolitical interests of a select few, namely the GCC and in particular 
Saudi Arabia, meant that the realpolitik of international relations had different plans 
for Yemen than it did in Libya. It is, therefore, difficult to claim that a global 
accountability norm is gaining strength without accounting for what continues to be 
a very important component of international criminal law debates and practices: 
amnesty laws.550 
Content and Extent of Decisions Regarding Prosecution 
 
The limited content and extent of the investigations and prosecutions that 
took place in all four case studies further underline the need to develop transitional 
justice theory. The emphasis on accountability for corruption and socio-economic 
crimes and a much more limited form of accountability for civil and political crimes 
in Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, points to a practice of scapegoating certain crimes 
in order to avoid the prosecution of a more comprehensive set of crimes. Moreover, 
certain highly symbolic individuals, such as Mubarak and Ben Ali, were prosecuted 
while several others were not. This practice of scapegoating is used by political 
leaderships with the aim of producing an authoritative image of a break with the 
former regime. In reality, however, the influence of the feloul in Egypt, the anciens 
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nouveaux in Tunisia and former President Saleh’s political maneuverings in Yemen 
reveal otherwise. The very limited human rights prosecutions that have taken place 
thus point to the controlled nature of the transitions.  
Nagy offers an important reminder that transitional justice is, by its nature, a 
selective process due to resource, time and political constraints.551 While these 
constraints are pertinent to the Arab region case studies and have been discussed in 
Chapter 3 as shaping factors, the political constraints of the Arab region prosecutions 
require a close examination because of their significant role in limiting the extent of 
the investigations and trials. By prosecuting only a handful of individuals for a 
significantly limited set of crimes, those actors shaping the prosecutions aim to 
create the impression of a symbolic break with the former regime in order to appease 
an outraged public that demanded the prosecutions in the first place.  Moreover, the 
limited selection of individuals that faced investigation and prosecution points to a 
prosecutorial strategy that is motivated by elite preferences and leadership interests 
rather than by the merits of the so-called global accountability norm. Finally, the 
focus on crimes of the transition in the investigations and trials that have taken 
places leaves decades of human rights violations unaccounted for.552  
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Robinson explains the importance of ‘quasi-judicial’ powers of the TDC and the expanded scope of 
the crimes to be covered: “Created in December 2013, the TDC was launched in June 2014 and will 
run for four years, with the possibility of a one-year extension…The law aims to address past human 
rights violations committed by previous regimes, in particular the regime of former President Zine al-
Abidine Ben Ali, who ruled from 1987 until the revolution in January 2011. During this time, Ben 
Ali’s extended family reportedly embezzled millions and, by 2010, controlled approximately 20 per 
cent of private sector profits in Tunisia.  In addressing corruption, the TDC will combine 
investigation, arbitration and reform functions. The Commission is mandated to investigate violations 
committed by the state and organized groups from July 1955 to December 2013… The significant 
powers of the TDC regarding arbitration and vetting effectively mean that the TDC’s work vis-a-vis 
corruption is characterized by a quasi-judicial nature. This is not necessarily a new phenomenon; 
indeed, there have been truth commissions that have had subpoena powers (including for individuals 
or documents and other objects)	  and search and seizure powers. However, it is certainly the first time 
that a truth commission has been given such far-reaching powers vis-a-vis corruption.” Isabel 
Robinson, ‘Truth Commissions and Anti-Corruption: Towards a Complementary Framework?’ 2014 
IJTJ 2, 13, 16. 
	   210	  
Before discussing the implications of the emphasis on corruption and socio-
economic crimes in the Arab region prosecutions, it is worth clarifying what is 
meant by ‘corruption.’ Isabel Robinson usefully sums up the difference between 
grand and low-level corruption:  
[C]orruption can…be understood as a systematic and structurally entrenched 
phenomenon that affects all social interactions. In this regard, it is important 
to distinguish between high-level or ‘grand’ corruption, involving 
appropriation of large sums of money by heads of state and senior officials, 
and low-level corruption – also referred to as ‘administrative’ or ‘petty’ 
corruption – which takes place ‘at the implication end of politics, where 
citizens meet public officials.’553 
 
In the Arab region case studies, both grand and low-level types of corruption took 
place and contributed to the ‘visibility’ that several interviewees referred to when 
explaining the impetus behind demands for accountability.554 The investigations and 
prosecution charges, however, pertain to the type of grand corruption that Robinson 
mentions.  
The content and extent of decisions regarding the prosecution of political 
leaders demonstrate that the Arab region is beyond recent debates calling for the 
merging of the two sets of rights in transitional justice mechanisms. Vasuki Nesiah 
laments the absence of sufficient consideration of Pinochet’s harmful 
macroeconomic policies in his trial. She argues that the Chilean and South African 
cases show that transitional justice often backgrounds systemic factors such as 
economic and racial structures, “rather than shining a light on them as enabling 
conditions of human rights abuse…[they] deter and distract from structural 
violence.”555 Sharp argues that economic violence has been the “blind spot of 
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554 See Chapter 3. 
555 Vasuki Nesiah, ‘The Trials of History: Losing Justice in the Monstrous and the Banal’ in Ruth 
Buchanan and Peer Zumbansen (eds), Law in Transition: Human Rights, Development and 
Transitional Justice (Hart 2014) 305. Nesiah notes that despite a sharp rise in poverty under 
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transitional justice” as it is rarely scrutinised as much as human rights 
violations. 556 Abou-El-Fadl draws attention to Egypt as an example of how 
conventional transitional justice falls short of addressing the former regime’s 
violation of social and economic rights. 557 The “invisibility” of the economic 
dimension of transitional justice is further highlighted by Miller, who argues that its 
inclusion would help ensure a more comprehensive accountability that would 
prevent renewed violence and inequality.558 
Various scholars have proposed several explanations for why socio-economic 
rights have not been included in most transitional justice processes in other parts of 
the world.  For example, transitional justice is largely based on traditional 
international human rights law, which has long viewed economic and social rights as 
“entitlements” rather than “rights.”559 Other explanations include the difficulty to 
ascribe responsibility to individuals for socio-economic crimes and that social justice 
is a longer-term political process that short-term transitional justice mechanisms 
cannot fully take into account.560 Moreover, scholarly discussions on the inclusion of 
economic and social rights in transitional justice mechanisms focus on their place in 
truth commissions and reconciliation deals, with limited discussion on their place in 
criminal prosecutions. As Makau Mutua notes, despite significant efforts to 
incorporate socio-economic justice into transitional justice mechanisms, “the human 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Pinochet’s rule, “it is striking that the impact of Pinochet’s macroeconomic policies is not part of 
Chile’s transitional justice story.” Nesiah (2014) 295-296. 
556 Dustin N. Sharp, ‘Addressing Economic Violence in Times of Transition: Toward a Positive-Peace 
Paradigm for Transitional Justice’ (2012) 35 Fordham International Law Journal 780, 782.   
557 Reem Abou-El-Fadl, ‘Beyond Conventional Transitional Justice: Egypt’s 2011 Revolution and the 
Absence of Political Will’ (2012) 6 (2) IJTJ 318.	  
558 For a more detailed discussion of the call for the inclusion of socio-economic accountability in 
transitional justice mechanisms, see Literature Review in Chapter 1. 
559 Louise Arbour, ‘Economic and Social Justice for Societies in Transition’ (Second Annual 
Transitional Justice Lecture hosted by the Center for Human Rights and Global Justice at New York 
University School of Law and by the International Center for Transitional Justice, New York 
University School of Law, 25 October 2006). 
560 Lars Waldorf, ‘Anticipating the Past? Transitional Justice and Socio-Economic Wrongs’ (2012) 21 
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rights idiom speaks largely in the language of the entitlements that are germane to a 
liberal, market democracy. It focuses on the so-called core rights that are essential to 
securing the people against political tyranny, but does little to ward off the privations 
that come from economic despotism.”561  
The Arab region prosecutions, on the other hand, show that contrary to most 
transitional justice experiences in other parts of the world,562 corruption and socio-
economic crimes figured quite heavily in the charges. Moreover, despite strong 
demands for accountability for civil and political rights, they have taken a much 
more limited form, largely focusing on crimes of the transition (as in Egypt, Libya 
and Tunisia), or they have been dismissed almost entirely (as in the case of Yemen). 
The reasons for this particular content and extent – or shape – of decisions regarding 
prosecutions are complex, as presented by the findings in Chapter 3. A number of 
conclusions can be drawn from them.  However, a brief review of the explanations 
for the content and extent of the prosecutions is worthwhile here, followed by a 
discussion of their important implications for transitional justice research and 
practice. 
Factors Shaping the Content and Extent of Decisions Regarding Prosecution in 
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen: A re-cap 
	  
Egypt experienced a controlled transition, whereby the military and other 
state agencies worked to ensure that investigations and trials did not extend ‘too far’ 
so as not to harm their political interests and subject themselves to prosecution. 
Linked to this explanation is the role of a politicised judiciary in blocking certain 
controversial cases. A third factor is the victims, activists and lawyers who were 
active in pursuing prosecutions were preoccupied with the more recent crimes of 
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2011 because they are ‘fresher’ and therefore easier to prosecute.563 Fourth, the 
absence of an enabling legal framework and other legal challenges such as the 
requirement of direct evidence have made human rights prosecutions particularly 
difficult, thereby limiting the extent of individuals on trial. Fifth, the emphasis on 
corruption and economic crimes was used as a means to scapegoat certain high-level 
individuals to deflect attention from the lack of accountability for a more 
comprehensive set of human rights violations and their perpetrators. 
In Tunisia, a number of explanations for the content and extent of 
prosecutions emerge. These include: a.) a combination of the relative success of 
workers’ movements; b.) a history of a very visible and rampant corruption; c.) 
specific public demands for prosecution; d.) a weak judiciary and legal framework, 
and e.) the anticipation of a truth and reconciliation commission that would address a 
more comprehensive set of crimes.564  A pre-occupation with political stability 
immediately following the uprising also stalled decisions regarding the prosecution 
of political leaders for human rights violations. 
The very few prosecutions that took place in Libya since Muammar Gaddafi’s 
ouster primarily focus on crimes committed during the 2011 conflict. Given the 
difficulty of access to the trials, the list of charges remains ambiguous.565 While the 
number of corruption charges does not match those of the prosecutions in Egypt and 
Tunisia, they are overwhelmingly focused on crimes of the transition, particularly the 
killing of protesters and mass rape. Three main factors help explain the limited 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
563 Interview with Gamal Eid, Human Rights Lawyer, Activist and Director of the Arabic Network for 
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564 This has been named the “Truth and Dignity Commission,” or TDC. See n 552. 
565 Elham Saudi, for example, explained that her organisation, Lawyers for Justice in Libya, faced 
difficulty in obtaining information on the charges. Elham Saudi in Noha Aboueldahab, ‘Rapporteur’s 
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<www.academia.edu/8738334/Rapporteurs_Report_Prosecutions_Politics_and_Transitions_-
_How_criminal_justice_in_the_Arab_Spring_is_shaping_transitional_justice> accessed 26 July 2015. 
Details of some of the charges are explained in Chapter 2.	  
	   214	  
content and extent of the prosecutions. First, an enabling legal framework that is 
equipped to prosecute serious crimes such as war crimes and crimes against humanity 
is absent. Second, victims and their families do not trust the judiciary to 
independently carry out investigations and trials, which has limited the number of 
legal complaints filed. There is also a serious lack of awareness and understanding 
among victims, lawyers, judges and the elite regarding the “concept of justice” as 
enshrined in international treaties.566 Third, a dangerous security situation means that 
many judges and lawyers fear for their lives when asked to represent Gaddafi regime 
officials and loyalists.  
International actors, geo-politics, legal challenges and a fairly ambiguous 
transition all contributed to the decision not to prosecute in Yemen. Weak judicial 
institutions are a significant factor that shaped decisions not to prosecute. Moreover, 
problems of security in Yemen have also infiltrated the judiciary. Judges and 
prosecutors have been – and continue to be – assassinated. 567  The strong 
involvement of the military in politics is yet another factor that has severely 
restricted progress towards prosecutions. As a result, even in cases where officials 
who hold high-level governmental positions are supportive of the push for criminal 
accountability of political leaders, their goals are quashed by other more powerful 
actors. Despite the immunity law and the challenges discussed above, there are 
efforts in Yemen to seek accountability for political leaders – whether in the form of 
prosecutions, truth commissions, or through other transitional justice mechanisms. A 
focus on crimes of the transition, namely, the killing of peaceful protesters in 2011 
has left the subject of pre-transition crimes to be dealt with by the non-existent 
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January 2014). 
	   215	  
transitional justice law. A number of explanations for this limited scope of crimes 
emerged.  
First, prosecuting crimes committed during the 2011 uprising is, as Al 
Kamali explained, easier and more practical. It is easier because “all the various 
political factions who continue to wield power in Yemen were involved in pre-2011 
crimes. 2011 crimes are more straightforward – the killing of protesters, full stop.”568 
Tayler observed that the question of how far back the transitional justice law should 
go was a “key sticking point” for the same reasons that Al Kamali identified.569 
Secondly, a lack of direct evidence linking Saleh and other high-level government 
officials to crimes such as the Friday of Dignity killings case significantly weakened 
prospects for prosecution. The destruction of evidence that Barman mentioned is 
also a contributing factor.570 Third, and perhaps most importantly, is that the 
complex and uncertain nature of Yemen’s transition has significantly impacted 
decisions regarding prosecution, effectively resulting in the immunity law. 
Implications for Transitional Justice Theory and Practice 
 
Despite the fact that the trials and overall transitional justice process in the 
Arab region have been heavily politicised and face many challenges, they present an 
opportunity to develop transitional justice theory and practice.  First, the Arab region 
cases demonstrate that addressing socio-economic crimes is a possibility, even 
within a difficult and opaque judicial and authoritarian environment. 571  While 
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570 ibid. 
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“While the politics that accompany transitional justice deny the social and the economic as justice 
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scholars and practitioners have been consumed with cautioning transitional countries 
against neglecting the incorporation of socio-economic rights crimes in their 
transitional justice mechanisms, the case studies in this thesis demonstrate that 
corruption and economic crimes have taken centre stage in many of the 
investigations and trials.572 Robins makes a similar observation:  
While the politics that accompany transitional justice deny the social and 
the economic as justice issues, the Arab Spring has confronted the 
discourse with transitions driven by slogans such as ‘bread, freedom and 
dignity.’ The revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia were catalysed by graduate 
unemployment and rapid rises in the prices of basic foods. This presents 
both a challenge and an opportunity for approaches to justice in transition, 
in terms of looking beyond electoral democracy and civil and political 
rights.573 
 
Given the vast extent of corruption, which involved the embezzlement of tens of 
millions of dollars in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen, some interim authorities 
decided to settle for reconciliation deals, as in Egypt and Tunisia.  
Through such deals, business tycoons such as Hussein Salem and former 
presidents such as Mubarak would pay the state the money they gained illicitly and 
this money would be used to help re-build Egypt’s battered economy. Legal steps 
were taken to facilitate these reconciliation deals, particularly the SCAF Decree No. 
4 of 2012, which “gives immunity from criminal prosecution to businessmen 
accused of corruption under Mubarak and offers them the chance to settle their cases 
with government commissions.”574 Wageeh explained that the military justified these 
reconciliation deals as a means to protect capitalism and restore economic security. 
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Rather than imprison individuals for such grand corruption and economic crimes, the 
reconciliation deals proved somewhat popular among a public eager to improve an 
economy “in tatters.”575 Tunisia took similar steps toward reconciliation deals with 
corrupt business tycoons and former Ben Ali regime officials in order to revive its 
economy. Its proposed Reconciliation Bill effectively offers immunity from 
prosecution in exchange for a portion of illicit gains to be returned to the state. David 
Tolbert, the president of the ICTJ, heavily criticised the proposed bill and 
emphasised the mutually reinforcing nature of socio-economic and political crimes:  
Massive corruption and violent human rights violations are mutually 
reinforcing, and unless this linkage is exposed and broken, it can lead to 
mutually reinforcing impunity. This is the lesson Tunisia must learn from the 
legacy of the brutal and corrupt Marcos dictatorship in the Philippines, 
which killed, tortured and forcibly disappeared approximately 10,000 
victims, and from the Duvaliers in Haiti, and the Fujimoris in Peru. All were 
responsible for massive human rights violations. All of them committed 
large-scale corruption.576   
 
A stronger account for the few yet significant cases in which corruption and socio-
economic crimes were the focus of prosecutions, as in the Asian examples cited by 
Lutz and Reiger and now in the Arab region as well, is therefore needed.577  
Second, the inclusion of socio-economic accountability does not, of course, 
necessarily imply a more comprehensive transitional justice process is in place. The 
Arab region cases, specifically Egypt and Tunisia where the trials are at their most 
advanced stage in comparison to Libya and Yemen, demonstrate that the inclusion of 
socio-economic crimes is, on its own, insufficient in ensuring a more comprehensive 
accountability mechanism. On the contrary, due to scapegoating strategies to 
appease public anger and to foment a symbolic “break” with the past, the focus on 
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corruption and socio-economic crimes has served as a means to protect interim and 
post-transitional authorities from prosecution for human rights crimes. Speaking 
about Egypt, Ziad Abdel Tawab notes:  
None of the violations of the past, including forced disappearances, 
constitutional and human rights violations have been prosecuted, except for 
some cases of corruption. This is an attempt by the military to show that the 
revolution was only about the corruption.578 
 
In this sense, the prosecution of political leaders for corruption crimes reflects the 
use of transitional justice for strategic purposes. As Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp 
and Sikkink observe, “Repressive governments often adapt to normative pressures 
for purely instrumental reasons” – those reasons being appeasement of public anger 
and a disingenuous attempt to show a definitive break with the former regime.579  
Third, the focus on crimes of the transition, particularly in Egypt and Yemen, 
presents a very real risk of the propagation of conflicting narratives regarding 
legacies of past injustices. This limited content of the trials furthers the use of 
transitional justice to entrench authoritarian rule. Michael Wahid Hanna warns 
against the detrimental consequences of the fabrication of historical narratives in 
Egypt. There, conflicting narratives on past atrocities have already had negative 
consequences and have derailed the transitional justice process.580 It will be a long 
while before Tunisia’s Truth and Dignity Commission yields results, including trials, 
as it was only established in June 2014. It may, however, become an example of how 
to expand the content and scope of the crimes through a specialised mechanism that 
is separate from the ordinary courts where the trials have thus far been conducted.581  
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Fourth, the uses of the limited criminal sanction, as proposed by Teitel and 
Orentlicher, fall short of explaining the limited extent of the investigations and trials 
in the Arab region case studies. The strategic limitation of prosecutions for the sake 
of preserving the “return to a liberal state”582 and the broader stability of the 
transition itself offer only a partial explanation for the decisions regarding the extent 
of individuals who faced investigation and prosecution. Orentlicher warns against 
the cynical use of prosecutions as a scapegoating practice. “This might happen,” she 
explains, “if prosecutions were directed against only low-level participants in a 
system of past atrocities or if patently political considerations infected the 
determination of defendants.”583 Teitel defines the limited criminal sanction as a 
practice of criminal investigations and prosecutions followed by little or no penalty. 
She identifies this practice as a partial process “that distinguishes criminal justice in 
transition,” because it does not result in full punishment.584 The merits of the limited 
criminal sanction, Teitel continues, is that it offers a “pragmatic resolution of the 
core dilemma of transitions; namely, that of attributing individual responsibility for 
systemic wrongs perpetrated under repressive rule.”585 
The problem with this argument is that it does not take into account complex 
transitions that do not constitute a shift to liberal rule. As an anonymous interviewee 
explained, the practice of selective prosecutions Egypt and Tunisia was a strategy 
aimed to “sacrifice a part of the regime to save the regime.”586 The starkly opposing 
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motivations behind Teitel’s description of the limited criminal sanction and the ways 
in which it has unfolded in the Arab region suggest the need for a serious 
reconsideration of the various and competing claims of transitional justice agents. 
Teitel further suggests that where prosecutions fail to provide full accountability, 
other mechanisms that recognise and condemn past atrocities can have 
transformative impact, “the public establishment of which liberates the 
collective.”587 But where there is a strong and very public demand for a retributive 
justice in the courts, the “mere exposure of wrongs”588 would fall far short of 
meeting victims’ expectations and desires. Moataz El Fegeiry and others have noted 
that for the Arab Spring protesters, justice means retribution, while reparations and 
truth commissions do not hold any significance. People are not so much concerned 
with the justice process itself; they instead want to see the outcome, such as 
imprisonment.589  
On the other hand, Koskenniemi suggests that selective trials that are also 
show trials – in the sense that they do not establish a full picture of the truth about 
past atrocities – are sufficient for the mere recognition that suffering was inflicted 
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and wrong.590 Koskenniemi outlines the limits of criminality, especially as an 
inevitable focus on individual leaders may “serve as an alibi for the population at 
large to relieve itself from responsibility.”591 Instead, or as a complement to criminal 
trials, he argues that truth commissions are able to address context in a way that 
criminality, especially in the form of prosecutions, cannot.592 It is too early to assess 
whether transitional justice mechanisms other than prosecutions will become 
acceptable for victims in the Arab region case studies. The merits of the limited 
criminal sanction, however, need to be re-examined when selective trials – both in 
content and extent – instead have a negative impact on the course of transitions and 
the stability of the state. The polarisation of Egyptian society, for example, is in 
many ways tied to those with loyalties to the Mubarak regime and those who have a 
strong desire to see more radical change and a clearer break with the authoritarian 
past. The result is a highly contentious justice process that has largely contributed to 
the suffering, rather than the healing, of victims and their families. 
Crippled Judiciaries, Crippled Prosecutions: Transitional justice in non-
liberal transitions 
 
The Arab region cases demonstrate that a re-thinking of transitional justice 
needs to take into account the absence of pre-existing democratic structures and what 
this means for criminal accountability prospects in such transitional contexts.  The 
challenges of pursuing prosecutions during highly contentious transitions where 
weak and politicised judiciaries are crippled by executive power meddling and by an 
inadequate legal framework need closer examination.  The case studies show that 
prosecutions of political leaders in times of transition provide a major opportunity 
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for the use and abuse of transitional justice for political ends. These ends are 
intimately tied to the nature of the transition, which as explained previously, does not 
fall neatly within the paradigmatic shift from authoritarian to liberal, democratic 
rule. The Arab region cases therefore present transitional justice – and criminal 
prosecutions in particular – as a process that prioritises politics over accountability, 
strengthens repression, and buttresses the overall disregard for the rule of law and for 
establishing the truth about past atrocities. This process has seen the use of military 
trials in Egypt to silence opposition, arbitrary and non-transparent judicial decisions 
in Libya, questionable acquittals in Tunisia, and an immunity law against the will of 
many Yemenis with detrimental political and security consequences. The lack of 
adequate legal frameworks has led to questionable acquittals, stagnant trials and the 
absence of trials in several cases. The abuse of transitional justice – currently and 
largely understood as a liberalising process – has instead strengthened repressive rule 
post-transition, effectively turning transitional justice and its prosecution mechanism 
on its head. As Nesiah aptly describes the motivations behind transitional justice 
decisions: “…transitional justice initiatives anchor a political horizon that bends 
towards historical closure and away from historical accountability.”593 
The argument that previously existing democratic institutions, particularly 
functioning judiciaries, are necessary in order for adequate trials to take place post-
transition falls significantly short of explaining the course of transitional events in 
the Arab region. Teitel warns against political justice and unfair trials and calls 
attention to the necessity of democratically functioning institutions in order to avoid 
such a scenario. Similarly, Lutz and Reiger argue that “accountability, by itself is 
neither sufficient nor possible absent other functioning democratic institutions, 
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including an independent judiciary…”594 It is useful to recount Huyse’s assessment 
of the Belgian, Dutch and French experiences in addressing their past atrocities 
following World War II. Huyse argues that the democratic institutions and structures 
that existed prior to the four years of repressive rule in those countries were able to 
survive and were not completely eliminated: “…four years of occupation and 
collaboration were insufficient time for the authoritarian regime’s legal culture and 
codes to take root.”595 This may explain the speed with which prosecutions were 
initiated.596 On the other hand, Huyse points to Central and Eastern Europe – 
particularly Czechoslovakia, Poland and Hungary – where communist regimes lasted 
for forty years. This meant that decision making on crime and punishment was much 
slower and “[t]he legal culture created by communism was firmly established and 
[proved] hard to eradicate.”597  
The United Nations’ solution to the lack of democratically functioning 
institutions needed to carry out fair prosecutions is to involve international and 
hybrid tribunals. It proposes the following in its guidance note on transitional justice:  
States emerging from years of conflict or repressive rule may be unable or 
unwilling to conduct effective investigations and prosecutions. In such 
situations, international and hybrid criminal tribunals may exercise 
concurrent jurisdiction… The ICC operates on the basis of the principle of 
complementarity articulated in article 17 of the Rome Statute. As such, it 
should also contribute to the development of national capacities to bring 
alleged perpetrators of international crimes to justice.598  
The killing of protesters during the Arab Spring uprisings would not reach the 
gravity threshold required to qualify as an international crime that the ICC, for 
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instance, could address. On the other hand, a special tribunal or hybrid tribunal 
could, as the United Nations suggests, overcome the problem of a state’s inability to 
carry out prosecutions due to a legacy of weak and corrupt institutions. Such a 
tribunal would not work, however, if the concerned state were unwilling to carry out 
prosecutions or to provide the evidence required to conduct prosecutions 
internationally. This leaves the question of the inexistence of democratically 
functioning institutions and a state’s consequent inability to carry out fair 
prosecutions unresolved. Indeed, it is a very real issue in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and 
Yemen, as the intelligence agencies, the police and other security agencies have 
either refused to submit or destroyed evidence requested by the courts to carry out 
prosecutions of former leaders. The problem, then, is not just weak and corrupt 
judiciaries. Where judiciaries are functioning, a non-cooperative police or 
intelligence force could seriously hamper the proceedings of a trial. 
Sharp argues that scholarly deliberations on the shortcomings of mainstream 
transitional justice’s assumptions “go to the heart of the field’s potential to serve as 
an instrument for the consolidation of more democratic societies grounded in 
positive peace.”599 But in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and Yemen, it was the very lack of 
democratically functioning institutions – and in particular the judiciary – that in large 
part led to the uprisings and prevented fair prosecutions from taking place. It is 
unclear, then, how Teitel and others, including those from the critical literature such 
as Sharp and Obel Hansen, would explain the possibility of having democratically 
functioning institutions in place during a phase of the “fledgling liberal state,”600 
particularly when the lack of such institutions was the reason the transitions occurred 
in the first place. Skaar’s nuanced account of the developments within the 
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Argentinian judiciary and their relation to the variations in trials over time is helpful 
here in understanding the role of institutional reform in facilitating fair criminal 
prosecutions. She attributes the initial absence of trials in post-transition Argentina 
to, among other factors, the politically biased courts. It took decades for judicial 
reform to materialise, which in turn opened up prosecutions after the initial lull.601  
 The socio-economic wellbeing of a country also adversely impacts the ability 
of judiciaries and other institutions to carry out a transitional justice process that is 
acceptable to victims. The prospects for redress for human rights violations are 
grimmer, scholars suggest, when pursued in poor countries with a lack of adequate 
access to justice. The poorer the country, the lower the chances that transitional 
justice and in particular costly prosecutions will be pursued.602 In such cases and 
especially where judiciaries are weak and corrupt, international law should, as Nagy 
argues, play a role in ensuring some form of accountability. 603 However, the 
implementation of such transitional justice “blueprints” by international actors is, as 
Mutua argues, “a paternalistic and imperialistic approach that should be rejected out 
of hand.”604 Instead, Mutua continues, societies should distance themselves from a 
desire for revenge against the perpetrator and instead seek ways to address “the 
injured soul of the victim, and the corruption of the nation’s moral fiber.”605  
Still others, such as Chandra Sriram, point to the merits of institutional 
reform before the implementation of transitional justice processes. Citing the 
example of Chile, she argues: “the introduction of judicial reforms such as changes 
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relating to judicial appointments, the size and composition of the Supreme Court, 
and the power of military courts played an important role in stimulating increased 
activism by domestic courts to try Pinochet era-crimes.”606 Sriram further argues that 
transitional justice is more likely to be successful in promoting a “normative 
environment conducive to democratic institution-building,” rather than promoting 
deep structural changes.607 Similar to Obel Hansen and other critiques of the impact 
of transitional justice as per its mainstream proponents, Sriram concludes that given 
the negative impact of transitional justice on democratic institution building in 
certain contexts, transitional justice may not be “the most appropriate instrument in 
all transition contexts.”608 
 These are serious points to ponder for Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen. As 
Abu Al Zulof noted when speaking about Yemen, many judges and prosecutors 
belong to the previous regime, making any prosecution attempts almost impossible 
without the necessary changes in the judiciary. These changes include reform, full 
independence, and capacity building for judges on human rights standards.609 Aziz 
describes the Egyptian judiciary as “politically vulnerable” and “facially 
independent,” used and abused by a savvy military to create a false appearance of 
transition.610 The result, Aziz observes, is “a nation firmly in the grasp, both 
politically and legally, of its military – with the judiciary’s blessing.” 611 
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Consequently, Aziz argues, there was no political transition in Egypt and therefore 
one cannot speak of a transitional justice process.612  
Aziz’s contention presupposes that a certain type of transition must take 
place in order for transitional justice to flourish. However, the case study findings 
reveal that a transitional justice process does take place in ambiguous political 
transitions. The fact that decisions regarding prosecution were taken – even in the 
case of Yemen where an immunity law was passed – provides ample material that 
challenges the predominant understanding of transitional justice as a liberalising 
process.  The absence of pre-existing democratic structures, particularly a 
functioning and independent judiciary, is perhaps the most significant factor that 
distinguishes the Arab region transitional justice processes from transitions 
elsewhere and particularly in Latin America. That said, the evolution of the 
Argentinian judiciary over time is an example of how, even in a radically different 
political transition such as that of Argentina, judicial reform had a significant impact 
on decisions regarding prosecution. In sum, to speak of the total absence of a 
transition in the Arab region case studies is to miss a crucial point: the use of 
transitional justice processes and of prosecutions in particular to consolidate 
authoritarian, non-liberal rule and to emphasise one historical narrative on past 
atrocities over the other. The absence of pre-existing democratic structures has 
contributed to this state of affairs in the Arab region, but it has not single-handedly 
shaped decisions regarding prosecution, as this thesis has thus far demonstrated.  
Conclusion 
	  
 This chapter has contributed to the proliferation of transitional justice 
discourses concerning complex and non-liberal transitions.613 I have argued that the 
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shift to a renewed form of repressive, authoritarian rule in several Arab region 
transitions undermines mainstream transitional justice theory’s presumption of a 
“return to a liberal state.”614 The complex nature of the Arab region transitions 
warrants a re-thinking of transitional justice and its pursuit in various contexts. 
Second, the pursuit of competing accountability agendas by both domestic and 
international actors weakens global accountability norm claims. The number of 
prosecutions of former political leaders may be increasing, but this does not take into 
account whether other senior level officials who oversaw massive human rights 
violations have also been prosecuted. It also does not take into account the motives 
behind the trials and their content and extent. Third, the emphasis on corruption and 
socio-economic crimes and the very limited focus on civil and political rights crimes 
are driven by the controlled nature of the transitions and point to a practice of 
scapegoating certain high-level officials and a certain set of crimes to show that there 
has been a break with the former regime. This, in effect, reinforces the use of 
transitional justice as a tool of entrenching authoritarian rule rather than as a 
mechanism to attain accountability or to establish the truth and acknowledge the 
suffering of victims. Finally, I have argued that a re-thinking of transitional justice 
needs to take into account the absence of pre-existing democratic structures. 
 The similarity of the challenges to prosecution in pre-transition Egypt, Libya, 
Tunisia and Yemen to those in the post-transition period is indicative of the 
ambiguous nature of the transitions. Without a definitive resolution of these 
challenges, the so-called transition offers no real change in its institutions and human 
rights practices. As a result, decisions regarding prosecution remain severely limited 
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and politicised. However, certain iconic human rights cases in pre-transition Egypt, 
Libya, and Tunisia served as major triggers, or turning points, that led to decisions to 
prosecute high-level officials in those three countries. These cases targeting pre-
transition high-level officials have, with the exception of Yemen, trickled into post-
2011 efforts to prosecute. Marked by the public outrage in response to the original 
crimes and the persistent efforts of civil society and individual lawyers to see the 
cases through, these triggers were milestones in the long and difficult road to 
accountability for political leaders in these countries. This is why it is crucial to 
identify pre-transition triggers and to analyse their impact, if any, in subsequent 
decisions to prosecute former political leaders. 
 The various factors that pushed and pulled decisions regarding the 
prosecution of political leaders in different directions strongly represent the battle for 
competing visions of transitional justice and criminal justice in particular. 
Discussions in the emerging scholarship on transitional justice decisions in the Arab 
region largely overlook the proliferation of actors that drive and shape transitional 
justice decisions. Instead, many of them attribute competing accountability agendas 
to differences between the Islamists and the secularists. The deconstruction of the 
various domestic actors involved in decisions regarding prosecution, however, has 
demonstrated that the origins of competing accountability agendas are more 
complex. Subotic’s argument that domestic elites, for example, use transitional 
justice to score political points is therefore important. Various actors, including but 
not limited to the Islamists, fall within the categories of justice resisters, 
instrumentalists and true believers that Subotic usefully identifies. Moreover, I have 
demonstrated that the starkly opposing justice strategies in Libya and Yemen weaken 
the international community’s claim to a global accountability norm. The 
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international community’s divergent goals, however, may appear less contradictory 
when explained within the peace versus justice debate. The outcome thus far, 
however, has seen anything but peace in both Libya and Yemen. 
 The content and extent of decisions regarding the prosecution of political 
leaders demonstrate that the Arab region is beyond recent debates calling for the 
merging of the two sets of rights in transitional justice mechanisms. The case studies, 
then, demonstrate that addressing socio-economic crimes is a possibility even within 
a difficult and opaque judicial and authoritarian environment. At the same time, the 
focus on corruption and socio-economic crimes has served as a means to protect 
interim and post-transitional authorities from prosecution for human rights crimes. 
This goes back to the argument that ambiguous transitions that lack a definitive 
break with the past manifest themselves in prosecutions, as remnants of the former 
regime attempt to shield themselves from the courts for their responsibility in past 
atrocities. The merits of the limited criminal sanction, then, need to be re-examined 
when selective trials (both in content and extent) instead have a negative impact on 
the course of transitions and on the stability of the state. 
 Scholars of both the mainstream and critical transitional justice strands argue 
that some degree of democratically functioning institutions, particularly the 
judiciary, is necessary in order for fair trials to take place. However, when the lack 
of such institutions was a major reason the transitions occurred in the first place, this 
argument falls short of explaining the course of transitional events in the Arab 
region. The absence of pre-existing democratic structures, particularly a functioning 
and independent judiciary, is perhaps the most significant factor that distinguishes 
the Arab region transitional justice processes from transitions elsewhere and 
particularly in Latin America. The ambiguity of the transitions has led some to 
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conclude that transitions simply did not take place in the Arab region.615 However, to 
speak of the total absence of a transition in the Arab region case studies is to miss a 
crucial point: the use of transitional justice processes and of prosecutions in 
particular to consolidate authoritarian, non-liberal rule and to emphasise one 
historical narrative on past atrocities over the other. Transitional justice processes do 
take place in ambiguous political transitions. The fact that decisions regarding 
prosecution were taken – even in the case of Yemen where an immunity law was 
passed – provides ample material that challenges the predominant understanding of 
transitional justice as a liberalising process.   
These arguments have profound implications for the study of transitional 
justice because they weaken long-standing scholarly assumptions of the liberalising 
directions of transitions and of transitional justice. From the outset, it is clear that the 
Arab Spring transitions – many of which are still ongoing – already point to the 
shortcomings of the prevailing assumptions of the liberal roots of transitional justice. 
Indeed, there is a fundamental tension between the liberal roots of transitional justice 
and the illiberal leanings of key socio-political actors.616 In recent scholarship, these 
illiberal socio-political actors who pose a challenge to the practice of liberal 
transitional justice are overwhelmingly identified as the Islamists.617 Scholars on 
transitional justice in the Arab region have largely stopped short of adequately 
discussing the use and abuse of transitional justice by other, secular political actors, 
most notably the military. The binary analyses that have emerged, pitting the 
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secularists against the Islamists, are therefore unhelpful in taking stock of how the 
Arab Spring is shaping transitional justice more broadly. As Mutua argues, 
“Dogmatic universality is a drawback to an imaginative understanding of transitional 
justice.”618 
This thesis therefore builds on the critical body of transitional justice 
literature. The mixture of non-liberal and ambiguous transitions, the multiple 
legacies of human rights violations and the particular content and extent of decisions 
regarding prosecution underline the need to re-examine transitional justice and to 
develop its theory and practice. The conflicting roles of regional and international 
actors, particularly in the case of Libya and Yemen, also reveal that transitional 
justice itself is not a consistently applied phenomenon that is rooted in so-called 
universal, liberal values. The case studies illustrate clearly that transitional justice is 
indeed a political project and cannot be described nor understood to be post-
political.619  
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Friederike Mieth (eds), Transitional Justice Theories (Routledge 2014) 202.	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 The objective of this thesis was not to make an argument for whether 
prosecutions should or should not be pursued within a transitional justice framework 
in the Arab region. Nor was its aim to provide a history of transitional justice as it 
has been pursued in other parts of the world. There is an abundance of literature on 
the history of transitional justice and the use of its various mechanisms, including 
prosecutions.620 The emergence of the prosecution of political leaders in the Arab 
region, however, remains a largely unexplored area of this rising trend of individual 
criminal accountability for political leaders. Rather than contribute to the many 
accounts of countries that have undergone transitional justice, this thesis has 
critiqued the theoretical underpinnings of mainstream transitional justice theory. The 
critique is based on the findings generated from Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen 
and through a detailed inquiry of what factors and actors triggered, drove and shaped 
decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders in these four case studies. 
This thesis has, therefore, aimed to explain the formative stages of these decisions, 
the factors that pushed and pulled the decisions in different directions, and the 
factors that shaped the limited content and extent of decisions regarding prosecution. 
It has also served as a critical inquiry of transitional justice scholarship, which is 
increasingly described as under-theorised.  
Transitional justice in the Arab region presents the strongest challenge yet to 
the transitional justice paradigm, which presumes a shift from violent, non-liberal 
rule to peaceful, liberal-democratic rule.  I have made this argument in four parts that 
examine the nature of the Arab region transitions, the role of international and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
620 One of the earlier accounts is in Neil J. Kritz’s three volumes on transitional justice cases from 
around the world: Neil J. Kritz (ed), Transitional Justice: How Emerging Democracies Reckon with 
Former Regimes (Vols. 1-3 USIP 1995). See Literature Review section in Chapter 1. See also 
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A. Payne and Andrew G. Reiter, ‘Transitional Justice Data Base Project’ (Web Portal) 
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domestic actors, the content and the extent of prosecutions, and the absence of pre-
existing democratic structures needed to pursue effective transitional justice 
strategies. First, the non-paradigmatic nature of the Arab region transitions, whereby 
a renewed form of repressive, non-liberal rule has largely taken shape, warrants a re-
thinking of transitional justice and its pursuit in various contexts. Second, the Arab 
region cases demonstrate that both domestic and international actors pursue 
competing accountability agendas, thereby weakening claims of a global 
accountability norm. Third, the emphasis on accountability for corruption and socio-
economic crimes as opposed to civil and political rights violations underline the need 
to develop transitional justice theory. The limited content and extent of the 
investigations and prosecutions in the four case studies point to a practice of 
scapegoating certain high-level officials to avoid the prosecution of others and to 
show that there has been a break with the former regime. This practice, I have 
argued, is linked to the controlled nature of the transitions. Finally, a re-thinking of 
transitional justice needs to take into account the absence of pre-existing democratic 
structures and what this means for criminal accountability prospects in non-
paradigmatic transitional contexts.  
Pre-transition efforts to prosecute political leaders including former ministers 
were few and largely unsuccessful. This was for a number of reasons, including: lack 
of political will, particularly as it was often the regime that was orchestrating crimes 
such as torture; lack of judicial independence; fear of the negative consequences for 
victims who were bold enough to file complaints against high-level officials; and 
lack of concrete evidence to build strong cases along with other legal challenges, 
such as lack of command responsibility provisions, preventing the successful 
prosecution of political leaders. The limited content and extent of prosecutions, 
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particularly in Egypt and Tunisia where the trials have advanced the most in 
comparison with Libya and Yemen, have also been impacted by a number of factors.  
The controlled nature of the transitions and the lingering influence of the 
feloul in Egypt, the emergence of the anciens nouveaux in Tunisia, and the political 
maneuverings of former President Saleh in Yemen meant that politicised judiciaries 
continued to block many cases, shielding former regimes from criminal 
accountability. However, other significant factors also shaped the content and the 
extent of prosecutions. Many interviewees cited the tendency of lawyers to focus on 
crimes committed during the uprisings instead of the decades of human rights 
violations that preceded them because those crimes were the most recent and 
therefore easier to prosecute. Moreover, the absence of enabling legal frameworks, 
such as the lack of command responsibility provisions and the stringent requirement 
of direct evidence significantly weakened the prospects of successful prosecution.  
The practice of scapegoating by interim and post-transitional leaderships led 
to the prosecution of certain high-level individuals – many of whom were eventually 
released – to deflect attention from the lack of accountability for a more 
comprehensive set of human rights violations and their perpetrators. The strength of 
workers’ movements in Egypt and Tunisia, coupled with the rampant and very 
visible corruption thrown in the face of the public for decades, contributed to the 
emphasis on corruption and socio-economic crimes in the trials. It is thus no surprise 
that the public demands for prosecution were heavily focused on corruption and 
socio-economic rights, hence the chanting of slogans such as ‘aish, hurreya, ‘adalah 
igtima’iya and pain, eau, Ben Ali non!621  
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Still, those few pre-transition prosecution attempts were bold in the sense that 
they targeted high-level officials in an extremely repressive and opaque judicial and 
political environment. Moreover, with the exception of Yemen, every case study 
demonstrates that certain pre-transition cases, although initially unsuccessful, re-
emerged in post-transition efforts to prosecute. This is true for the Khaled Said case 
in Egypt, the Abdallah Qallel case in Tunisia, and the Abu Salim prison massacre 
case in Libya. For example, of the three pre-transition cases targeting high-level 
officials in Tunisia, the Baraket Essahel case implicating Abdallah Qallel has had a 
significant impact on the pursuit of high-level government officials in Tunisia 
following the 2010 uprising. The initiation of the case in Switzerland in 2001 
followed by its revival ten years later in Tunisia is a strong indication of the case’s 
importance for the victims and its symbolic value for many Tunisians, particularly 
during and shortly after the transition. The same can be said for the Khaled Said case 
in Egypt and the Abu Salim case in Libya.  
I have explained that the role of international actors in driving decisions to 
prosecute in post-transition Egypt and Tunisia was negligible. I have also argued that 
international actors were more influential in pre-transition Egypt and Tunisia as they 
helped document human rights violations, raise awareness, and pressure 
governments to improve their human rights practices. The Tunisian case in particular 
benefited from the role of international actors given that universal jurisdiction laws 
in Switzerland and France were used to pursue the prosecution of high-level officials 
such as Abdallah Qallel, General Habib Ammar and  Khaled Ben Said. On the other 
hand, international actors such as the United Nations Security Council, the ICC, and 
the GCC played a significant role in driving prosecutions in Libya and in 
establishing the immunity law in Yemen. The Arab region cases, then, demonstrate 
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that both domestic and international actors pursue competing accountability agendas, 
thereby weakening claims of a global accountability norm. Just as there are 
competing objectives regarding criminal justice among domestic actors, so there are 
competing accountability preferences among international actors.  
While not comprehensive, each case study revealed that while the triggers 
and drivers are marked by the traditional motives for a more just, liberal democratic 
order, the shapers paint a more complex picture that presents a significant challenge 
to mainstream transitional justice theory. The various shaping factors that pushed 
and pulled decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders in different and 
even opposing directions are a strong indication that different actors have been 
fiercely battling each other for competing visions of transitional justice – and of 
criminal justice in particular. A re-thinking of transitional justice therefore needs to 
take into account how non-liberal, or non-paradigmatic, transitions undermine 
mainstream transitional justice theory’s presumption of a “return to a liberal 
state.”622  
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen all demonstrate that the predominant 
understanding of transitional justice as post-political and as a phenomenon that 
exudes the universality of international human rights norms falls short of explaining 
their decisions regarding prosecution. Instead, the use and abuse of transitional 
justice and of prosecutions in particular have served to strengthen a transition to 
renewed forms of authoritarianism. The Arab transitions do not fall within the 
paradigmatic framework for transitions that is marked by a shift from authoritarian 
to liberal democratic rule. Nor do, as scholars are increasingly observing, other 
transitions that have informed transitional justice theory. The “paradigmatic 
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transition” from “violent conflict to peace and democracy,” then, is no longer an 
adequate framework for the analysis of varied transitions and their transitional 
justice decisions.623 
Moreover, the absence of pre-existing democratic structures, such as 
effective judiciaries and a separation of powers, reinforces the argument that the 
liberalising ritual of transitional justice is a far cry from the reality of the Arab region 
transitions. Sriram’s discussion on the merits of institutional reform before the 
implementation of transitional justice processes is relevant here. Sriram argues that 
given the negative impact of transitional justice on democratic institution building in 
certain contexts, transitional justice may not be “the most appropriate instrument in 
all transition contexts.”624 This, however, is a discussion beyond the scope of this 
thesis, but that is nevertheless crucial for the future development of transitional 
justice scholarship in the Arab region. 
A rapidly burgeoning field, transitional justice is broad, inter-disciplinary and 
evolving in radical ways. Transitional justice and its various mechanisms, including 
truth commissions, reparations, vetting, and prosecutions, are spread widely and 
draw scholarly attention from lawyers, political scientists, anthropologists, 
sociologists and historians. Prosecutions, however, are the most pursued mechanism 
of transitional justice, and the Arab region is not an exception to this trend.625 It is, 
then, a field that possesses highly political attributes, but is heavily legalistic in its 
application. Sharp critiques the tendency of actors to pursue a top-down approach to 
transitional justice that is focused on “technocratic legalism” that wrongly overlooks 
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Institution-building (Policy Paper October 2014) <www.tjdi.org> accessed 31 July 2015. 
625 Truth commissions have also increasingly become a popular mechanism of transitional justice. 
	   240	  
the “underlying politics of transitional justice interventions.” 626 Nagy similarly 
critiques the heavy influence of the “international legalist paradigm” and notes, “The 
problem is not with law and human rights per se but with the depoliticised way in 
which ‘justice’ can operate.”627 Such calls to take the political and the contextual 
into account are certainly crucial to understand both how transitional justice operates 
in various contexts and to understand the limitations of the transitional justice 
paradigm as it currently stands. But politics is what has driven transitional justice 
decisions in the four case studies and indeed in many other transitional countries.  
An argument might be made, then, for a more legalistic rather than a less 
legalistic approach, if effective prosecutions are the end goal of a particular 
transitional justice strategy. The privileging of law, of course, does not mean that 
political factors will cease to shape transitional justice, including prosecution-related 
decisions. Teitel’s assertion that transitional justice in its globalised form is 
increasingly disassociated from politics thus comes into question.628 Koskenniemi’s 
description of the centrality of politics to law better describes the unfolding of 
decisions regarding prosecution in the Arab region during a highly contentious and 
political transitional period. Perhaps ironically, Teitel’s description of the role of law 
in times of transition is useful here:  
To the extent that transitions imply paradigm shifts in the normative 
conception of justice, the role of law at these moments appears deeply 
paradoxical.  In ordinary times, law provides order and stability, but in 
extraordinary periods of political upheaval, law is called upon to maintain 
order, even as it enables transformation. Accordingly the ordinary intuitions 
and predicates about law simply do not apply in transitional situations.  
These dynamic periods of political flux generate a sui generis paradigm of 
transformative law.629 
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However, the “normative conception of justice” Teitel refers to above is itself 
contested and far from monolithic when examined within the context of the Arab 
region cases, and indeed in other parts of the world.630 To the extent that law enables 
transformation, as Teitel notes, the type of transformation it enables is diverse, as the 
case studies demonstrate. Moreover, independent judiciaries are necessary to 
implement law equally and effectively. The absence of independent judiciaries, then, 
makes the legal application of decisions during highly contentious transitions 
inevitably, if not more, politicised.  
Areas for further research into the implications of decisions regarding 
prosecution in non-paradigmatic transitions are numerous. Here, I identify a few key 
areas of research that could further develop the rich yet under-theorised field of 
transitional justice, particularly within the context of prosecutions. First, victims and 
non-victims’ perception of justice is a topic that warrants examination, particularly 
in the Arab region where retributive justice tends to take precedence over restorative 
justice, reconciliation and other justice methods. Judy Barsalou’s work on Egypt has 
addressed this question of perception and serves as a useful reference for further 
studies.631  
Second, I have generally described the role of the judiciary in shaping 
decisions regarding prosecution in the four case studies as one that has been 
politicised and crippled by weak legal frameworks and a lack of separation of 
powers. However, judiciaries are much more complex than this. For example, the 
judiciary in Egypt has traditionally been split along loyalties to various political 
forces. The same can be said for Yemen, where tribal loyalties have often caused 
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clashes within the judiciary. Judicial politics, then, is a crucial area of research, 
particularly in the four case studies where judiciaries have and continue to play a 
significant role in shaping the pursuit of transitional justice. Moreover, the absence 
of fully independent and effective judiciaries pre-transition presents the Arab region 
as a significant case for comparison in the transitional justice literature, which has 
thus far been dominated by the experiences of states where the history and status of 
the judiciary is quite different. I refer here again to the importance of Skaar’s work 
on the role of judiciaries in transitional justice over time.632  Skaar notes, “Politics 
can change overnight, whereas judicial culture and legal precedents may take years – 
even generations – to shift.”633  
Third and related to this question of functioning judiciaries and transitional 
justice is the question: do prosecutions strengthen or weaken transitions to 
democracy? This is not a new area of research; it has already been a subject of much 
scholarly debate.634 In her discussion of Poland, Agata Fijalkowski argues that 
“prosecutions do not form part of the state’s process of transitioning towards 
democracy, and could, in fact, occur years later, such as in various Central and 
Eastern European states.”635 Jack Snyder, Leslie Vinjamuri, Jack Goldsmith and 
Stephen D. Krasner argue against the prosecution of leaders because they believe it 
harms democracy building by making authoritarian leaders tighten their grip on 
power.636 Snyder and Vinjamuri further claim that human rights trials can increase 
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the likelihood of future atrocities rather than serve as a deterrent.637 Olsen, Payne and 
Reiter also caution against the use of trials in fragile transitional contexts and point 
instead to the importance of striking a “justice balance.”638 Since the authors’ 
transitional justice database covers a period that ends in 2007, their findings 
understandably do not include the developments from the Arab region.639 
But decisions regarding prosecution in the Arab region case studies now 
provide a wealth of material to re-visit this question of trials and democracy 
building, particularly because of the complex nature of the transitions. On the other 
hand, the question of whether or not transitional justice and prosecutions in 
particular strengthen democracy may not provide the best analytical angle from 
which to assess the impact of the Arab region transitions on transitional justice. This 
is because of the non-traditional, non-paradigmatic nature of the transitions and of 
the divergent goals of transitional justice actors in the Arab region. The assumption 
that a liberal democracy is the end-goal therefore may not provide a suitable starting 
point for any analysis of transitional justice in the Arab region. Finally, the 
contentious immunity law in Yemen presents a classic case study within the 
framework of the peace versus justice debate that has featured prominently in the 
transitional justice literature. A re-visiting of the peace versus justice debate in the 
context of Yemen would therefore provide a fresh contribution to this often cyclic 
discussion. 
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The arguments presented in this thesis have profound implications for the 
study of transitional justice because they weaken long-standing scholarly 
assumptions of the liberalising directions of transitions and of transitional justice. 
From the outset, it is clear that the Arab Spring transitions – many of which are still 
ongoing – already point to the shortcomings of the prevailing assumptions of the 
liberal roots of transitional justice. The emerging scholarship on transitional justice 
decisions in the Arab region, however, largely overlooks the proliferation of actors 
that drive and shape transitional justice decisions. Instead, it often reduces competing 
accountability agendas to differences between actors such as Islamists and 
secularists. The deconstruction of the various domestic actors involved in decisions 
regarding prosecution, however, has demonstrated that the origins of competing 
accountability agendas are more complex. Such binary analyses are therefore 
unhelpful in taking stock of how the Arab Spring is shaping transitional justice more 
broadly. This thesis has questioned the foundational assumptions of transitional 
justice through an inquiry of decisions regarding the prosecution of political leaders 
in the Arab region. It ultimately calls for a revision and a rethinking of our current 
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Appendix I | Sample List of Interview Questions 
 
The following is a list of sample interview questions that were asked during 
interviews in Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen between 2012 and 2014. This is not 
a comprehensive list of questions, as the interviews were semi-structured to ensure a 
focused comparison of data across the cases. This was done through the use of a set 
of questions asked of each individual, followed by additional questions generated by 
the responses received and by the particular context of the case study. 
 
1. What is the current status of prosecutions in X country?  
2. Who took the decisions to prosecute/not to prosecute? Was there any 
contestation of these decisions? By whom and what was the content of these 
contestations? 
3. Were there efforts to prosecute former leaders, military officers, police 
officers, and other high-ranking government officials in X country before the 
2010/2011 uprising? If so, by whom, when, against whom, how and what 
was the outcome?  
4. What factors, if any, triggered decisions regarding the prosecution of political 
leaders in X country?  Were there key turning points in the past that helped 
pave the way toward these prosecutions/amnesties? Which ones and how? 
5. What or who were the key drivers of decisions regarding prosecution?  
6. Did civil society influence leadership preferences and vice versa? How?  
7. What was the content of popular demands for the prosecution of political 
leaders? 
8. Who was involved in X country’s immunity law? How did it come about? 
How has it impacted decisions regarding prosecution in X country? 
9. Are there accusations of corruption and financial crimes? Why is there an 
emphasis on these crimes, more so than on human rights crimes?  
10. What, if any, has been the role of external actors in the decisions to 
prosecute/not to prosecute in X country?  
11. What factors ultimately led to the decision to prosecute (or not to prosecute)? 
Who were the main actors involved? Any further contacts I should get in 
touch with? 
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Appendix II | List of Interviewees640 
 
EGYPT 
1. Ahmed Abdallah – Human Rights Officer and Lawyer, 6 April Movement. 
2. Anonymous senior expert on transitional justice in Egypt, International 
Center for Transitional Justice. 
3. Mohamed Al Ansary – Lawyer and Legal Researcher, Cairo Institute for 
Human Rights Studies. 
4. Khaled Ali – Executive Director, Hisham Mubarak Law Center; former 
presidential candidate (2012); Co-Founder of the Bread and Freedom Party; 
lawyer and activist.  
5. Gamal Eid - Lawyer and Executive Director, Arabic Network for Human 
Rights Information (ANHRI).  
6. Mohamed El Shewy – Transitional Justice Programme Officer, Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights. 
7. Wael Eskandar – prominent blogger, independent journalist and media 
commentator; member of Kaziboon campaign, which called for 
accountability for crimes committed by the Egyptian military. 
8. Judge Adel Maged – Vice President, Court of Cassation. 
9. Nadeem Mansour – Director, Egyptian Center for Economic and Social 
Rights (ECESR). 
10. Habib Nassar  - Former Middle East and North Africa Director, International 
Center for Transitional Justice. 
11. Amal Sharaf – Co-founder and Foreign Media Spokesperson, 6 April 
Movement. 
12. Tamer Wageeh – Director, Economic and Social Justice Unit, Egyptian 
Initiative for Personal Rights (EIPR). 
 
LIBYA 
1. Dao Al Mansouri – Veteran lawyer and human rights activist. 
2. Rana Jawad – BBC journalist. 
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3. Amal Jerary – Director of Communications, Prime Minister’s Office (for 
former Libyan Prime Minister Aly Zeidan). 
4. Azza Maghur – Veteran lawyer and human rights activist. 
5. Stefano Moschini – Libya Programme Coordinator, No Peace Without 
Justice. 
6. Habib Nassar  - Former Middle East and North Africa Director, International 
Center for Transitional Justice. 
7. Lydia Vicente – Executive Director, Rights International Spain (Vicente did 
some transitional justice work in Libya and provided useful contacts). 
 
TUNISIA 
1. Anonymous – Senior Employee, Office of the High Commissioner for 
Human Rights. 
2. Anonymous – Senior Employee, Tunisian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  
3. Anissa Ben Hassine – Researcher and Professor, l'Ecole Supérieure des 
Sciences Economiques et Commerciales de Tunis (ESSEC). 
4. Amor Boubakri – Lawyer and Professor, University of Sousse; UNDP 
Consultant. 
5. Ruben Carranza – Director, Reparative Justice Programme, International 
Center for Transitional Justice.  
6. Abderrahman El Yessa – Democratic Governance Advisor, UNDP, Tunisia. 
7. Amna Guellali – Tunisia and Algeria Researcher, Human Rights Watch. 
8. Charfeddine Kallel – Lawyer and Member, Groupe de 25. 
9. Akram Khalifa – Human Rights Officer, OHCHR, Tunisia. 
10. Anis Mahfoudh – Human Rights Officer, OHCHR, Tunisia. 
11. Anis Morai - Lawyer, Professor, Columnist and Host of 'Dans le Vif du 
Sujet', a radio talk show in Tunisia that tackles the socio-political and legal 
issues facing the country. 
12. Habib Nassar - Former Middle East and North Africa Director, International 
Center for Transitional Justice. 
13. Messaoud Rhomdani – Vice President, Ligue Tunisienne de Droits de 
l’Homme (LTDH). 
14. Solène Rougeaux – Director, Avocats Sans Frontières, Tunis Office. 
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15. Amor Safraoui – Coordinator, National Coalition for Transitional Justice; 
Head, Groupe de 25. 
 
YEMEN 
1. George Abu Al Zulof – Country Representative, OHCHR Yemen. 
2. Hamza Al Kamali – Member, Transitional Justice Working Group, National 
Dialogue Conference. 
3. Manal Al Qudsi – Programme Officer, Yemen Center for Transitional 
Justice. 
4. Ahmed Arman – Lawyer and Executive Secretary, National Organisation for 
Defending Rights and Freedoms (HOOD). 
5. Abdulrahman Barman – Human Rights Lawyer, National Organisation for 
Defending Rights and Freedoms (HOOD). 
6. Omar Own – Consultant, UNDP Yemen; NGO Expert. 
7. Tamer Shamsan – Political Activist; Columnist. 
8. Letta Tayler – Senior Researcher, Human Rights Watch.  
9. Belkis Wille – Yemen and Kuwait Researcher, Human Rights Watch. 
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Public Prosecution Office: Overview of Egypt’s Prosecutor General and Public 
Prosecution Office641 
 
“The role of the public prosecutor is to conduct a neutral, unbiased investigation into 
the truth. Criminal investigations are generally initiated based on complaints filed by 
citizens or government officials, but may also be initiated by the Public Prosecution 
Office itself based on information such as news reports. 
In conducting investigations, public prosecutors acting in their capacity as judicial 
officers receive the sworn testimony of witnesses, which is reduced to a written 
statement and signed by both the witness and the prosecutor, much like a deposition 
or affidavit. Such a sworn statement constitutes substantive evidence without the 
need to call the witness to testify at trial. 
 
If the public prosecution finds that the evidence justifies a trial, charges are filed 
with the trial court in the form of a referral, which consists of a statement of the 
charges and a summary of the evidence supporting each charge as to each defendant. 
The referral and public prosecution file constitute substantive trial evidence without 
the need to call live witnesses.” 
The Course of a Criminal Case at the Public Prosecution642  
“After the prosecution receives a report or notification of an incident, or a report on 
the evidence gathered and the investigation that was done in matters that warrant 
investigation, an action is initiated if the evidence to indict is sufficient to increase 
the likelihood of getting a conviction. But if the case papers are devoid of indicting 
evidence, or if the evidence is not likely get a conviction, the case is dismissed or a 
decision is made thereon indicating lack of grounds to initiate action as the case may 
be.  
In Matters of Misdemeanors and Violations 
The action is initiated by summoning the defendant to appear in the summary court. 
However, if the crime was a misdemeanor that was committed by way of the press or 
other means of publication, excluding misdemeanors that are injurious to persons, 
the action is initiated before the criminal court by referral from the solicitor general.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641 Excerpts from ‘Public Prosecution Office: Overview of Egypt’s Prosecutor General and Public 
Prosecution Office,’ <http://egyptjustice.com/public-prosecution-office/> accessed 2 December 2015. 
642 Excerpts from ‘Structure of the Public Prosecution Office in Egypt,’ Programme on Governance in 
the Arab Region (POGAR), United Nations Development Programme. 
<ftp://pogar.org/LocalUser/pogarp/judiciary/prosecution/structure-egypt.pdf> accessed 2 December 
2015.	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-- For actions brought before misdemeanors and violations courts, the summons to 
appear that is served upon the defendant may be disregarded. Such is the case if he 
were present at the hearing and was officially charged by the prosecution prior to 
trial.  
-- A criminal action is not considered initiated simply because the prosecution 
officially endorsed its submission to the court. The reason for this is that such 
endorsement is nothing more than an administrative order sent to the prosecution’s 
clerk’s office to prepare the summons to appear. Even if such summons were 
prepared and served in accordance with the law, it would have various legal 
implications.  
-- A case does not leave the hands of the prosecution, until a summons is given to the 
defendant to appear in court. If the prosecution orders the transfer of the case to the 
court without serving a summons to appear, it has the right to refrain from 
transferring the case to the court and return to the investigation and disposal of the 
case papers in light of any new facts, and to issue an order of lack of grounds to 
initiate the criminal action.  
-- The consequence of initiating a criminal action by way of a summons to appear 
before the court is connecting the sentencing authority with the case, and the lapse of 
the prosecution’s right to conduct the initial investigation with respect to the 
defendant who is to be tried for the incident itself. Whatever the prosecution does 
after that is considered non- probative with regard to said incident.  
This does not preclude the prosecution, as an evidence-gathering authority, from 
doing whatever it deems necessary, whether by itself or through the commissioner of 
the judicial police. It submits the evidence report to the court.  
-- The dates for hearings in cases brought before the misdemeanors and violations 
court are set by members of the prosecution themselves. This is not left to the clerks.  
Consideration should be given to setting proximate hearing dates for cases that 
require expediency, such as cases that involve incarcerated defendants or cases 
related to crimes that are detrimental to the public welfare, and in compliance with 
the provisions of Article 276 repeated of the Criminal Procedure Code, which 
requires the review of cases concerning those crimes set forth in the Article, in a 
hearing that takes place within two weeks of the date it was referred to the competent 
court.  
In Criminal Matters  
-- If the prosecution member sees fit to initiate a criminal action in criminal court, he 
must then send the case to the solicitor general accompanied by a list containing the 
purport of witnesses’ statements and prosecuting evidence, signed by him, in 
addition to an indictment for the solicitor general to sign.  
-- The indictment must show the name of the defendant, his place of residence, a 
description of the crime with which he is charged, the date of commission of said 
crime, and the applicable articles of law.  
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-- The solicitor general himself studies important criminal cases; and as necessary 
has the right to assign the heads of prosecution offices to study it and submit it to 
him. In addition, he has the right to distribute among them, and among the rest of the 
general jurisdiction prosecution, all other cases for study and submission to him to 
take action on them.  
Moreover, he must complete whatever deficiencies may exist in these cases from the 
aspects of investigation, and to correct whatever errors and inaccuracies may exist in 
the registration and description thereof.  
-- The initiation of a criminal action in criminal matters, by its referral from the 
solicitor general or whomever is acting on his behalf, to the criminal court, is done 
by an indictment showing the crime with which the defendant is charged of 
committing and the elements of that crime, all the aggravating or mitigating 
circumstances that are to be considered during the penalty phase, and the applicable 
articles of law. The indictment is to be accompanied with a list containing the 
purport of witnesses’ statements and prosecution evidence.  
The solicitor general automatically appoints an attorney for every defendant in a 
felony case who has been ordered transferred to the criminal court, in the event such 
defendant had not retained an attorney to defend him.  
The prosecution informs the litigants of the order issued by the solicitor general to 
transfer the case to the criminal court or the supreme state security court within ten 
days of the issuance thereof.  
-- Immediately upon the solicitor general’s issuance of the order to transfer the case 
to the criminal court, the case file is sent to the court of appeals to set a date for it to 
be reviewed before the competent court. If the defense requests a time to read the 
case file, the prosecution sets a time for it not to exceed ten days during which the 
case file remains at the clerk’s office until such time when it is possible for the 
defense to read it but not remove anything from it.  
Initiation of an Action Through Direct Prosecution  
-- A criminal action may be initiated through direct prosecution in misdemeanors 
and violations, even if such misdemeanors were defined by law as being exceptional 
cases that fall within the jurisdiction of the criminal court. These are misdemeanors 
committed by way of the press or other means of publication excluding 
misdemeanors that are harmful to persons. Excluded from that are the following:  
1. Crimes that are committed outside the Republic, whereby the right to move such 
criminal cases is restricted to the prosecution alone.  
2. Cases brought against an employee, public servant or any police officer, for a 
crime committed by them during the performance of their duties or as a result 
thereof, except those crimes provided for in Article 123 of the Penal Code, e.g. when 
a public employee uses the authority of his position to suspend the execution of 
orders issued by the court, or the provisions of the laws and regulations, or delay the 
collection of assets and fees, or suspend the execution of a judgment or order issued 
by the court or by any competent entity, and such public employee deliberately 
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refrains from executing any of the aforesaid judgments or orders upon the lapse of 
eight days of his admonition by a process server, provided that the execution of such 
judgment or order falls within the responsibilities of such employee.  
3. Orders issued by the investigating judge or the prosecution that there would be no 
grounds to initiate an action if the prosecutor for civil rights has not appealed such 
order within the prescribed time or has appealed it and it was upheld by the appellant 
misdemeanor court while in session in the deliberating chamber.  
-- The direct case is initiated through a summons to appear served by the prosecutor 
for civil rights. If this summons is not served, the case does not come into the 
jurisdiction of the court. The summons to appear must include the civil rights claim 
and it must be done in accordance with the prescribed rules for service to the 
litigants as set forth in Article 123 et seq. of the Criminal Procedure Code.  
-- When a criminal case proceeds, it becomes the undertaking of the prosecution 
alone as a matter of right, and not the prosecutor of civil rights. This is with respect 
to all who have moved it before them, and not the court’s carrying out of the civil 
rights prosecutor’s motions with regard to the criminal case under review.  
-- Criminal cases may not be initiated through direct prosecution before juvenile 
courts, military courts and state security courts, as the law did not grant these courts 
the jurisdiction to decide civil cases adjoined with criminal cases. It did not allow 
originally for these courts to accept civil cases.  
The Investigation by the Public Prosecution  
-- The prosecution member commences the investigation after receiving information 
or notification, or receipt of the evidence gathering report, and reading such report 
and transferring the contents thereof to an investigation report. The investigation of 
the defendant commences by questioning him verbally about the charge attributed to 
him after advising him of such charge and the punishment therefor, and that the 
public prosecution is the agency that is conducting the investigation. If the defendant 
confesses to the charge, the prosecution member begins interrogating him in more 
detail while bearing in mind to highlight whatever points would reinforce the 
confession. If the defendant denies the charge, the prosecution member would ask 
him whether he had something to present in his defense, and if he had witnesses for 
his defense that he would like call upon. This defense and the names of the witnesses 
are recorded in the report.  
Thereafter the prosecution member asks the defendant whether he wants to call upon 
other witnesses. If he decides that he does not have other witnesses, that is recorded 
in the report as well. Then the prosecution member orders that all the witnesses 
called by the defendant are summoned immediately, and they are asked to wait in a 
secluded place until their turn comes to be questioned. The investigation is 
completed by questioning the witnesses for the prosecution in the order of their 
importance. The prosecution member talks with them to elicit their statements and 
determine to what extent they are truthful. He confronts them with whatever 
statements they made in the evidence gathering report that are inconsistent with what 
they testified to before him. He discusses the matter with them. He has the right not 
to re-open the questioning of those persons who were questioned previously as 
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witnesses in the evidence gathering report, if such witnesses had not testified to 
anything material, thus making it useless to re-question them.  
Whenever there is mention of a name of a person who may possibly have 
information about the incident, he is summoned immediately and questioned about 
his information. Then he interrogates the defendant – this is in the event he had not 
initiated his interrogation after questioning him verbally about the charge attributed 
to him and getting his [the defendant’s] confession -- by confronting him with the 
evidence established against him. He asks him if he has anything to refute it, then he 
records in the report the defendant’s defense, if such defense exists. The prosecution 
member must begin by hearing the witnesses for the defense immediately after 
concluding the interrogation of the defendant to avert any subornation of the 
witnesses in such a way so as to conform with the defendant’s statements. There 
should not be any delay in hearing their testimonies based on the fact that the 
defendant is incarcerated, as it would not be difficult, neither upon him nor his 
family, to contact these witnesses. It is also to be taken into consideration to confront 
defendants with witnesses with respect to inconsistencies in their statements.  
Thereafter, the investigation is completed by making use of experts, or conducting 
surveillance and inspection if necessary.  
Upon the conclusion of the investigation, the necessary action is taken on it in 
misdemeanors, violations and felonies, as the case may be.”  
Tunisia 
Functions of the Office of the Public Prosecutor643 
“Pursuant to article 22, the Prosecutor-General is placed at the head of the 
prosecution service but specifically ‘under the authority of the Minister of Justice.’ 
Article 23 provides that the Minister of Justice may “report to the Prosecutor-
General the violations of criminal law within his knowledge, may require him to 
initiate, or ask someone to initiate, the prosecution or to seize the competent 
jurisdiction with the written submissions considered desirable.’ In addition, by virtue 
of article 21 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, all public prosecutors are ‘required 
to comply with written submissions in accordance with instructions given to him 
under the conditions set out in article 23.’ The Minister of Justice may also order the 
Prosecutor-General to the Court of Cassation to lodge an appeal against a ruling to 
the Court of Cassation.644 
[…] 
Under article 30 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the public prosecutor has 
discretion over whether to dismiss a complaint or denunciation received by or 
transmitted to him or her. No reason is required for the dismissal and there is no 
power to request judicial review of a prosecutor’s decision not to prosecute. Where 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
643 International Commission of Jurists, ‘The Independence and Accountability of the Tunisian 
Judicial System: Learning from the Past to Build a Better Future’ (Report, May 2014) 66-68.	  
644 Code of Criminal Procedure, article 258(6). 
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the victim of a crime wishes to ensure criminal proceedings are started, he or she 
must become a civil party and request the opening of an inquiry or commence direct 
proceedings against the accused.645  
[…] 
The prosecutor has discretion to assign cases to the investigating judge of his choice 
within the jurisdiction. Article 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure stipulates that 
when a crime is committed, the public prosecutor should inform the Prosecutor-
General of the Republic and the relevant Attorney-General, and order an 
investigating judge within his jurisdiction to conduct an inquiry. Article 49 provides 
that where there are several investigating judges in one jurisdiction, the prosecutor 
decides who will be in charge of the investigation. Investigating judges are 
themselves assigned to their functions by the Minister of Justice.646 Furthermore, the 
Minister of Justice can order a judge to assume the role of investigating judge for a 
specific case.647  
According to testimony heard during ICJ missions to Tunisia, prosecutors designate 
investigating judges based on the nature of the case. ‘Sensitive’ cases, including 
cases of corruption or cases involving high officials of the former regime, are 
reportedly assigned to ‘specialized’ investigating judges known for their loyalty to 
the authorities or their superiors. 
[…]  
The Military Justice System in Tunisia648  
Tunisia’s military justice system derives from the code of military justice, 
promulgated on January 10, 1957.649 The military justice system is composed of 
three permanent military first instance tribunals and a military appeals court;650 a 
Military Chamber of Indictment (Chambre militaire de mise en accusation) before 
the Permanent Military Tribunals; the Military Court of Cassation, which is a section 
of the ordinary Court of Cassation, in which sits a high military officer appointed by 
the Ministry of Defense; military investigative judges and the military public 
prosecutor.651 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
645 ibid, article 36. 
646 ibid, article 48. 
647 ibid. 
648 Human Rights Watch, ‘Flawed Accountability: Shortcomings of Tunisia’s Trials for Killings 
during the Uprising’ (January 2015) 1 <www.hrw.org/report/2015/01/12/flawed-
accountability/shortcomings-tunisias-trials-killings-during-uprising> accessed 26 July 2015. 
649 Decree n° 57-9 (10 January 1957) www.legislation-securite.tn/fr/node/27829 accessed 4 December 
2015.  
650 The permanent military Tribunal of Tunis (covering the governorates of Tunis-Ariana-Manouba-
Ben Arous-Bizerte -Nabeul- Zaghouan-Sousse-Monastir); the permanent military tribunal of Le Kef 
(covers the governorates of Kef- Jendouba- Beja- Siliana-Kasserine- Kairouan) and the permanent 
military tribunal of Sfax (covers the governorates of Sfax- Mehdia- Sidi Bouzid-Gabes- Médenine-
Tataouine-Tozeur- Gafsa- Kebili).  
651 Code of Military Justice (10 January 1957), article 1.  
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The military courts have jurisdiction over military offenses, offenses committed 
against the army, and offenses against the ordinary law when they are committed by 
military personnel against other military personnel either in-service or when off-
duty.652 The jurisdiction ratione personae of the military courts covers officers of the 
army and several other classes of military personnel, as well as civilians alleged to 
have committed or participated in offenses in military barracks, or to have 
committed defamation against the army.653 According to this classification, the 
competence ratione personae of the military courts includes members of the internal 
security forces that constitute ‘a civil armed force’ under the control of the Ministry 
of the Interior, including the agents of the National Security organization and of the 
National Police.654 Under article 22 of Law 70 of August 1982 regulating the Basic 
Status of Internal Security Forces ‘cases involving agents of the internal security 
forces for their conduct during the exercise of their duty and linked to internal or 
external state security, or to the protection of public order [...] during public 
meetings, processions, marches, demonstrations, and gatherings, must be transferred 
to the competent military courts.’  
[…] 
In July 2011, six months after the ouster of Ben Ali, the interim government issued 
two decree laws, number 69 of July 29, 2011, amending the military justice code, 
and number 70 of July 29, 2011, on the organization of military justice and the 
statute of military judges.  
These reforms had four main objectives, according to the military prosecutor:655  
1.  To reinforce the independence of military justice from the executive. The 
previous law gave the ministry of defense wide powers in procedural matters. 
The commencement of criminal proceedings in the military courts required 
the approval of the minister of defense.656 The minister also had authority to 
order the suspension of the execution of any sentence imposed by a military 
tribunal.657 The new decree laws abolished both these powers.  
2. To increase the presence of civil judges in military courts. Decree law 
number 69 requires the president of the tribunal and the presidents of sections 
to be judges from the civilian courts.658 
3. To establish a double degree of jurisdiction through the creation of a military 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
652 ibid, article 5.  
653 ibid, article 8. Article 91 of the Code of Military Justice stipulates that it “is punishable with three 
months to three years imprisonment anyone, military or civilian who commits in public and by words, 
gestures, writings, drawings, photography or films, outrages against the flag or the army, offenses 
against the dignity, the reputation or the moral of the army, or acts undermining military discipline, 
obedience and due respect to superiors or criticizes the action of military hierarchy or the military 
officers which offends their dignity.”  
654 The statute of Interior Security Forces (6 August 1982) Law no. 82-70, arts. 22, 4. 
655 Human Rights Watch interview with Colonel Marouane Bouguerra, General military prosecutor, 
October 2011.  
656 Code of Military Justice (10 January 1957) arts. 15,21. 
657 ibid, article 44. 
658 Modifying and completing the military justice code (29 July 2011), article 10. 
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appeals court; and to lengthen the time limit for appealing a decision to the 
cassation court, harmonizing it with the 10 day deadline for filing that applies 
to decisions rendered by the civilian judiciary.   
4. To ensure access of victims to military justice. The original Code of Military 
Justice  did not allow parties to join a case before military courts as parties 
civiles.659  Decree law 69 changed this. Its article 7 provides the ‘constitution 
of civil parties and the rules and procedures set up in the criminal procedure 
code.’ The code of criminal procedure allows launching of civil actions are 
allowed before military justice in conformity with the procedure allows ‘all 
those who have personally suffered a harm as a direct result of the offense’ to 
bring an action. In addition, victims now have the right to make claims for 
reparation under the criminal procedure code.”  
Libya 
Libya’s Prosecutor General initiates investigations and enforces arrests. However, 
“the emergence of a parallel judicial system in which independent armed groups 
[assume] state functions, arresting, detaining and kidnapping individuals without 
judicial oversight or accountability,” has complicated the process of prosecution.660 
The excerpts below from a report by the International Crisis Group help explain the 
current situation with regards to the process of prosecution in Libya. 
“The first trials against Qadhafi-era officials occurred in mid-2012, in either ordinary 
criminal courts or their military counterparts […] the state referred non-military 
former regime officials in its custody to the ordinary criminal justice system.”661  
“Libya has a four-tier judicial system. At the bottom are district courts (mahakim 
juziya), with a single judge and jurisdiction over commercial and civil cases valued 
less than 1,000 Libyan dinars ($750), as well as over certain family law cases; above 
these, are courts of first instance (mahakim ibtidaiya) that function both as an 
appellate court for the district tribunals and as the initial court for all other civil, 
commercial and family cases; further up the chain are appeals courts (mahakim al-
istinaf) that also function as the initial tribunal for criminal and administrative cases. 
The Supreme Court (al-mahkama al-ulya) serves as a constitutional court and a court 
of cassation, deciding appeals of civil, commercial, criminal, administrative and 
family cases.”662  
“[R]evolutionary brigades – and, at times, criminal gangs posing as such – have been 
operating above the law, hindering the work of investigators and judges. They all at 
once assume the roles of police, prosecutors, judges and jailers. Armed brigades 
create investigation and arrest units; draft lists of wanted individuals; set up 
checkpoints or force their way into people’s homes to capture pre- sumed outlaws or 
people suspected of aiding the former regime; and, in some cases, run their own 
detention facilities in their own headquarters, isolated farms or commandeered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
659 Code of Military Justice (10 January 1957), article 7.  
660 International Crisis Group, ‘Trial By Error: Justice in Post-Qadhafi Libya’ (April 2013) 18. 
661 ibid, 34. 
662 ibid, 16. 
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former state buildings.”663  
“Hundreds of armed groups that emerged victorious and refused to lay down their 
arms after the regime’s fall still function as parallel police forces, at times working 
against state interests. Although some armed groups nominally fall under the 
authority of a civilian or military prosecutor’s office – depending on whether they 
have been recognised by the interior or defence ministry – they tend to act both 
independently and arbitrarily. Such bodies for the most part also lack investigative 
capacity, and their members have never undergone formal police or legal training. 
Having compiled lists of ‘wanted’ individuals – without reference to any judicial 
procedure – they have carried out arbitrary arrests, kidnappings and killings of 
alleged ‘anti-revolutionary’ figures well after the end of hostilities. Indeed, more 
than 7,000 people captured by so-called revolutionary brigades during and after the 
2011 conflict remain in arbitrary detention, for the most part in makeshift 
prisons.”664 
Yemen 
The following excerpts from Yemen’s Code of Criminal Procedures outline the 
process of prosecution in Yemen as well as the role of the General Prosecution:665   
Article 21: The General Prosecution has the jurisdiction over the initiation, 
presentation and implementation in the Court. Such indictment may not be filed by 
any others except in the cases stipulated in the Law. 
Article 22: The General Prosecution is not permitted to suspend a criminal 
indictment, or to abandon it, or to interfere in its proceedings, or to rescind it or the 
ruling issued regarding it, or the suspension of its execution or implementation 
except in the cases stipulated by the Law.  
Article 23: The General Prosecutor himself or through any members of the General 
Prosecutor shall proceed with carrying out charges in accordance with the provisions 
of the Law.  
Article 24: The victim, the claimant of a personal entitlement or a right, the claimant 
for a civil right is an associate joint litigant with the prosecution in the criminal 
lawsuit and a litigant in the civil indictment associated with it, if he has any claims 
thereto. The person liable for the civil rights or entitlements shall be considered as a 
joint litigant of the accused in the criminal lawsuit and the civil indictment 
associated with it, if he is entered into or he interfered in it, even though no claims 
are presented to him accordingly.  
 
Article 26: Criminal lawsuit may not be filed against a Judicial Enforcement Officer 
or a Public Employee for a crime any of them committed while carrying out his job 
or due to the latter, except with the permission of the General Prosecutor, or anyone 
delegated for this among the Public Attorneys, or the Heads of the Prosecution. The 
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permission must be issued in the cases involving blood retribution or organic 
retribution or financial compensation, or in the cases involving libel if the victim 
presented a complaint and persisted on it.  
 
Article 27: The General Prosecution may not file charges before the Court except 
when it is based on complaint filed by the victim or anyone acting legally on his 
behalf in the following situations: 
1. In libel, insults and disclosure of personal secrets, or in the case of insults, 
threats, in words and in deed, or cause of simple bodily harm, unless the crime 
occurred to one entrusted with a public servant, during the execution of his duties 
accordingly or due to such execution.  
2. In those crimes occurring on properties between the direct line relatives, 
the branches thereof, the spouses or the sisters and brothers.  
3. Crimes involving checks.  
4. In the crimes involving destruction, distortion, damage of private 
property, or the killing of animals without justification, or unintentional 
fires, or the violation of the sanctity of the property of others, as well as 
the situations specified by Law.  
 
Article 28: If the victims of a particular crime are multiple, it is sufficient to have a 
complaint presented by one of them; if the accused are multiple member; the 
complaint is filed against only one of them, it shall be considered as being presented 
against all of them in legitimizing the investigation of the Prosecution with them.  
 
Article 29: The right to complain terminates in accordance with the provisions of 
Article 27 after the passage of four months from the date of the victim becoming 
aware of the crime, or of it being committed, or the removal of the compulsory 
excuse which prevented the presentation of a complaint; the right to complain 
collapses with the death of the victim of the crime.  
 
Article 30: In all cases, the Law requires that a criminal indictment be filed based on 
the presentation of a complaint, no investigation may take place in such a case until 
the complaint has been presented. 
 
Article 31: Whoever has the right to present a complaint in the cases indicated in 
Article 27 may withdraw it at any time.  
Article 32: If the Elementary Court sees in the charges presented to it that there are 
suspects other than those on whom the charges are being filed against, or that there 
are other events or facts that are not implicated on them, or that there is a crime that 
is linked to the accusation presented before the Court, then the Court may refer the 
case to the Prosecution for investigation and to deal with it in accordance with Part 
Three of Volume TWO of this Law.  
If a decision is issued to refer charges to another court, the Court may refer it to 
another Court; if the Court does not act decisively in dealing with the original 
indictment; it is linked with the new indictment, in a manner that makes their 
separation unacceptable, the whole case may be then referred to another court.  
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Article 33: The Appeals Court, when reviewing an appeal, has the same authority 
stipulated in the previous article; the referral, in this case may be to the another 
Primary Court other than the Court which issued the ruling being appealed. In all 
cases such transfer shall take place through a decision of the Chairman of the Court 
in accordance with the Law.  
Article 34: The concerned bench which is reviewing a case based on an appeal for 
the second time in the Supreme Court has the same authorities as outlined in the 
previous two articles. 
Article 35: The Court has the right, while reviewing a case, if any acts occur which 
violate its orders, or the respect which it shall be accorded; there is attempt to 
influence in its judicial decisions, or the witnesses before it with respect to charges 
under its review to file a criminal lawsuit against the accused in accordance with 
Articles 32 and 33; to issue its verdict thereof.  
Article 84: The Judicial Enforcement Officers are considered, in the areas of their 
jurisdiction, to be the following officials: 
 
First: The members of the General Prosecution; 
Second: The Governors [of the Governorates];  
Third: The General Security Managers; 
 
Fourth: The District Administrators 
 
Fifth: The Police and Security Officers; 
 
Sixth: The Guards Supervisors, the Police Precinct Supervisors, the Police 
Checkpoint Supervisors, and otherwise whoever is delegated to take on the 
role of Judicial Enforcement Officers;  
Seventh: The Village “Elders”; 
 
Eighth: The Air and Sea Craft Captains; 
 
Ninth: All [Government] employees who are delegated as Judicial 
Enforcement Officers in accordance with this Law; 
 
Tenth: Any other entity assigned to take on the role of Judicial Enforcement 
in accordance with the Law. 
 
Article 85: The Judicial Enforcement Officers shall report to the General Prosecutor 
and subject to his supervision within the jurisdictions for Judicial Enforcement. 
The General Prosecutor may request the concerned relevant entity to look into 
anyone for whom there could be a violation or deficiency in carrying out of his 
duties; he may file disciplinary lawsuit, all of this shall not prevent filing criminal 
charges. 
Article 86: If the General Prosecutor felt that a Judicial Enforcement Officer 
committed a severe error, or that the penalty ruled to him is insufficient, and also if 
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the concerned entity did not respond to the request for looking into Judicial 
Enforcement Officers, the case maybe taken up to the Appeals Court to consider 
removing the Judicial Enforcement status from the relevant official; all of this does 
not prevent the filing of criminal lawsuit. This Court may also take on a case at its 
own discretion or based on the request of the Chairman whether a case that is 
presented to it is appropriate, and shall look into the case of removing the Judicial 
Enforcement status in the situations cited in the previous article. 
Article 91: The Judicial Enforcement Officers are assigned to investigate crimes and 
to chase after those who commit them; to examine all reports and complaints and the 
gathering of evidence and information relevant to them and to record them in the 
Minutes [Report] which shall be sent to the General Prosecution.  
Article 92: If the Judicial Enforcement Officer is notified or becomes aware of a 
crime occurrence of a severe nature, or is of those so specifically designated by the 
General Prosecutor by a decree from him, he must inform the General Prosecution 
and immediately move to the crime scene to safeguard it and to arrest all that is 
relevant to the crime and to carry out all the necessary examinations; in general, he 
shall take all the necessary measures to safeguard the evidence of the crime and 
whatever will facilitate the investigation thereof, listen to all the statements from 
anyone having any information on any crimes that occur and to interrogate the 
suspects about them.  
He must also record all this in the Minutes [Report] of Investigations and Collection 
of Evidence, which he shall sign along with the witnesses he listened to and the 
experts whose help he sought. He shall have no right to put the witnesses and experts 
under oath, unless he is concerned that it will be impossible to get the testimony 
under oath after this testimony. All these report shall be submitted to the members of 
the General Prosecution upon his presence. In the other crimes the Minutes [Report] 
of investigation and collection of evidence which are carried out by the Judicial 
Enforcement Officers in accordance with what is stated above, shall be duly sent by 
them to the General Prosecution to take the appropriate measures.  
Article 93: The member of the General Prosecution, upon receipt of the Minutes 
[Report] of Investigation and Collection of Evidence or upon the presentation of the 
Minutes [Report] for his review must ensure the fulfillment of these report to the 
requirements thereof prior to any further action being taken; he shall return it to its 
source of origin for completion, or designate someone to complete or completing 
them or he shall complete them by himself.  
Article 94: Anyone who is aware of the occurrence of a crime which fall under those 
crimes which the General Prosecution may file charges for, without having to wait 
for a complaint or permission, shall inform the General Prosecution immediately or 
the nearest Judicial Enforcement Officers.  
Article 95: Any general public employee, or those appointed for public service, who 
comes to learn, while performing their duties, or as a result thereof of the occurrence 
of a crime, which fall under those crimes which the General Prosecution may file 
charges for, without having to wait for a complaint or permission, shall inform the 
General Prosecution immediately or the nearest Judicial Enforcement Officers.  
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Article 96: If a member of the General Prosecution and a Judicial Enforcement 
Officer meets at the scene of a crime, the member of the General Prosecution shall 
carry on the tasks of the Judicial Enforcement Officer; if any of the Judicial 
Enforcement Officers has already commenced work, the member of the General 
Prosecution may investigate by himself or to order the completion thereof directly.  
Article 109: The General Prosecution is the sole authority that handles charges 
based on the Minutes [Report] For the Collection of Evidence in accordance with the 
following provisions: 
Article 110: f the General Prosecution felt that the Minutes [Report] For the 
Collection of Evidence involves a serious crime, then the criminal lawsuits shall not 
be filed until it has investigated it.  
Article 111: If the General Prosecution felt that the case is ready for presentation 
based on the Minutes [Report] For the Collection of Evidence, which entails the 
occurrence of a non-serious crime, then the suspect is ordered to attend directly to 
the Court of appropriate jurisdiction.  
Article 112: If the General Prosecution feels that there is no scope for bringing 
charges to a case, it shall issue an order with cause, to file the papers temporarily 
with the continuation of the careful checking if the perpetrator is unknown or that the 
evidence against him is inadequate, or to order the final filing of the papers, if the 
incident did not constitute a crime, or is insignificant. The decision for filing due to 
non- significance shall only be issued by the General Prosecutor or anyone 
designated by him to this end.  
Article 113: If the General Prosecution issued an order to file a case, it shall notify 
this to the victim of the crime claiming civil rights. If any of them dies, the notice 
shall be given to his heirs, in total, at his place of residence. Each of those mentioned 
has the right to appeal a decision to file a case in the court of appropriate jurisdiction 
within 5 days of the date of the notification thereof.  
Article 114: The General Prosecution may cancel its decision to file a case if the 
period set for not hearing a criminal indictment cited in Article 38 of this Law has 
not expired.  
Article 115: The jurisdiction of the General Prosecution is limited to the 
investigation of crimes occurring within the jurisdictions of the Court under which it 
carries out its work. 
Article 116: The General Prosecution has the authority to investigate and prosecute 
and all the authorities and responsibilities set by the Law; he may directly exercise 
the authority to investigate himself or through any member of the General 
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